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Introduction
Resistance and the liberal peace: a missing link
There is no conflict between communities here. (Administrative Local Authority 
2014; Association Paix et Concorde (APC) Representative (no. 180) 2014; DDRRR 
Officer 2014)
The demobilisation programmes cannot achieve success because they are not tack-
ling the real causes of  conflict. The armed groups have the government as their main 
target and they are largely supported by the civilian population. (DDRRR Officer 
2014)
The problems we face now sparked with the Rwandan genocide, although some 
come from before; but they continue because we need a political negotiation, a land 
reform, jobs and a real democracy where people can participate and not just be put 
in jail. (Union Paysanne pour le Développement Intégral Representative 2014)
These statements reflect some important sentiments of  those who have experienced war in the Democratic Republic of  Congo (DRC) and the Great Lakes since the 1990s.1 They imply an interpretation of  the conflict 
as stemming from several overlapping economic and political issues that cannot 
be reduced to a military issue, a problem of  state failure or a problem of  identity 
among the different ethnic groups in the country. Embedded in them is a criti-
cism both of  the actors of  the conflict and of  those who are involved in the 
peacebuilding process. They therefore evoke the different forms of  resistance 
against lack of  progress to solve the political and economic issues that underpin 
the conflict. An analysis of  these forms of  resistance allows understanding of  
that experience, the conflict and the process of  peacebuilding.
Building peace is a political process where the distribution of  political and 
economic goods, including decision-making power, privileges, rights and access 
to material resources, is established. This process both continues and changes 
the distributing mechanisms that were in place before the conflict started. Peace-
building is therefore a process that is constituted and resisted by the multiple 
actors involved. However, it has been studied much more as an instrument of  
power and order than as a process that is resisted.
2
Everyday resistance, peacebuilding and state-making
The liberal peace debates have produced a body of  critical research that has 
analysed the theory and practice of  contemporary peace interventions from dif-
ferent positions. These debates have questioned the paradigm of  the liberal peace, 
inquiring about how liberal and how successful these interventions are. The 
paradigm of  the liberal peace has served to identify the consensus on the ration-
ale and goals of  these interventions since the 1990s. This consensus revolves 
around the idea that ‘democracy, the rule of  law and market economics would 
create sustainable peace in post-conflict and transitional states and societies, and 
in the larger international order that they were a part of ’ (Campbell, Chandler, 
and Sabaratnam 2011: 1). From different critical perspectives, peacebuilding 
has been seen as a Western-driven strategy that fundamentally serves Western 
interests, whether as a form of  control, discipline, extraction, or even as a new 
form of  imperialism (Chandler 2006; Duffield 2007, esp. Ch. 7 and 8; Richmond 
2010, 2011a). For Vivienne Jabri (2007), peacebuilding signals a much deeper 
transformation of  the nature of  war and the maintenance of  international order 
where war and peace have an intimate and co-constitutive relationship.
Yet, without an account of  resistance, the critique of  peacebuilding risks 
distorting the power and commitment these interventions have to achieve such 
aims. Resistance has been present all along in peace and conflict studies but it 
has not been until recently, in the context of  the liberal peace debates, that resist-
ance has been developed more systematically (Falk 1995; Manning 2003; 
Newman and Richmond 2006; Stedman 1997). In fact, the liberal peace debates 
have experienced what could be termed as a turn to resistance. In the attempt to 
offer a more nuanced account of  peacebuilding, resistance has been made 
central to the critique of  the liberal peace. Over the decade since 2006, different 
works have offered a more sustained theorisation of  resistance in this context 
(Keranen 2013; Mac Ginty 2006, 2008, 2011, 2012; Mitchell 2011a; Newman 
and Richmond 2006; Richmond 2009a, 2011a, 2011b, 2012; Richmond and 
Mitchell 2012a; Zanotti 2006). They have argued that international peacebuild-
ing is a complex process that local societies shape and oppose with multiple 
strategies. They have questioned the categories of  the international and local 
created in policy and scholarly research. What has changed is, firstly, that study-
ing resistance has come to serve a critical normative agenda about what peace-
building is and/or should be; secondly, it has opened the scope to study a vast 
array of  forms of  resistance, including unorganised and even individual forms 
of  non-compliance; thirdly, it has challenged an early view of  peacebuilders as 
overpowering actors and societies undergoing peacebuilding as powerless or 
passive recipients; finally, it has contributed to the politicisation of  the interven-
tions. As a result, not only has the power exercised by these interventions been 
contextualised and examined more thoroughly, exploring the political nature of  
the aims of  these interventions; they have also contributed to exploring the 
political aims and alternatives of  intervened societies.
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However, most problematically, this turn has generated a vague account of  
resistance and has ended up missing it by focusing on hybridity instead. Several 
other problems are connected to this. The locus of  resistance has been placed on 
an international–local contention, and not only has this reified the binaries that 
were meant to be surpassed, but the ‘locals’ have been depoliticised by locating 
their agency of  resistance in a vague account of  local culture, rather than in 
power relations along class, gender and race lines. Culture is a source of  resist-
ance, but it has to be explained and linked to the material and symbolic under-
pinnings of  power relations. Additionally, despite this turn being underpinned 
by everyday theorists such as Michel de Certeau and James Scott, much of  this 
framework remains under-theorised.
This book takes these issues as its starting point. It locates resistance in the 
experiences of  war, peacebuilding and state-making and critically applies the 
work of  James Scott and Michel de Certeau. It defines resistance as the pattern 
of  acts by individuals and collectives in a position of  subordination against the 
everyday experience of  domination. What is resisted is not the fact that interven-
tions are liberal or externally driven but the reproduction of  a coercive and 
extractive order through war and through the process of  reconstituting state 
authority. The aim of  this book is not only to highlight how contested peace-
building processes are, but also to examine the practices that constitute, chal-
lenge and subvert them. This approach to resistance implies a sociological 
approach to peacebuilding and entails focusing on the practices of  coercion and 
extraction that are embedded in the practices of  state-making. With this, the 
book highlights the myriad of  contradictory projects and actors that are involved 
in such a task. It also theorises peacebuilding within the continuum of  practices 
of  assertion of  state authority that constitute the backbone of  peacebuilding.
The book explores these dynamics through the case of  ‘Africa’s World War’. 
The concept of  ‘Africa’s World War’ or, more specifically, ‘Africa’s first World 
War’2 has been applied to the conflict that took place between 1998 and 2003 
in the Democratic Republic of  Congo (DRC). Although the book retains a focus 
on the DRC, following Gerard Prunier (2009) it uses the concept of  ‘Africa’s 
World War’ to emphasise the transformative nature of  a series of  conflicts that 
took place in the mid-1990s in the central and Great Lakes regions, and that 
have to do with historical, global, regional and local factors. The examination 
of  resistance in this case allows for the politicisation of  the conflict and the 
players involved, looking at the role that popular classes’ rejection of  historical 
conditions of  domination has played in the outbreak and continuation of  the 
conflicts until today. This is also a case whose complexity allows for a deep 
insight into one of  the longest and largest peacebuilding interventions in the 
post-Cold War period, with the participation of  multiple international and 
regional organisations, sometimes, as in the case of  the European Union (EU), 
for the first time in their history. The focus on resistance, as previously suggested, 
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also aims to offer a deeper examination of  the conflict itself. This deeper analysis 
entails moving away from simple explanations of  the conflict as stemming from 
state failure, greed or identity. Its goal is to grasp the overlapping issues in histori-
cal perspective, to connect transversal issues at the global, regional and national/
local levels. This chapter offers an overview of  the main arguments of  the book 
and of  the chapters that follow.
Hybridity and the functional focus on resistance
As previously mentioned, the attention to resistance has ultimately served to 
account for how hybridity comes about. Resistance produces hybridity, although 
hybridity is also an outcome of  the practical challenges and innumerable clashes 
that are present in any war and post-war context. Hybridity refers to the complex 
interactions and mutual transformations between interveners and local socie-
ties, identifying how the liberal peace is not entirely successful in imposing its 
agenda (Belloni 2012; Mac Ginty 2010, 2011; Richmond 2009b). The conclu-
sions from Anna Jarstad and Roberto Belloni’s edited volume on hybrid govern-
ance summarise the main contentions of  the hybridity debates: hybridity already 
exists from previous international–local interactions; there are a mixture of  
informal and formal mechanisms; and a hybrid peace may well reinforce vio-
lence and oppression, but has the potential to offer peace processes stability and 
legitimacy (Jarstad and Belloni 2012: 4).
For Belloni (2012), hybrid peace governance grasps the fact that peace pro-
cesses feature a series of  liberal, illiberal, international, local, formal, informal, 
war and peace elements. Hybridity is therefore an analytical alternative to the 
liberal peace. But beyond its analytical purchase, hybrid peace governance also 
implies for Belloni a rejection of  the universal value and applicability of  the 
liberal peace, a rejection of  the ‘patronizing top-down approach’ and an alterna-
tive to ‘Western social engineering and paternalism’ (Belloni 2012: 34). Hybrid-
ity is therefore not just an outcome but also a means to make the international 
agenda work and actually constitutive of  peacebuilding (Belloni 2012; Martin-
Ortega and Herman 2012; Richmond and Mitchell 2012b; Sriram 2012). Sub-
sequent developments of  hybridity have increasingly theorised such dynamics, 
though under other terms, for instance ‘friction’ or ‘heterotopias’ (Björkdahl and 
Höglund 2013; van Leeuwen, Verkoren, and Boedeltje 2012).
Not only has resistance played a secondary and subservient role to hybridity, 
but the hybridity framework also has several shortcomings. Chandler and 
Nadarajah and Rampton identify that one of  the pivotal claims of  the turn to 
hybridity is that peacebuilding could be legitimate if  it operated from the bottom 
up, considering local customs and culture (Chandler 2010b; Nadarajah and 
Rampton 2015). With this, hybridity offers a way into the liberal peace and not 
away from it. The hybridity framework also suffers from a certain presentism 
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that disregards the historical constitution of  subjects and power relations. When 
studying resistance in processes linked to the constitution and transformation 
of  political, economic and social institutions, it has to be understood and studied 
as a political category forged historically. Even if  the targets of  resistance are 
‘international’ actors or international institutions, resistance cannot be delinked 
from the historicity of  class and patterns in relations of  domination. As Nadara-
jah and Rampton put it:
Through a selective engagement with hybridity that neglects the multilectical char-
acter of  hybridisation and the longue dureé timeframe through which hybridity mani-
fests, and instead concentrating on the contemporary dynamics in a presentist 
fashion, the hybrid peace approach fails to take seriously the historical co-constitution 
of  the international, national, and local and the relations of  power that connect 
these in both peace and conflict. (2015: 50–1)
Examining resistance from the perspective of  Michel de Certeau and James 
Scott entails looking at the patterns in power relations. Contrary to what the 
hybridity debates suggest, where there could be an end point where legitimacy 
is achieved, for Certeau and Scott, relations of  domination can never be legiti-
mate as such. Power relations are a constant struggle where legitimacy and 
obedience are always limited and government requires repression. This approach 
has the capacity to achieve the aims of  politicising, disaggregating, historicising 
and problematising peacebuilding beyond hybridity.
Resistance in the hybridity literature
The works that have more consistently looked at resistance are evidence that the 
theorisation of  resistance has played a secondary role to that of  hybridity. For 
Oliver Richmond, ‘[r]esistance to the liberal peace in post-colonial terms implies 
a hybrid form of  peace with its own transformative qualities, which are resistant 
to exclusion’ (2012a: 197). Resistance is a form of  local everyday agency that 
hybridises the liberal peace. Thus portrayed, this agency is vague in terms of  
identifying the subjects that carry it out and limited in its critique of  the liberal 
peace, since this agency has the ability to tame the oppressive elements of  the 
liberal peace and realise its emancipatory potential (Richmond 2011a: 241–2). 
Roger Mac Ginty’s International Peacebuilding and Local Resistance does not offer 
a framework of  resistance because resistance is part of  the four-tiered frame-
work of  hybridity which includes ‘the coercive power of  the liberal peace, the 
incentivising power of  the liberal peace, the ability of  local actors to resist the 
liberal peace, and the ability of  local actors to provide alternatives to the liberal 
peace’ (2011: 92). Resistance is broadly defined as ‘the ability of  local actors, 
networks, and structures to resist, ignore, subvert, and adapt liberal peace inter-
ventions’ (Mac Ginty 2011: 78). Yet too many questions remain open. For Mac 
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Ginty, resistance can be elite or non-elite driven, conscious or unconscious, and 
it can be both an engagement against and a disengagement from peacebuilding 
(2011: 6, 10–11, 72–3, 84–5). Audra Mitchell (2011a) has offered one of  the 
most sophisticated applications of  Michel de Certeau in peacebuilding contexts, 
and although resistance is not the main focus, she offers some clues about it. For 
her, ‘both the “powerful” and the “weak” are the subjects and objects of  resist-
ance’ and, as such, resistance ‘is a mutual dynamic in which all parties feel 
capable of  (at least to some degree) controlling, shaping or intervening in the 
acts, powers or logics that shape their lives’ (Mitchell 2011a: 31). What Mitchell 
wants to capture is that peacebuilding is a process defined by conflict and trans-
formation. Yet, from her account, what, if  anything, distinguishes resistance 
from agency and power politics, and resistance of  the ‘powerful’ from resistance 
of  the ‘weak’ is left unexplained.
In an edited volume by Richmond and Mitchell (2012a), resistance is the 
driving force to again focus on hybridity. According to the editors, everyday 
agency is the site of  hybridisation of  liberal peace. It is the site of  the encounter 
of  international and local agencies which accept, co-opt and resist each other, 
giving way to mutual transformations of  both the liberal agenda and local envi-
ronments (Richmond and Mitchell 2012b). They outline their two approaches 
to the everyday: post-colonial (Richmond) and sociological (Mitchell) – the latter 
with a subdivision between post-Marxist and post-modern approaches. For Rich-
mond and Mitchell locals are ‘indigenous actors’ and, although material ine-
qualities need to be taken into account, resistance cannot be seen ‘as the agency 
of  the powerless against the powerful, in which the latter are irresistible for the 
former’ (2012b: 26). Instead, echoing Mitchell’s previous works, ‘many ways of  
resisting should be viewed as a shared dynamic, or as a reflexive tension, in 
which all actors are simultaneously objects and subjects of  change and must 
negotiate, shape or help to determine the nature of  this change’ (Richmond and 
Mitchell 2012b: 26). Although they are right in pointing out that resistance is 
not an exclusive domain of  the powerless, it seems that resistance may have 
different connotations and implications, when it is done in the realm of  govern-
ment against international donors, to the resistance peasants may offer against 
certain economic agreements affecting land distribution.
Even so, Richmond’s and Mitchell’s volume is one of  the few that looks 
consistently at resistance. However, although the editors offer an overall theo-
retical framework that draws on Michel de Certeau, the chapters discuss too 
wide a range of  ‘tactics’ to be able to systematically link them to Certeau, and 
in fact only few of  them explicitly refer to him or offer a definition of  what resist-
ance is. One of  the exceptions is that of  Alison Watson for whom ‘the smallest 
act of  everyday resistance may represent the challenge to what is perceived to 
be the accepted boundaries of  political behaviour’ (2012: 42). Another is the 
chapter by Liam Kelly and Audra Mitchell, who, drawing on Michel de Certeau, 
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see peace building as ‘“strategies” – that is, comprehensive, rationalizing logics 
of  power that control and shape their external environment’ (2012: 278). These 
strategies and the logics that constitute them are subverted and contested by 
‘conflictual acts’ which include graffiti painting, rioting, the building of  walls 
and flying of  flags, the display of  emblems or doing damage to security cameras. 
The chapters in Richmond and Mitchell’s volume thoroughly and with empirical 
data show actions that reject, refuse, transform, question, contest or ignore the 
actions of  the liberal peace, but without explaining the difference and relation-
ship between these actions, especially when they can be individual, collective, 
conscious, unconscious, ideologically or not ideologically driven, self-interested 
and selfless acts. Thus it is unclear how, for example, the act of  mothering 
(Watson) relates to the armed Meekamui movement in Bougainville (Boege 
2012). Beyond the identification of  ‘local’ actors, it is also unclear who the 
subject of  resistance is. Roland Bleiker’s point in the conclusion to the volume, 
that resistance is not about hostility but about how resistance shapes hybridity, 
demonstrates that resistance in this volume is a means to theorise hybridity, and 
many things remain to be known about resistance (2012: 296).
There have been other approaches which have not relied on the everyday 
framework to account for resistance but where hybridity gives the rationale for 
analysing resistance (Keranen 2013; Zanotti 2011). They have focused on 
examining actions that the political elite in societies have taken against interna-
tional actors. Zanotti makes an important critique of  the theorisation of  resist-
ance. From a Foucauldian perspective, Zanotti offers a critical exploration of  the 
interconnections, struggles, mutual manipulations and accommodations of  
international power and local resistance in the context of  United Nations (UN) 
peace interventions. With Foucault, power is observed in the practices of  gov-
ernmentality, biopolitics and carceralization that are deployed through the pro-
motion of  democracy, legal reforms, advice, methods of  increasing legibility, 
disciplinarity and monitoring the application of  political, economic and social 
reforms. This is complemented with a Marxist perspective regarding uneven 
distributions of  power and the key role of  material and economic conditions in 
political life. Resistance in this framework is defined as agonistic, that is, as 
inscribed within subjects’ power relations, as ‘a transformative action’ (Zanotti 
2011: 10). Zanotti’s aim is to not totalise power or to romanticise resistance, 
and the conclusion is that peacebuilding interventions are not all successful in 
imposing their aims and resistance is not a full-on emancipatory enterprise. 
They are ‘hybrid’ and ‘ambiguous’ (2011: 134 and 136).
Yet, in carving her contribution, the argument is put against normative 
extremes. Zanotti’s conclusion that ‘[n]o overarching malignant trait is associ-
ated with international normalizing “power” or liberatory quality with local 
“resistance”’ does not seem to represent the reality of  the literature or of  the 
actors in the interventions (2011: 11). Duffield and Hardt and Negri, discussed 
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as representatives of  the ‘demonization of  interventions and the romantisation 
of  the resistance’, raise many caveats that take Zanotti’s concerns into account 
(2011: 11). Duffield (2001, 2007) identifies sites of  resistance with a wide range 
of  confrontations, boycotts, sabotages and violence that go from the tacit refusal 
to apply World Bank policies to actions by the Taliban government. While Duf-
field is vague in his conceptualisation of  resistance, he notes the ambiguities 
therein. Similarly, Hardt and Negri also discuss resistance strategies and strug-
gles that have failed, ended in even more exploitative regimes or been narrowly 
conceived (2001, Ch. 1.3 and 3.3). Their point (made from a political theory 
approach) is the capacity of  these struggles to reproduce in ways that can bring 
about change (Hardt and Negri 2001, Part 4). Whether that change looks eman-
cipatory is another matter, for resistance cannot be studied as a struggle of  the 
good against the bad or vice versa. Focusing on everyday acts of  resistance 
facilitates distancing from an overarching tale of  liberation while understanding 
the many quotidian ways in which domination is mitigated.
What hybridity has missed
The main problems with these accounts are that the three core elements of  
resistance regarding the subjects, object and means of  resistance have remained 
ambiguous. ‘Who’ is the subject of  resistance has been seen as an undefined 
‘local’. ‘What’ is the object of  resistance has been theorised as ‘the liberal peace’, 
whereas the extent to which these interventions follow liberal values or locals 
reject liberal values is questionable. ‘How’ resistance is undertaken has been 
seen as hidden and ungraspable without due explanation. This has resulted in 
a vague account of  resistance, in a drift away from the original framework of  
everyday resistance and in a limited politicisation of  peace operations.
As seen, the local seems to identify the bulk of  the targeted ‘indigenous’ 
society undergoing peacebuilding. For Oliver Richmond, who has gone further 
in theorising the local, it has diverse meanings and grasps the different intersect-
ing relations from within society, between the interveners and societies, and the 
processes of  hybridisation amongst them (2011a: 13–14). The local can signify 
the space where interventions take place, an internationally defined subject, or 
a pre-existing subject. Yet none of  these meanings offers the basis for an account 
of  resistance as an act of  subjects in a socioeconomic hierarchy. Rather, these 
agencies and subjects are representatives of  a shared culture that is threatened 
by the illegitimate aspects of  the liberal peace. Resistance in peace and conflict 
studies has not offered an analysis of  the genesis of  agency beyond the view that 
locals reject international agendas. Class, gender, race and other sources of  
domination are referred to but they are not treated as structures, relations or 
practices of  domination before, during and after peacebuilding, impacting the 
object, subjects and means of  resistance. They have been evacuated and replaced 
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by a notion of  the local that seems to be simultaneously power and resistance, 
oppressor and oppressed. The idea of  a hybrid alternative is seen as a mutually 
beneficial outcome where the critical aspects of  the analysis of  resistance are 
reduced to a question of  legitimacy, whereas, as previously stated, resistance 
reveals that legitimacy is contingent and changing.
The object of  resistance has been seen as the liberal peace, producing a false 
division between the international as liberal and the locals as illiberal. What 
exactly is being resisted beyond an artificial ideological divide needs to be estab-
lished. The areas of  resistance this book focuses on show that such an ideological 
divide does not exist. The UN missions in the DRC have presented elements of  
authoritarianism; for example, although the set-up of  the mission was negoti-
ated at the time of  the first peace agreement in Lusaka in 1999, it will finish 
when the UN Security Council decides (MONUSCO-PNUD-OCHA 2015). Cor-
ruption and rape have not been absent from the mission (UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki-Moon 2015; Escobales 2008; Zeid Al-Hussein 2005: para. 6–13). Addi-
tionally, the modus operandi of  ‘adapting the working mechanisms to the context 
of  the country’ seems to imply that illiberal elements are part of  the approach, 
regardless of  where they come from (MONUC Political Affairs Officer (no. 7) 
2009). Similarly, democracy, representativeness and participation are demands 
that are part of  the agenda of  many peasants, armed groups and civil society 
members in the DRC. This does not show that locals are also liberal or that peace-
building processes are not liberal enough, but that presenting a conflict along 
lines clear cut like this is not a productive way to understand the politics of  any 
given war and peacebuilding context.
Liberal-ness does not define interveners or interventions at large, nor does 
illiberal-ness define intervened societies. Conceiving of  the target of  resistance 
in this way does not fully reflect the issues that are still present from war or, in 
fact, from the historical configuration of  a particular polity. Rooting resistance 
in the practices of  state-making allows us to explore relations of  domination in 
a disaggregated historical manner, taking into account the ambiguities that exist 
in these contexts. It does not mean seeing resistance as an anti-state crusade; it 
means highlighting processes of  authority assertion, violence and extraction 
linked to the practices of  state-making that can be exercised by a variety of  
actors, ranging from state agents, the military and corporations to international 
interveners.
The problems of  who resists and what is resisted are echoed in ‘the how’. 
Resistance has been conceived in the liberal peace debates as an ad hoc response 
to the actions of  the internationals rather than as part of  continuous relations 
of  oppression, of  conflicts that emerged before, during and after the war and as 
an opportunity to stage long-time aspirations in a context of  political change. 
Additionally, from the overview of  the approaches to resistance observed 
above, a dichotomy can be distinguished between the visible public and largely 
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organised resistance of  elites and the unorganised, invisible and disorganised 
resistance of  non-elites. Elaboration on what the relationship between these 
forms of  resistance and violence is or what it means for resistance to be ‘hidden’ 
and ‘ungraspable’ is lacking. For example, Richmond refers to a wide range of  
practices, from non-compliance and subsistence strategies to Ghandian and 
Latin American pro-democracy-inspired civil movements (2011a: 119 – 22). He 
characterises the nature of  this agency, and hence of  resistance, as being ‘hidden, 
fragmented, often disguised and localised’ (2011a: 13).3 The explanation is 
insufficient to equate hiddenness and disguise with non-violent resistance, while 
simultaneously exemplifying it with more organised and public forms of  mobi-
lisation. Although this is done via the social movements literature and, in par-
ticular, the work of  Alberto Melucci, how these different arguments and 
frameworks relate to an account of  resistance requires further explanation 
(Richmond 2011a: 130).
Not all authors have rejected the idea of  including violence in their frame-
work of  everyday resistance. Violence in Mac Ginty is linked to the coercive and 
violent political context of  post-conflict interventions in which violent resistance 
comes alongside other practices that range from ‘outright resistance’ to ‘forms 
of  non-compliance’ (2011: 80). The relationship between them is the capacity 
they have of  hybridising state-building, and not the link they have to an account 
of  resistance. In exploring the transformative capacity that peace processes, 
conflict and violence have, Mitchell has examined that peacebuilding and resist-
ance can take a violent form too. Acts can take many forms and can actually be 
used to advance a position of  power. What would make them acts of  resistance 
in the everyday framework is their use to deny or mitigate subordination.
The dynamics of  survival and armed resistance are illustrated in the ten-
sions around the mine of  Kamituga, a remote location of  South Kivu. The mine 
has been closed since 1996.4 Even after Banro gained a new concession and 
began explorations in 2011, the mine has not re-opened. This has not stopped 
thousands of  miners occupying the mine and extracting gold illegally, even 
at the risk of  being jailed. It is a question of  survival. Groups are formed to 
exploit a vein. Generally one is able to get a small amount of  gold some days 
per week, but it can take several years to find a vein, let alone exploit the entire 
vein. The group is formed of  diggers, porters, grinders and those who separate 
the gold from the rock. Sometimes the tasks are paid separately if  the group is 
not big enough. About 0.15 g of  gold (measured as one and a half  toothpicks) 
is worth 5,000 Congolese francs (fc), to be shared between those who have 
worked in the process. Working in the mine is a survival mechanism, not a 
way to get rich. Most of  Kamituga’s population has some form of  relationship 
with the mine, but they resent their working conditions and the little profit 
that the mine brings to those who work directly and to the town as a whole. 
This resentment builds on years of  neglect in a region that has experienced 
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large-scale conflict and continues to be threatened by the operations of  the 
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of  Rwanda (FDLR) and armed groups such 
as Nyakiriba. In this context, people from around the area have established links 
with these and other armed groups such as Raïa Mutomboki. This is paid with 
all sorts of  reciprocal agreements, such as security in return for information, 
food or refuge.
Self-reliance, critique, survival and violence are all mechanisms that resist 
the continuation of  conflict, poverty and marginal decision-making power. The 
chapters that follow show that resistance discourses displayed by peasants, 
market sellers and civil society members are shared by members of  armed 
groups. They also show that, although it is difficult to generalise, civil society 
members and the civilian population cannot be seen as separated from armed 
groups. The subsistence activities that pose a challenge to the channels of  dis-
tribution that funnel resources upwards, marginalising the vast majority of  the 
population, are a fundamental part of  everyday forms of  non-violent and violent 
resistance.
Without these elements an account of  resistance continues to be vague. 
Currently it is used alongside a plethora of  other concepts such as ‘critical 
agency’, ‘subversion’, ‘contestation’, ‘distortion’ and ‘hybridisation’ (Mac Ginty 
2011; Richmond 2011a). Other scholars have also referred to ‘reactions, resist-
ance, contestation and rejection’ (Autesserre 2014, esp. Ch. 3), ‘boycotts’, 
‘transformation and subversion’ (Mitchell 2011a: 30–32), ‘social resistance and 
unruliness’ (Hume 2011; Pugh 2011) and ‘friction’ (Björkdahl and Höglund 
2013). This signals a lack of  conceptual precision and that the focus is not on 
resistance as such; the concepts have added to a critique of  the liberal peace but 
have left the concept of  resistance too open. The result is a limited account of  
resistance that has yet to fulfil the aims of  repoliticisation, disaggregation and 
critical analysis of  peace interventions. This book aims to work in that direction, 
although it is not the final word on the matter. Resistance needs to be contextu-
alised, and there is much to be learned from the analysis of  different cases.
A reworked account of  resistance and peacebuilding applied to  
‘Africa’s World War’
The main implication that the study of  resistance has in a context of  conflict 
and peacebuilding is therefore not that the kind of  peace that comes out of  those 
processes is hybrid. As many scholars of  hybridity have pointed out, societies are 
all already hybrid. The main implication is that peacebuilding becomes part of  
the spectrum of  authority, imposing claims on the population. It engages in the 
same practices of  state-making. It is constitutive of  the process of  the assertion 
of  state authority and therefore it is not external to the practices of  coercion and 
extraction that come with it. A sociological reading of  peacebuilding as 
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state-making shows the impossibility of  disentangling the long patterns of  coer-
cion and extraction both in state–society relations and in domestic–international 
relations from how distribution of  political and economic goods is done during 
conflict and peacebuilding processes. This is not dissimilar to Vivienne Jabri’s 
insights about the co-constitutive nature of  war and peace, but it adds a histori-
cal perspective. This allows resistance to be grounded in authority claims, coer-
cive and extractive practices, all of  which have a long history, and exposes the 
long-term aspirations of  popular classes.
The methodology of  practice
This sociological view aims to take a historical and long-term approach and 
leads the book to analyse resistance and state-making as a set of  practices. Prac-
tices are understood, following Certeau and Scott, as a representation of  the 
practical ways of  dealing with the experience of  domination in everyday life, as 
well as a reflection of  millenarian practices of  subordinate classes. Practices are 
the mechanisms, informalities and improvisations that allow for certain schemes 
to be put ‘in practice’ (Scott 1998: 6). Adler and Pouliot identify five character-
istics that clearly convey this meaning. Practices: (1) are a ‘performance’, which 
is the doing or making of  something; (2) they are a ‘pattern’, constituting ‘regu-
larity of  behaviour’ and ‘the flow of  history’; (3) they are ‘socially recognisable’; 
(4) they ‘represent a skill (more than knowledge)’; and (5) they ‘weave together 
discursive and material worlds’ (2011: 6–7). In this account, practices and 
actors do not represent just a hybrid outcome but are part of  a process of  con-
tinuity and change.
A focus on everyday resistance allows understanding ‘practical knowledge’ 
or ‘mētis’ (Scott 1998: 313). For resistance, this methodology implies a focus on 
individual, collective, ideological and material insubordination; for statebuild-
ing, it focuses on the practices that facilitate and concretise the operationalisa-
tion of  formal schemes. This connects with Africanist literature that has focused 
on actual practices to observe the practical ways in which states work, beyond 
and even in contradiction to formal regulations. These practical ways create 
their own routines that knit together how public administration, services and 
norms work (De Herdt and de Sardan 2015; Meagher 2012; Meagher, De Herdt, 
and Titeca 2014; Raeymaekers 2014). These approaches in the Africanist litera-
ture offer an analysis of  hybrid institutions and routines that enable regulations 
and norms by state and non-state actors alike (Laudati 2013; Seay 2013; de 
Sardan 2012; Leinweber 2012; Titeca and De Herdt 2011). In a different way, 
this book concentrates on practices that define state-making more generally and 
where resistance is rooted.
‘Practices’ cannot be disentangled from the relationships, context and pro-
cesses of  which they are part. These ways of  doing in everyday life have a history 
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and are representative of  patterns. They are not random or one-time acts that 
can be taken purely on their own but, rather, the evidence of  the contingent and 
historical nature of  the present. A focus on everyday practices provides an 
opportunity ‘to reveal the present as a malleable construct which is embedded 
in a historical context, thereby serving to unearth the process of  temporal con-
tinuity and discontinuity with previous social practices’ (Hobson 2002: 7). The 
continuities, and not just the transformations, need to be accounted for as part 
and parcel of  the intentions, incoherence, purpose and mismanagement of  
statebuilding. Accounting for resistance thus requires historicising the everyday, 
even if  focusing on present everyday activities.
A focus on practices does not automatically mean doing ethnography even 
if  there has been a close relationship between the two in the liberal peace debates. 
Richmond openly calls his work ethnographic, further claiming that this 
approach is amenable to an active-research that has an emancipatory aim in 
mind (2011a: 129). This ethnography has to be used to study the ‘practices, 
discourses and rationalities [that] produce governmentality’ as well as the prac-
tices of  subversion that, against each other, create hybridity (Richmond 2011a: 
12). Wanda Vrasti (2008) has argued that the use of  ethnography in interna-
tional relations (IR) since the end of  the 1980s has been selective and instru-
mental, mainly for data-collection purposes or as a way of  critiquing the standard 
methodological foundations of  the discipline while maintaining the credentials 
for remaining within the parameters of  scientific research. According to Vrasti, 
this use has not taken account of  the political implications of  employing this 
method, its imperial legacy and the critical transformation that it has undergone 
within anthropology. Taking ‘the Comaroffs puzzle’, Vrasti wonders: ‘How do we 
explain that, just when ethnography was being challenged within cultural 
Anthropology for its structuralist, Orientalist and masculinist foundations, 
other disciplines, IR included, turned to ethnography as a potential source of  
political emancipation?’ (Jean and John Comaroff  cited in Vrasti 2008: 294). 
Vrasti’s article has opened a debate about the relationship between IR’s ontology 
and methodological avenues.5 This is not to deny the value of  ethnography for 
IR – in fact, Vrasti calls upon international scholars to engage critically with 
ethnography, and not to disregard it. What Vrasti’s critique illustrates is the need 
to engage with the intellectual baggage of  theoretical and methodological 
approaches used and incorporated into research.
This book takes this critique seriously and, although it follows Scott and 
some of  his methodological approach with a focus on practices, it is not ethnog-
raphy (1998: 312). This is because the time spent in the field is considered to 
have been insufficient, and because a full and critical engagement with the 
legacy of  ethnography from anthropology falls outside the book’s scope. Despite 
this, there is still an acknowledgement of  what Ruth Behar calls the ‘epiphany’ 
that material, research and analysis have undergone between the observation, 
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the field and the final text (cited in Vrasti 2010: 84).6 There is also an exercise 
of  ‘zooming in’ to observe a person criticising the government, or another enter-
ing into a negotiation to tame the authoritarian nature of  military rule, followed 
by a ‘zooming out’ to extrapolate these to patterns of  actions whereby domina-
tion is resisted.7
Peacebuilding as state-making
As Chapter 1 will argue, peacebuilding has a state-making ethos. This means 
that the reconstruction of  the state, statebuilding, has become the preferred 
formula for peacebuilding. This understanding underpins the critical peacebuild-
ing literature (Chandler 2009; Mac Ginty 2011: 12; Richmond 2011a: 14). In 
fact, as Hameiri (2014) points out, the decline of  the liberal peace does not 
extend to statebuilding. The new explicit focus on security and stability in UN 
missions gives evidence to the fact that if  they were ever separate, peacebuilding 
primarily entails building the state apparatus, reforming the security sector and 
monopolising the means of  violence. Missions in the DRC, the Central African 
Republic (CAR), Mali and Haiti focus on ‘stabilisation’, being renamed the 
Mission of  Stabilisation in Congo (MONUSCO), Multidimensional Integrated Sta-
bilisation Mission in the CAR, Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission 
in Mali and United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti. Scholars have seen in 
these changes a conservative status-quo turn from the liberal peace agenda 
(Natorski 2011). However, peace interventions have generally illustrated an 
understanding of  the state as ‘[t]he foundation-stone of  international peace and 
order’ (UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 1992. para. 17). States that 
no longer fulfil that task need to be reconstructed.
As Navari argues, the conception of  the state as the embodiment of  peace 
is not extraneous for either IR or political theory, for which the state is ‘an arena 
of  moral choice’ (1993: 44). It depends only on whether the state is seen as the 
ethical order (Hobbes/Hegel), in which case intervention might be ruled out; or 
whether the state is seen as the best order available (Locke), in which case inter-
vention might be required to preserve or infer some changes within states 
(Navari 1993: 48). Interventions have adopted a Lockean approach. However, 
seeing the state as a peace-broker denotes what Navari also identifies as ‘a series 
of  epistemological devices amalgamated with political theory’ (1978: 108). She 
refers to the theoretical practice of  stripping the state of  its historical and socio-
logical elements as a historically contingent institution of  domination and 
turning it into a necessary organising mechanism to maintain national and 
international order. Seeing peacebuilding as state-making attempts to break 
with these limitations.
The book sees peacebuilding as primarily concerned with the practice of  
asserting state authority. To do so it must build simultaneously on practices of  
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coercion and extraction with an overarching claim to legitimacy. Underpinning 
this understanding of  state-making is Charles Tilly’s theory of  state-formation 
whereby states have generally been formed by a process of  accumulation of  
capital and coercion. This does not suggest that war has necessarily contributed 
to the centralising and organising of  the coercive and extractive apparatus of  
the state in a Tillean sense. In fact it could be the opposite (Taylor and Botea 
2008). Tilly offers an account of  historical patterns in the practices of  state-
making, with a focus on coercion and extraction, and a reference point on which 
to articulate relations of  domination and resistance. What this framework tries 
to do is to stay away from normative political questions about what a state should 
be and instead construct one to understand how states work.
However the book goes well beyond Tilly. Firstly, in seeing practices of  asser-
tion of  state authority as coercion, extraction and claims to legitimacy, it is more 
broadly framed within a Weberian tradition. With this, the book illustrates that 
these practices are constitutive of  state authority and not limited to a region or 
a historical context. In fact, what contemporary authors writing in this tradition 
have argued is that states are the result of  competing, chaotic plural processes 
and transversal interests both from within and from without (e.g. Mann 1993; 
Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1990). These are not far from the dynamics and features 
identified by theorists of  African states.
Secondly, despite the similarities, African states have been formed out of  a 
different experience, including that of  colonisation and slavery. Additionally, 
Weberian approaches are Eurocentric. Not only do they portray the European 
state as self-made, but they underpin the tendency to portray the European 
state as the model with which to compare all other states. These methodological 
and ethical concerns take the book to draw on Africanist literature, and in 
particular on Achille Mbembe’s theorisation of  Africa’s political space (Mbembe 
1991c, 2001, 2003). The work of  Mbembe allows us to observe the particu-
larities of  state-making in Africa due to its historical configuration from pre-
colonial, colonial and post-colonial experiences. Observing these particularities 
also studies an African case from a more general state-making experience, 
avoiding pre-conceptions of  Africa as an exceptional case. Understanding how 
the configurations of  political authority have tended to produce forms of  indi-
rect authority, delegating in the military, commercial elites, corporations and 
more recently in armed groups and peacebuilders is important. Such is the 
understanding of  the dynamics that maintain African states as producers of  
raw materials and debt repayments. Peacebuilding does not represent a new 
time that has broken with the past; it adds to the spectrum of  practices of  
authority already in place, reflecting the patterns in relations of  domination. 
It is this historisation that the book takes up as its foundation to explain the 
nature of  resistance and its context. This historicity counters the main narra-
tives of  the DRC, which have seen the DRC’s conflict as a representation 
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of  a transhistorical dynamic of  plunder and violence, or as a transhistorical 
conflict over land and identity, and ultimately as a failure. The insight that the 
DRC provides is that peacebuilding is not so much a ‘hybrid’ of  international 
and local agency as it is a process of  state reconstruction that reflects the co-
constituted nature of  any given political institution and order in world politics. 
State-making per se, as Tilly and other Weberian authors show, is an interna-
tionalised process where, as Mbembe argues, domestic and international 
spheres are entangled.
Resistance
In Chapter 2 the book offers an alternative account of  resistance based on James 
Scott, with elements of  Michel de Certeau. As observed above, the peace and 
conflict studies literature has primarily drawn on Certeau. His framework is 
appropriate to theorise hybridity, yet it leaves many aspects of  resistance unde-
fined. Certeau analyses two kinds of  practices which he links to a Clausewitzean 
understanding of  strategy and tactic in war. ‘Strategy’ is that of  the general. It 
represents power (‘a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution’) and its 
practices relate to the delimitation of  a place from which external threats and 
targets can be controlled and managed (Certeau 1984: 37). A ‘tactic’ is ‘the art 
of  the weak’, of  the soldier, the private; it operates within ‘the enemy’s field of  
vision’ but it does not have the vision of  the enemy as a whole, rather, it plays 
with it, mostly in the form of  ‘trickery’ (Certeau 1984: 18). In Certeau’s analysis, 
power and resistance, strategy and tactic respond to an ‘everyday war’ of  target-
ing and trickery, of  delimitation and avoidance, of  control of  autonomy and of  
reappropriating the everyday order of  life according to one’s own logic.
Certeau’s notion of  resistance comes from his discussion of  ‘la perruque’ 
(the wig). Workers may sometimes play the role of  the employee, as if  wearing 
a wig, but may not be performing the work assigned. Certeau defines it as 
follows:
It differs from absenteeism in that the worker is officially on the job. La perruque 
may be as simple a matter as a secretary’s writing a love letter on ‘company time’ or 
as complex as a cabinetmaker’s ‘borrowing’ a lathe to make a piece of  furniture for 
his living room. (1984: 25)
Here it is possible to see how, for Certeau, the doing – that is, the writing of  the 
love letter, which responds to the logic of  the secretary’s own life and interests 
– is a way of  subverting the logic of  work and the power relation between 
employer and worker. It is also clear that the figures of  the ‘weak’ and the 
‘soldier’ against the ‘strong’ and ‘the general’ point to a notion of  subversion 
that is linked to their material relations and social hierarchy. Seeing ‘tactics’ as 
a form of  resistance by elites does not follow straightforwardly from this 
Introduction: Resistance and the liberal peace
17
framework. Resistance for Certeau is not an oppositional organised collective act 
against capitalism. It is a quotidian strategy that subverts subordination.
However, this lays ambiguous ground due to the fact that these practices 
need to be comprehended by their outcomes. If  can we assume resistance only 
when the logic of  power has been subverted, a trap is created by the fact that 
power is generally successfully imposed. Conversely, there may not be any situ-
ation in which the logic of  power is not subverted somehow. In the context of  
statebuilding, the logic of  subversion and outcomes applies best when theorising 
hybridity (an outcome) but resistance remains elusive. This is not to disregard 
Certeau. Quite the contrary, the proposal here is to make a more specific use of  
his framework.
The book draws on critical analysis of  the work of  James Scott and Certeau 
(Certeau 1984; Scott 1985, 1990, 2009). Scott concretises the account by 
basing it on patterns and subordinate groups against claims from authority, 
however uncoordinated and limited their practices might be.8 Although this is 
a contentious aspect of  the framework, the framework also provides an account 
of  the intent and motivations resisters have. It encompasses both material and 
symbolic claims, individual and collective actions; and it finally examines a 
diverse range of  acts, including how violent and non-violent practices relate to 
everyday resistance. However, Scott’s definition could be improved by referring 
directly to the patterned character of  resistance rather than defining it mainly 
as an intentional act against domination. Additionally, intentions and motiva-
tions could be more directly linked, and, since Scott’s ideas are developed in a 
pacified context, more could be said about the relationship between everyday 
resistance and violence. Following Michel de Certeau, Scott’s approach could 
also include acts that do not oppose or address authority claims directly but are 
used to fulfil one’s own needs to the detriment of  claims made by authority.
My definition of  resistance that is used throughout this book will be as 
follows: ‘Resistance is the pattern of  acts undertaken by individuals or collectives 
in a subordinated position to mitigate or deny the claims made by elites and the 
effects of  domination, while advancing their own agenda’ (cf. Scott 1985: 290). 
The book identifies subordinate classes with what Nzongola-Ntalaja names as 
the working class (both skilled and unskilled) and the peasantry (1983: 58–9);9 
and with what Barrington Moore calls ‘lower classes’, ‘those with little or no 
property, income, education, power, authority, or prestige’ (1978: 35 and xiii). 
The concept of  subordinate/non-elite is complex and contingent. It is intersected 
by the different kinds of  subordination that cut across economic, social and 
political relations including class, gender, ethnic group, race, age, sexuality and 
physical ability. In the context of  African polities this has been problematised 
even more, pointing out the fluidity and muddled nature of  social and political 
relations, especially as privileges, rights and material goods are delivered infor-
mally, hinging on personal relations (Magubane and Nzongola-Ntalaja 1983; 
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Schatzberg 1980). Yet, as Gerard Prunier argues, noting the fluidity of  the social 
and political world in Africa and linking classes with their networks in the infor-
mal economy does not rule out the existence of  classes, but only a recognition 
of  their problematisation and nuances (1991: 4). The implication of  Prunier’s 
argument is that in the exercise of  accumulation and power, distribution may 
follow networks of  kin and proximity (where ethnic groups and their own rank-
ings add an extra layer of  social stratification) and may also create fluid bounda-
ries but maintain an unequal class system. This book notes how different kinds 
of  subordinate experiences relate to different kinds of  resistance, but its main 
focus is on linking these to broader dynamics of  resistance in the exercise of  
building state authority.
Two different categories will be proposed. On the one hand, and closer to 
Scott’s account, there are acts that address authority’s claims more directly 
(claim-regarding acts) – for example, tax evasion and denigration of  legitimacy. 
On the other hand, and closer to Michel de Certeau, there are acts that follow 
‘self-logics’ and in doing so mitigate authority’s claims and the effects of  domina-
tion (self-regarding acts). These acts are done in solidarity with one’s friends and 
family or prioritising one’s own needs (Certeau 1984: 25–6). Survival strategies 
in the DRC, which are generally adopted following relations of  proximity and 
based on an ethic of  reciprocity, not only provide ways to mitigate poverty and 
deteriorating living conditions in a militarised context, they also enact alterna-
tive forms of  social organisation and political authority.
Resistance is explored through different discursive, violent and survival 
practices in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, respectively. These practices include denigra-
tion, slandering, mockery and reworking of  mainstream statebuilding discourse; 
the activities of  Mai Mai militias and their use by rural communities to provide 
security; and creative survival practices that range from tax evasion to land 
reappropriation and the provision of  all sorts of  social services. Scott has often 
been criticised on the grounds that intentions are ungraspable, that resistance 
acts are too ambiguous and ambivalent to serve as a category of  analysis and 
that he excessively simplifies social reality (Hibou 2011a: Ch. 1; Mbembe 2001: 
103–8; Ortner 1995; Weaver Shipley 2010: 666). In response to these critiques, 
which have also concluded that resistance does not exist or is incomprehensible, 
this book argues that resistance cannot be accounted for in all-or-nothing terms. 
It proposes a gradation of  some elements depending on the visibility of  the 
intentionality, the intensity and exposure of  the acts used and how directly 
authority claims have been addressed.
In exploring these different elements, as mentioned earlier, this book argues 
that the practices of  everyday resistance are determined by the political context. 
The context of  the DRC, although defined as ‘post-conflict’, ‘peace consolida-
tion’, ‘peace-building’ or ‘stabilisation’, is one of  ongoing war, increasing mili-
tarisation and plural authority (Dolan 2010; ISSSS 2013; UN Security Council 
Introduction: Resistance and the liberal peace
19
2010, 2013; UNSSSS/ ISSSS 2009). The ways in which rural communities 
engage in multiple acts of  resistance should be seen as an attempt to deny and 
mitigate domination provoked by that context. Ultimately there is no universal, 
all-encompassing framework of  resistance. Any framework needs to connect its 
major defining elements of  patterns, motivations, acts and actors, and be 
contextualised.
‘Africa’s World War’
As Zubairu Wai (2012a: 3) demonstrates, there is a certain epistemology of  
African conflicts that takes their most brutal aspects to be the overarching frame 
of  analysis. The DRC conflict is a vivid example of  that. The failure of  state insti-
tutions and the race for resources, in addition to the barbarous aspects of  war 
including rape and torture have been seen to be the underlying issues (Collier 
2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Kaplan 2000; Rotberg 2003). According to 
the state-failure and resource-wars theses, countries in the region, elites and 
politicians in the DRC as well as ruthless militias have entered into conflict to 
battle for the control of  resources, making it impossible for the DRC to develop 
politically and economically. The logics of  corruption, of  profiting from conflict 
and the behaviour of  some political elites in the distribution of  privileges and 
power have been inscribed within the logics of  neopatrimonialism and bad gov-
ernance (Collier 2007; Reno 1998b). These explanations are premised on a 
normative rather than an analytical paradigm that compares a pathological 
image of  the DRC to an idealised rational bureaucratic view of  politics and the 
economy.
Since about 2010 there has been a shift in thinking about the roots of  con-
flict in the DRC that has moved towards land and identity. Unresolved historical 
cleavages around land and power distribution, both of  which are linked to iden-
tity and belonging, create the basis for political mobilisation through violence 
(Autesserre 2010, 2012a; Bøås 2012; Fahey 2010, 2011). The international 
peacebuilding response has prioritised international actors’ interests and 
agendas, compromising core peacebuilding and stabilisation goals, leaving the 
local sources of  conflict unaddressed. It has also taken a complacent approach 
to Congolese and regional actors, who have ignored or even manipulated inter-
national participants to pursue their own interests while continuing to receive 
international funding (Autesserre 2012a; Trefon 2011; Vlassenroot and Raey-
maekers 2009). Although these analyses have offered nuanced explanations of  
the micro-dynamics of  conflict and point out important trends in security and 
peacebuilding policies in the DRC, the way that some of  them have detached con-
flicts from their regional and international contexts risks reproducing a depoliti-
cising and pathological account of  the conflict. Not only does the localisation 
of  conflicts portray the local as an autonomous ahistorical sphere, additionally 
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this approach does not emphasise enough the role that popular classes’ political 
aspirations have played in the start and continuation of  conflict, and does not 
consider patterns of  mediation and shared authority in world politics (MacMil-
lan, Little, and Lawson 2014).
These aspects have been taken up by those who have focused on the political 
and regional roots of  conflict from different perspectives (Marriage 2013; 
Ndaywel è Nziem 1998; Ngoie Tshibambe 2013; Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; 
Prunier 2009; Raeymaekers 2014; Stearns 2011; Vlassenroot 2002; Vlassen-
root and Raeymaekers 2004a). Most of  this literature, however, is still based on 
the paradigm of  the failed neopatrimonial state. This book contributes to these 
debates by analysing the political, economic, regional and historical roots of  
conflict, although it avoids normative conceptions of  the state. This is done by 
focusing on resistance and looking at longer patterns in state–society relations 
and highlighting patterns of  extraction and coercion that link the local condi-
tions of  the DRC with the global economy. Peasants have become involved in the 
war not only because they have been primary targets, but also because the war 
awoke amongst them a latent desire for revolt that continues to this day in dif-
ferent ways, including through violence. French anthropological and sociologi-
cal literature has looked at these issues in some detail, but little has been done 
in the English IR literature (Acker and Vlassenroot 2001; ADEPAE et al. 2011; 
Amuri Misako 2007; Autesserre 2010; Vlassenroot 2002). The moral economy 
of  survival also needs to be explored as a space for resistance, and not just as a 
space of  oppression and suffering (Ela 1994, 1998). Resistance has a longue 
durée that is inseparable from how political authority has been configured 
historically.
The book draws on 48 weeks of  fieldwork between 2009 and 2014, and a 
close follow-up of  the case from the first democratic elections in the DRC in 
2006. This includes 174 interviews with UN, government and army officers, as 
well as with Congolese NGOs, trade unionists, combatants and ex-combatants 
of  armed groups (Yakutumba, Federal Republican Forces (FRF), Simba Mai 
Mai/MRS (Mouvement Revolutionaire Socialiste), Raïa Mutomboki, Mai Mai 
Nyakiriba, ex-Mai Mai Dunia and ex-Mai Mai Padiri), members of  peasant coop-
eratives, street and market sellers and miners. The material used also comes from 
17 formal participant observations, seven focus groups, one small survey and 
multiple informal conversations. Fieldwork took place in Kinshasa, in the prov-
ince of  North Kivu (in Beni, Butembo, Masisi, Nyiragongo and Goma) and in the 
province of  South Kivu (in Bukavu, Bunyakiri, Fizi and Mwenga).
The purpose of  the case study is not to make causal inferences or to test 
hypotheses. The question it addresses is not why but what everyday resistance 
is and how it happens. The book systematically examines different practices of  
resistance against practices of  domination fostered by conflict and state-making. 
Thus, following Patrick T. Jackson, the book is more an inquiry than a test of  
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nullifiable hypothesis (2010, esp. Introduction). This does not mean that resist-
ance does not exist beyond our thinking, but that researching and theorising 
resistance is not an exercise of  objective measurement of  independently existing 
facts. The evidence provided throughout the book is verifiable in so far as these 
are not hidden or invisible acts. It claims that ‘its validity is internal to its own 
methodology’, and while its interpretation is open to challenge, it is consistent 
(Jackson 2010: 191). This may not be ‘science’ but it is ‘something to use as 
guidance for systematic thorough inquiry that has the potential to produce a 
certain kind of  knowledge’ (Jackson 2010: 191).
The conflict in the DRC and the way peacebuilding strategies have been 
designed and applied can serve to compare other case studies. Much of  the 
fieldwork is focused on North and South Kivu because they are the provinces 
where conflict continues and where peacebuilding strategies have focused the 
most. The context of  North and South Kivu is complex but cannot be separated 
from the politics of  the DRC and the broader central and Great Lakes regions as 
a whole. The regions also reflect African politics more generally. The elements 
of  how violence takes place, the importance of  seeing the material and symbolic 
underpinnings of  different forms of  resistance, as well as how coercion, extrac-
tion and the claims to legitimacy play out, are all important to understanding 
relations of  power and resistance in conflict and peace processes beyond this case 
and Africa.
There are limits to the generalisations that can be made. For Scott, 
‘[w]hile something can indeed be said about forestry, urban planning, agricul-
ture, and rural settlement in general, this will take us only so far in understand-
ing this forest, this revolution, this urbanization, this farm’ (1998: 318). This 
means that although it is possible to argue that the nature of  political autho-
rity enabled through peacebuilding processes is plural, what it really means in 
Eastern DRC (e.g. plural centres of  power including state and non-state actors in 
parts of  North Kivu, or statebuilding through the deployment of  the military) 
may imply important shaded differences to what it means in Bosnia (e.g. the 
influence of  the EU and the US amongst different Bosniak and Croat politi-
cal projects). In other words, highlighting certain practices as resistance may 
provide a methodological container that will be meaningful only once they are 
contextualised.
What lies ahead
The chapters that follow pave the way for research focused on resistance in peace 
and conflict studies. They lay the path to continue a necessary journey that was 
started but that has taken a detour towards hybridity. As was already mentioned, 
the book starts with the three framing chapters, followed by three empirical 
chapters. It starts by rearticulating peacebuilding, focusing on its core element: 
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the reconstitution of  state authority. It continues with the framework of  resist-
ance, followed by an overview of  Africa’s World War. The three empirical chap-
ters focus on the three arenas of  resistance that the book proposes to explore: 
discourses, violence and survival. The Conclusion discusses the implications 
of  this new understanding. One of  these implications is to serve as a connec-
tion between peace and conflict studies, security studies, IR, sociology and 
anthropology in their study of  resistance. The book adds to the growing number 
of  resistance studies in IR, counterbalancing the focus the discipline has placed 
on the study of  power. Ultimately, order needs an account of  resistance to be 
fully explained. While this is becoming a common call among IR scholars, the 
study of  resistance still plays a secondary role in the discipline (Armstrong, 
Farrell, and Maiguashca 2004; Eschle and Maiguashca 2007; Hirst 2015; Stern 
2005).
Resistance is not different within international peacebuilding, since it is 
embedded more broadly in patterns of  society relations, in the dynamics of  
international political economy and in state constitutive patterns of  world order. 
Power–resistance relations are not an isolated relationship between authority 
and subject. In fact, one of  the insights from looking at peacebuilding from a 
historical sociological perspective and from an African case study is that this 
relationship is a plural relationship of  ‘multiple authorities and centres of  politi-
cal control’, not a binary (Raeymaekers 2007: 173). The particular context is 
marked by, on the one hand, increasing militarisation, authoritarianism and 
impoverishment of  the civilian population and, on the other, by a political dis-
course of  peace, democracy and development. Peacebuilding in the DRC is 
undertaken and mediated by a wide array of  international, national, state and 
non-state actors. The process of  reconstituting state authority leads these actors 
to engage in contradictory practices of  militarisation, peacebuilding, shared 
sovereignty and proxy wars. Peacebuilding is in this sense the representation of  
the practices of  state-making more generally. Resistance counters the different 
forms of  extraction and violence that continue or worsen unwanted conditions 
of  living, not the intervention of  international actors.
The book proposes to embrace ambiguity and plurality to look at both resist-
ance and state-making. Similar to Hollander and Einwohner it sees resistance as 
‘socially constructed’ (2004: 548). In the process of  identifying what is resist-
ance and what is not, its recognition by those who resist, those who are targeted 
and those who observe creates a complex interconnection of  subjective meaning. 
However, despite these complexities, the book sees resistance as a political cat-
egory worth studying in its own right. Recent analyses of  post-conflict state-
building through the lens of  state-making have afforded a better understanding 
of  this process (Berger and Weber 2006; Bliesemann de Guevara 2010, 2012; 
Jung 2008; Migdal and Schlichte 2005; Schlichte 2009). What these analyses 
do not emphasise enough is that both statebuilding and state-formation (as 
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ideal-type processes) share patterns in governing and resistance practices. 
Resistance features intermittently in these analyses to argue that different actors 
mould the state, that there are hegemonic as well as subordinate agencies and 
that these may not necessarily follow a top-down approach. Similar to the 
hybridity debates, resistance in these studies is also mentioned to point out that 
statebuilding is contested and mediated, but not as a developed account of  it. 
This book sees resistance as a prevalent historical practice in everyday life that 
needs to be studied and comprehended.
In the book, embracing these complexities entails seeing resistance not in 
normative terms but as Janus-faced, highlighting how there are multiple self-
interested power-seeking agendas behind it (Lawson 2007; Selbin 2009). Yet the 
claim is that in order to attain a better understanding of  how resistance operates, 
resisters and dominant actors must be analytically categorised by their symbolic 
and material privileges, their decision-making power and class. Its advantage is 
to formulate a way to observe patterns in social relations that simultaneously 
capture the complexity of  an internationalised context of  war and state-making. 
The ultimate aim is not to portray a romantic view of  resistance but to open up 
paths to study forms of  resistance and contribute to the project of  a nuanced 
and critical analysis of  peacebuilding operations.
NOTES
1 These quotes are representative of  many experiences recorded throughout the period of  
field research between 2009 and 2014.
2 The term ‘Africa’s First World War’ was apparently coined by Assistant Secretary of  State 
Susan Rice, although it has been legated by journalist Lynne Duke, who, in a biographical/
journalistic account of  Africa’s contemporary history, notes that ‘Susan Rice, the U.S. 
assistant secretary of  state for Africa, would call this conflict the first “world war” of  
Africa because of  its continental proportions, the array of  regional powers involved, and 
the high stakes at play’ (Duke 2003: 237).
3 These remain as a reference throughout Richmond’s book.
4 The information in this paragraph comes from: Participant Observation XXVII (2014); 
Focus Group Femmes Kamituga (2014); Mai Mai Nyakiriba1 (2014); Mai Mai Nyakiriba 
2 (2014).
5 See the discussion in Millennium Journal of  International Studies (Vrasti 2008, 2010; Ran-
catore 2010; see also the engagement of  Richmond with Vrasti, Richmond 2011a: 129).
6 See also the transition from ‘history’ to ‘text’ in Certeau (1988: Ch. 1).
7 For Certeau, using ‘zoom lenses’ provides the ‘sociological and anthropological perspec-
tive that privileges the anonymous and the everyday’ (Certeau 1984: v).
8 This does not mean that loose social movements do not exist (Richmond 2011a). In the 
case of  the DRC, a tapestry of  civil and political organisations and ongoing social and 
political struggles take place in a more public sphere. This is seen through the struggle of  
collectives that have been particularly vocal and also particularly persecuted, like human 
rights organisations, journalists, feminists, women’s-rights organisations, students, 
peace activists, pygmies, etc. However, not only are the practices Scott focuses on more 
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prevalent, they also form the basis of  these more public struggles. See for example De 
Villers and Tshonda (2004).
9 Cf. Nzongola-Ntalaja adds a third category, the ‘lumpenproletariat’, not included here 
because this serves a Marxist category of  a class not interested in revolutionary politics, 
and does not have analytical value in this book.
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Legitimacy, violence and extraction in the 
practice of  building states
[T]o govern men as to produce and collect goods is inseparable from the specific 
modes of  the distribution and modulation of  violence. (Mbembe 1991a: 7)
Ruling over people
Whatever other challenges peacebuilding faces, whether administra-tive reform, economic reactivation or the stabilisation of  conflicts, it poses peacebuilders with the basic question of  how to assert state 
rule. Peacebuilding has a state-making ethos and, as Weber argues, states are 
‘associations of  rule’ (1978: 51). Since 1945, a significant quantitative and 
qualitative development in the doctrines of  intervention and conflict manage-
ment has made state–society relations the sphere of  international intervention.1 
These operations have included programmes for economic, security sector and 
civil administration reform, as well as for promoting certain civil society activi-
ties. Since 2001, when so-called failed states were designated as the major cause 
of  conflicts, interventions have aimed at the transformation of  the state appa-
ratus, supporting governments and the central administration, in so far as the 
state is considered the cornerstone for the end of  conflict and for the establish-
ment of  a long-lasting peace. Operations such as those in Bosnia, East Timor, 
Afghanistan and Kosovo heralded an era in which peacebuilding is statebuild-
ing, by whatever other name it is called (Chesterman 2004). Current policy 
indicates that statebuilding has survived other aspects of  the liberal peace 
agenda (Bliesemann de Guevara 2010; Hameiri 2014), and, in fact, it has a wide 
consensus from Western and non-Western governments (Curtis 2013).
These processes have generally been studied under a global governance 
framework. The very few historical-sociological approaches demonstrate that 
little is known about how the reconstruction of  state authority impacts on 
peacebuilding (Bliesemann de Guevara 2012, 2015; Jung 2008; Migdal and 
Schlichte 2005). As Newman argues,
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In historical perspective statebuilding has generally been a coercive and often a 
violent process. Statebuilding involves imposing a unified, centralised state and sub-
jugating peripheral regions, securing border areas and imposing regulation, institu-
tions, taxation and control. This has been a violent process because it threatens the 
interests of  recalcitrant actors and it encounters outlying resistance which must be 
suppressed. […] In stark contrast, in the twenty-first century scholars and policy 
analysts interested in peacebuilding portray peacebuilding and statebuilding as com-
plementary or even mutually dependent. (2013: 141)
However, Newman himself  falls short of  fully developing a historical-sociological 
approach. This chapter analyses statebuilding from the practices and patterns 
that constitute it presently and historically. It argues that peacebuilding as state-
building is based on the same practices of  coercion, extraction and claims to 
legitimacy that define state-making, and that these practices are the ground for 
resistance. Resistance reflects not just issues of  bad governance, or a rejection 
of  internationally led agendas that impinge on a local culture. It reflects the 
experience of  war, poverty, and political processes as intolerable and humiliat-
ing. However, as Eric Wolf  states, social science cannot be restricted to the study 
of  ‘self-contained’ societies (1982: 385). Resistance needs to be seen as an 
expression of  an experience that is historical and inseparable from global politi-
cal and economic processes.
Peacebuilding shares with state-making the claims to legitimate authority 
to distribute rights, privileges, violence and economic resources. It is based on 
a high-modernist discourse of  peace, democracy and development that promises 
to be the solution to the problems (post-)conflict states and societies face; it is 
based on the support of  a strong winning party or a power-sharing agreement, 
in a way that militarises government; and it continues or establishes 
new ways of  extraction that tend to reinforce patterns of  accumulation and 
dispossession.
These three elements (coercion, capital and legitimacy), which relate to 
the legacy of  Max Weber, are part and parcel of  a widely embraced tradition 
about what states are and how they came into being. As Hintze pointed out, 
Weber’s insight is to have revealed the state as an ‘institutional enterprise pos-
sessing coercive force’, tearing down ideological conceptions of  the state as a 
neutral and collective good (cited in Anter 2014: 40). But this approach has 
its limitations.
Hannah Arendt criticised Weber for having merged violence and power. She 
argued that violence does not create power, but destroys it (1970: 35–8). For 
Arendt, the issue is not to have linked violence with the exercise of  state violence 
but to have established a causal and ontological link. Weber is also at the root 
of  the ‘bellicist’ account, which, although it establishes what Teschke calls the 
‘core hypothesis constitut[ing] the dominant paradigm of  state formation theory 
in contemporary scholarship’, does not fit the formation of  all states (2003: 
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119).2 The ‘bellicist’ account entails a process which Norbert Elias (1982) saw 
as having ‘two phases’. In the first phase, the threat and preparation for war 
provides the momentum to recruit men and taxes, simultaneously creating the 
incentives to centralise and develop institutions for the securing of  the territory. 
A second phase takes place when this institution is democratised. The problem 
of  this account is that it is focused on the process of  power concentration and 
later democratisation that ultimately reflects the unfolding of  the modern Euro-
pean nation-state.
The benefit of  the Weberian tradition is to offer a relatively simple formula 
that allows us to sharpen the perspective about the continuities, changes, 
specificities and generalities of  different states and different past and contem-
porary state-making processes. In this book, state-making (and peacebuilding/
statebuilding) is a process of  asserting, consolidating and exercising rule 
through the management of  violence and wealth that has both national and 
international elements. This simple formula fits a wide range of  states, and in 
particular African states, which have been forged out of  processes marked by 
violence and extraction, with claims to legitimacy. For Achille Mbembe, rule 
and states in Africa were consolidated during colonisation through two different 
forms of  violence, one of  conquest under a claim of  ‘right to rule’ and another 
of  ‘domestication’ under the discourse of  civilising the natives (2001: Ch. 1). 
The particularities of  peacebuilding come from the contexts and international 
structure in which they are embedded. The contemporary reconstruction of  
state authority after conflict has not represented an authority resting on popular 
consent, but the political compromises of  different parties through power 
sharing which international actors have advocated for. The discourse of  peace-
building informs these strategies and underpins the need for these compromises, 
also affording a platform for legitimising international actors. Recognising 
common practices as longer patterns of  state-making that link different kinds 
of  states with different historical developments allows us to depathologise 
‘failed’ states.
The chapter starts with a discussion of  Weberian historical sociology in 
order to analyse not only coercion, extraction and claims to legitimacy as con-
stitutive practices of  states, but also how informal and plural forms of  govern-
ance do not make the DRC pathological; in fact, they characterise the nature of  
peacebuilding as a plural and improvised form of  ruling. This is illustrated with 
some empirical examples in the fourth section of  the chapter. Before that, a third 
section analyses both Africa’s normality and exceptionalism. It first discusses the 
main critiques that Weberian historical sociology has received in making African 
states a ‘shadow’ of  the ideal European states (cf. Ferguson 2006) and then 
goes on to analyse particularities of  African states through the work of  Achille 
Mbembe. The section highlights the need to take Africa’s historicity into account 
in order to understand its politics and its interconnected nature with global 
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politics. The chapter facilitates an analysis of  the object of  resistance beyond 
international actors, while also pointing to several challenges of  theorising resist-
ance in this context. These will be more fully developed in the following chapters.
Practices and patterns of  state-making
Historical sociology has provided some of  the most extensive research and theo-
risation on state theory and state formation. It is not unitary, as there have been 
different approaches within it, nor does it necessarily provide the best account. 
It suffers from important critiques, since it is underpinned by Weber and his 
Eurocentric approach. Other theories have also added important insights. Michel 
Foucault, post-structuralism and feminism have identified the constitutive links 
between the private and public arenas, the plural and decentralising exercise 
that power relations within states give rise to and the important relationship 
between formal and informal processes (Ashley 1988; Foucault 2008, 1991; 
Wilmer 2009). Some of  these features, explored below, are synthesised in Achille 
Mbembe’s theory of  the African political space.
Historical sociology, and some elements of  Weberian theory, are still useful 
to observe not the specificities of  the European state but the broader patterns 
through which states assert rule. Historical sociology is a corrective to three 
misunderstandings commonly made in peacebuilding literature and policy, 
which are that: (1) statebuilding, as an internationally led enterprise, is external 
to the actual practice of  ruling and is a solution to the problems of  war; (2) the 
state is a naturally, and not historically, occurring institution, and its problems 
can be solved by changing its internal dynamics, without addressing the ine-
qualities and dynamics of  the global political economy; and (3) the state is the 
‘hero’, able to harmonise competing interests inside and outside (cf. Ashley 
1988). This form is an ideal version of  the state as a service provider, with a 
central and coherent administration based on routinised bureaucratic practices 
and with high levels of  legitimacy to distribute and manage wealth and violence, 
based on the rule of  law. Peacebuilding thus exposes an ideal version of  the 
Weberian state, which not only sanitises its history and disregards the con-
straints that the international context imposes, but ascribes to it features that 
do not belong to even the most organised and consolidated states.
By contrast, (post-)conflict states and, in particular, African states are char-
acterised by neopatrimonial practices. As discussed below and in Chapter 3, the 
sources of  state failure and of  conflict come down to how violence, wealth, rights 
and services are distributed through personal networks of  patronage rather 
than rational, bureaucratised procedures. Yet this understanding ceases to be a 
policy or analytical argument and becomes normative political theory about 
how society should be organised and about the way political and economic goods 
should be distributed.
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An analysis of  historical sociology shows that centralisation, monopoly of  
violence, impersonal bureaucratised practices and legitimacy are all limited and 
contested. The hallmark of  Weberian theory is to see the state through the lens 
of  the institutionalisation and legitimation of  the means of  coercion which 
grants the state the organisational capacity to administer the population of  a 
particular territory (Weber 1978: 54–6). Territory and rule, backed by force 
under a claim to legitimacy, were all necessary elements in the definition of  a 
state. Weber is generally misunderstood on this, for he never implied that the 
state would have the monopoly of  coercion, just that it would have the legitimate 
means of  coercion. This could be extended to his vision of  ruling. Weber looked 
at the state, and indeed at every social relationship, as an association in which 
two elements, force and rule, were combined (Anter 2014: 46). In fact, ‘the state 
as a relation of  rulership consisting of  command and compliance [became] the 
paradigm of  political thought in the later nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies’ (Anter 2014: 48).
Contemporary historical sociology has added nuances to a Weberian state 
theory that many consider unfinished (Anter 2014: 1–2; Mann 1993: 58). 
Mann’s ‘institutional statism’ sought to synthesise two currents that until then 
had seen the state either as a place to host particular interests or as an actor, 
entirely driven by an elite administration. Mann’s categorisation allows us 
to see some of  the flaws in the approaches to the conflict in the DRC and 
current peacebuilding policy. The first current, which sees states as places, has 
a class-based/Marxist version and a liberal/pluralist version. Class-based the-
orists think that states are the result of  class struggle at two crucial points 
during feudalism and early capitalism. This gives states their capitalist charac-
ter and their fundamental function as instruments for ‘capital accumulation 
and class regulation’ (Mann 1993: 45). In many respects, though gener-
ally outside the historical-materialist framework, this links to the vision of  
resource wars and post-colonial states as instruments for the enrichment of  
the elites and their allies that end up serving the status quo within states 
(Deneault 2008; Renton, Seddon, and Zeilig 2007). Mann’s liberal version 
of  this approach, pluralism, is for him ‘liberal democracy’s (especially Ameri-
can democracy’s) view of  itself ’ (1993: 45). It accounts for the birth of  the 
democratic state through the rise of  pressure groups contesting old regimes 
and their institutions and increasing popular participation (Mann 1993: 
45). This reflects the vision of  much peacebuilding policy and liberal schol-
arship. An old, undemocratic ‘neopatrimonial’ state is the cause of  conflict, 
it is illegitimate and it needs to be replaced by a legitimate democratic state 
where a wide spectrum of  the population is represented and is able to par-
ticipate (ISSSS 2013; Lemay-Hébert 2009; Fukuyama 2004). In both ver-
sions of  the ‘state as a place’, society is almost equated with the state and, 
as Mann notes, there is no account of  how the state operates (at least partly) 
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autonomously, nor of  how it is intervened and constituted by transnational 
pressures (1993: 47).
Mann’s second current refers to those who think of  the state as an actor, 
or what he sees as ‘true elitists’ (1993: 48). This is a branch of  state theory 
initiated by Mosca and Pareto, and later elaborated on by Oppenheimer and 
Skocpol. The latter version posits that states have autonomous power to dis-
tribute resources and act in their own geopolitical environment. Whereas this 
approach managed to clearly identify states as actors in a world of  states, it 
still took the state as unitary and systemic, too concentrated on the actual 
rulers, and forgot to account for transnational actors and international inter-
ference, as well as state–society relations (Mann 1993: 48–52). The practice 
and priorities of  many peacebuilding operations also reflect a focus on the 
actual government. As mentioned before, this has been the case of  many flawed 
democratic elections, power-sharing agreements and, in general, the focus on 
the security apparatus of  the state.
Mann’s proposal is to see state power emanating from the autonomous 
power of  different political institutions, as it has been able to constrain past and 
present struggles. The resulting institutionalised power represents ‘state power’ 
and not just ‘elite power’, which simultaneously emphasises not just that ‘elites’ 
dominate civil society but that ‘all actors are constrained by existing political 
institutions’ (Mann 1993: 52). The virtue of  this approach, to which Skocpol, 
Tilly, Weir and others contributed, is to present the state’s nature as ‘chaotic, 
irrational, with multiple departmental autonomies, pressured erratically and 
intermittently by capitalists but also by other interest groups’ (Mann 1993: 53). 
By this means Mann captures the nature of  states as configured by a complex 
interconnection of  historical processes and actors. Tilly’s particular contribu-
tion is to capture the practices of  state-making as common to the exercise of  
state authority.
Tilly’s landmark study on state formation opens with the story of  Hammu-
rabi’s conquest of  the nearby Mesopotamian city-states around late 18 BC, 
asserting that it was representative of  patterns of  state formation in history 
(1990: 1). Tilly acknowledged that the deployment of  a discourse that legiti-
mised Hammurabi’s rule as divine and just was important to the process of  
subjecting the population of  these states to his own Babylonian rule. Hammu-
rabi claimed a right and an obligation to make laws, under the divine dictate of  
the god Marduk, thus further vilifying all resistance as going against divine will 
(Tilly 1990: 1). For Tilly, although this conquest contained an important cul-
tural, religious and rule-making exercise, it was coercive power that allowed 
Hammurabi to create his state. The underlying theory is that state-making is an 
act of  power concentration determined in large part by mutually influencing 
external and internal pressures. Different combinations of  these dynamics pro-
vided different types of  states, but the pathways were similar.3 The rivalry and 
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conquest of  elites provoked wars; this provoked the need for military conscrip-
tion and taxation, centralising state power and turning it into an instrument of  
coercion against the population and for the subjugation of  rivals. The absolutism 
of  this new institution was transformed into more democratic forms of  govern-
ment only several centuries later, through wars and revolutions, and not through 
a social contract (Tilly 1990: 110–19). State–society bargaining, added to the 
development of  commercial, military and diplomatic alliances, gave way to the 
modern European state system (Tilly 1990: 15–22). This should not be read in 
terms of  the necessary pathway all states should or would follow in an evolution 
towards better and more progressive ways of  ruling. What Tilly is arguing is that 
democracy was not part of  the natural evolution of  European states; it was a 
hard and long struggle, fought over centuries. In fact, for Tilly:
At least for the European experience of  the past few centuries, a portrait of  war 
makers and state makers as coercive and self-seeking entrepreneurs bears a far 
greater resemblance to the facts than do its chief  alternatives: the idea of  a social 
contract, the idea of  an open market in which operators of  armies and states offer 
services to willing consumers, the idea of  a society whose shared norms and expecta-
tions call forth a certain kind of  government. (1985: 169)
For Tilly, war-making and the taming of  competitors for state-making was not 
about annihilating them so much as it was a process of  fostering alliances. This 
is well exemplified by Tilly’s thesis of  state-making as organised crime (1985), 
which also sheds light on the limited legitimacy and limited monopoly of  means 
of  violence that states have. By this measure, states were protection rackets. 
State-makers rise as protectors of  allies and competitors when the threats are 
real, but also when they are invented. In order to foster rule, channel accumula-
tion and gain allies, the government could invent a threat and portray itself  into 
a protector in the eyes of  elites, transferring wealth and punishing the popula-
tion if  necessary (Tilly 1985: 171). Organised crime was not a challenge to the 
state but its actual source, used to gather elite support, maintain extraction and 
yield coercive power. In this equation, the distinction between ‘“legitimate” and 
“illegitimate” force makes no difference to the fact’ (Tilly 1985: 171). For Tilly, 
the fact is that state authority requires the management and, if  possible, the 
monopoly of  violence (1985: 171). The Tillean account of  coercion and accu-
mulation offers the possibility of  understanding coercion and extraction as con-
nected to state-making not only as an account of  the formation of  a new state, 
but as continuous practices of  the assertion of  state authority.
These authors focus on a process that has as its outcome the European state, 
but their vision is only partial. Additionally, they take the European state as a 
self-made miracle, not accounting for the input that colonisation had. Mann’s 
definition of  the state centres on the rise of  differentiated institutions and per-
sonnel whose power radiates from the centre, that are linked to a particular 
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territory and exercise authority with the capacity to impose binding rules backed 
by ‘some organized physical force’ (1993: 55). Although Mann acknowledges 
the limited monopoly of  force, and the ‘capacity’ rather than the ‘legitimacy’ to 
impose rules, he still emphasises centralisation and bureaucratisation as defin-
ing state features. This does not, however, account for shared and delegated 
authority. Mann also saw states as based on and constituted by a class system 
as well as patriarchy, but separated the specific mode of  production from the 
mode of  rule-making and force. In particular, Mann (1984) saw militarism as 
separate from the rise of  capitalism and contingent to it, originating in the geo-
political needs of  states. This accounts only partially for the rise of  contemporary 
African states, so tied to the capitalist and militaristic enterprise of  European 
expansion. In general, the Weberian account of  the state centres excessively on 
the outcome of  the European state, rather than on an open-ended process with 
common practices, where processes of  legitimation and contest are permanent. 
Mann and Tilly, however, internationalise Weber’s account, adding the impact 
of  international processes, actors and structures on the local environment. They 
also show that coercion and extraction are not always seen as legitimate and 
that resistance shapes states.
Bourdieu offers a practice-based understanding of  states and state forma-
tion, while remaining within a Weberian framework. He sees states as the result 
of  the accumulation of  different forms of  capital that are rooted in the prepa-
ration for war, but offers insight into the ways these practices have been rou-
tinised. For Bourdieu (1994), the requirements of  war involve the formation 
of  ‘capital of  physical force’, which simultaneously implies the formation of  
‘economic capital’. This is expanded with ‘information capital’, which includes 
statistics and census, cartography and cultural means. The different forms of  
capital require ‘symbolic capital’, that is, legitimacy. These different forms of  
capital do not only account for the rise of  the state as kings, armies and their 
agents, but also for the bureaucratisation of  state rule. This means the sys-
tematisation, routinisation and depersonalisation of  functions related to the 
management and concentration of  those forms of  capital. The transition from 
the administration of  justice directly by the king with his immediate vassals to 
the administration of  justice by a specialised body under a codified law is very 
important for legitimacy. Yet legitimacy is always limited because consent is 
limited (Bourdieu 1994: 14–15).
Different forms of  resistance have impinged upon state-making. The het-
erogeneity of  the population was a difficulty for establishing state rule across 
Europe, and this became the target of  increasing homogenisation in terms 
of  language, religion, and administration (Tilly 1990: 107). The more these 
types of  mechanisms disturbed the subordinate population, the more resist-
ance they gathered (Tilly 1990: 100). Subordinate groups were likely to 
‘[employ] the “weapons of  the weak”’ (James Scott, cited in Tilly 1990: 101), 
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but these turned into outright revolt when the state’s actions were particu-
larly damaging to their collective identities, when they had strong ties between 
them or with national or international elites and when they had identified the 
state’s vulnerabilities. States have impacted on the form resistance has taken, 
but that resistance has also determined the form of  the state (Tilly 1990: 
117–22).
Two initial conclusions come from the above. Firstly, states have been forged 
through long historical processes and continue to be shaped by multiple pres-
sures. Secondly, despite the complexity that states have achieved, they retain a 
common pattern in their rule-making efforts through the management of  vio-
lence and wealth under a claim to legitimacy. Peacebuilding is then a process of  
supporting state claims, while establishing claims of  its own. State-making, even 
in its contemporary form, entails practices of  coercion and extraction, both 
symbolic and material, that simultaneously demand the recognition of  legiti-
mate authority. Extraction needs not to be seen only in terms of  tax extraction. 
As Tilly argues, ‘capital’ is what allows the state to finance its war-making, state-
making and the continuation of  the running of  the state, and this comes from 
taxes as well as from credit, debt and rents (1990: 84–6). These coercive and 
extractive practices, whether in the form of  the threat or the use of  force, taxa-
tion, wealth and rights redistribution, are the object of  resistance. Yet much 
more needs to be said about how specifically these aspects and dynamics are 
represented in a context of  war and peacebuilding in contemporary Africa. 
Additionally, a response to the Eurocentrism of  this Weberian legacy of  histori-
cal sociology is required.
African states: challenges, particularities and generalities
It has been precisely a Weberian account of  the state that has underpinned the 
vision that the DRC does not exist or that it does not function in the right way 
(Eriksen 2011: 237–9). For Migdal and Schlichte (2005: 4) a Weberian ‘image’ 
of  the state as ‘coherent, fairly unified actors, set apart from, or above, other 
social organizations’ has permeated both academic research and policy-making. 
In fact, for Migdal, the state is a ‘field of  power marked by the use and threat of  
violence and shaped by 1) the image of  a coherent, controlling organization in 
a territory, which is a representation of  the people bounded by that territory, and 
2) the actual practices involving those staffing its multiple parts and those they 
engage in their roles as state officials’ (2004: 15–16). The use of  informal extra-
official channels does not mean that these are not geared towards ruling and 
asserting authority. Migdal and Schlichte agree with the view that violence is 
central to state power (2005: 16). Their view is that this power, which affects 
practices of  norm-making, tax and labour extraction, bureaucratic administra-
tion and the use of  force, will vary across states (Migdal and Schlichte 2005: 
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16). A focus on actual practices beyond legal/illegal, formal/informal or public/
private divides is what can demonstrate the ways in which states operate (Migdal 
and Schlichte 2005: 16 and 31). This focus has also taken scholars to note the 
multiple forms of  governance that have emerged as a result of  civil society 
groups taking over, as well as from the consequences of  war (Meagher et al. 
2014; Titeca and De Herdt 2011); although, as De Herdt and Sardan argue, the 
implication of  civil society in governance and informal arrangements is hardly 
a new phenomenon (2015: 3). For Achille Mbembe, as will be seen below, what 
defines African states is their entanglement with time, processes and dynamics 
that make them assert their authority by means of  coercion and extraction 
under claims of  legitimacy through private and informal channels. The ideal 
version of  Weberian state theory underpinning the measurement of  the capac-
ity and propriety of  states raises important ethical implications and leaves many 
aspects of  African states unexplained.
Ethical challenges to the bellicist account
One of  the main challenges to the bellicist account is its Eurocentric narrative, 
which has an ethical and a methodological dimension. The experience of  African 
state formation has particular specificities marked by the experience of  slavery 
and colonisation. As Makau Mutua notes (2001), this experience configures 
different a state–subjects relation to that of  Western states, which is based on 
struggles embedded in the processes of  industrialisation and the rise of  the 
bourgeoisie.
The bellicist account’s ‘elision of  empire’ has been the target of  critiques 
(Carvalho, Leira and Hobson 2011: 737). Bhambra (2007) argues that the 
Weberian-inspired narrative has a civilisational bias. Its narrow view of  pro-
cesses outside violence and war has artificially created a ‘success’ story by which 
to measure others. Yet it is important to recognise that even in the relatively 
parochial narrative of  European state formation its sources of  authority, as Tilly 
points out, are not consent and democracy, but war, coercion and accumulation. 
When colonisation is added to this narrative, which, as Bhambra (2010) argues, 
is constitutive and not a consequence of  modernity, it shows that European 
states were not entirely self-made but have benefited from extraction, exploita-
tion and war in the colonies.
The challenge to the Eurocentric versions of  the rise of  Europe and capital-
ism does not necessarily undermine the argument that war, coercion and accu-
mulation played a role in the emergence of  states. Hobson’s research (2004) 
shows how tools and ideas fundamental for the rise of  ‘the West’ were the result 
of  the copying, appropriation and exchange of  inventions and technologies 
developed in East Asia and North Africa. With the example of  Central America, 
Holden (2004) sees that the climax of  state power, well into the twentieth 
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century, was not so much the concentration of  coercive power in the hands of  
the state but its dispersal amongst the population. Common to these accounts is 
what Veena Das saw as the fundamental flaw in Weber’s argument: ‘The state’s 
monopoly over what Weber called “legitimate” violence does not end violence 
– it redistributes it’ (2007: 4). The flaw is in having concentrated exclusively on 
the mechanisms of  centralisation rather than on coercive and military practices 
as important to the process.
Other critiques argue that war, in particular, has not played such a funda-
mental role in Europe, and less so elsewhere. Teschke notes that royal marriages 
and the process of  class formation in Europe gave way (somewhere close to the 
early nineteenth century, and not the Westphalian peace) to the so-called 
modern state system (2003: 11; 220–5). He also challenges the notion of  the 
concentration of  coercive mechanisms. He argues that:
due to peasant possession of  the means of  subsistence, feudal mobility enforced 
access to peasant produce by political and military means. Since every lord repro-
duced himself  not only politically but also individually on the basis of  his lordship, 
control over the means of  violence was not monopolised by the state, but oligopolisti-
cally dispersed among a landed nobility. (2003: 46)
This resonates with the state-formation theses outside Europe (Clapham 2000; 
Herbst 2000; Young 1997). Patterns of  state formation in central Africa have 
been varied. The Great Lakes region, together with the Ethiopian highlands, 
have had ‘the longest traditions of  relatively centralized state structures’ (Herbst 
2000: 11). These have been the result of  migration flows and the influence of  
the centralising exercises of  political rule in the Kongo, Luba-Lunda and the 
Kunda kingdoms (Muiu and Martin 2009: 104). Wa Muiu and Martin argue 
that the Kongo kingdom had developed a highly centralised structure around a 
single currency, a centralised army and the king (Muiu and Martin 2009: 
104–5). However, this power was articulated on a mutual assurance of  author-
ity between the king and local elites. Protection and tribute formed a network 
of  political authority where elites shared power, and their allegiance to the king 
was linked to religious, identity, security and economic agendas (Ndaywel è 
Nziem 2009: 135–6). State-making was not just about concentrating power 
away from competitors but also about sharing sovereignties. Resistance on the 
part of  the population took the form of  flight from authorities. Distance to the 
centralised administration of  power meant laxer power, and this encouraged 
authorities and elites to extend their rule through alliances rather than war 
(Muiu and Martin 2009: 104).
Looking at actual practices of  governance, James Scott provides a different 
account, arguing that what drives state-makers is ‘high modernism’, that is, the 
‘faith’ in administration, science and technocracy to organise people and nature 
in a productive way (1998: 4–6). As Proudhon argues,
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To be ruled is to be kept an eye on, inspected, spied on, regulated, indoctrinated, 
sermonized, listed and checked off, estimated, appraised, censured, ordered about. … 
To be ruled is at every operation, transaction, movement, to be noted, registered, 
counted, priced, admonished, prevented, reformed, redressed, corrected. (Cited in 
Scott 1998: 183)
Statebuilding in this version is an exercise of  control that aims at making the 
population and the environment legible, hence simplified and homogenous. 
These practices are still underlined by the logic of  asserting rule and extracting 
consent, taxes and labour under the threat of  or use of  coercion. Additionally, 
in the DRC these homogenising practices have not been the hallmark of  the state-
building exercise. The largest census undertaken was done only in 2011 for 
voting purposes.4 Even the biometric census completed in 2015 for the military 
and its new phone-payment system do not change the fact that governance 
practices do not rely on turning the Congolese into consuming and working 
taxpayers (EEAS 2015; UNDP 2010).
There is a deeper question of  the feasibility and ethics of  offering an intel-
ligible reading of  the forms of  social and political imagination in contemporary 
Africa solely through conceptual structures and fictional representations used 
precisely to deny African societies any historical depth and to define them as 
radically other, as all that the West is not (Mbembe 2001: 11). Not least, the 
European state, most prominently embedded in an idealised service-provider form 
in policy documents, makes the African state a bad state. Dunn noted that 
‘[s]ince citizenship, territorial integrity, and monopoly on the tools of  coercion 
are all considered prerequisites for statehood, this raises serious doubts about 
whether African states are in fact states at all’ (2001: 55). Dunn shows how 
common misunderstandings in both IR and Africanist state theory, which take 
the state as a given, impose a European model as shorthand for what states 
are. As a result ‘African’ states are applied all sorts of  ‘madlibs’ – adjectives to 
be inserted in a blank space next to the word ‘state’ – all of  them accentuat-
ing its lack of  something, its failure. Dunn’s (2001: 46) survey of  these ‘labels’ 
includes:
‘failed’ (Leys 1976), ‘lame’ (Sandbrook 1985), ‘fictive’ (Callaghy 1987), ‘weak’ 
(Rothchild 1987), ‘collapsing’ (Diamond 1987), ‘quasi’ (Migdal 1988), ‘invented’ 
and ‘imposed’ (Jackson 1990), ‘shadow’ (O’Brien 1991), ‘over-developed’ and ‘cen-
tralized’ (Davidson 1992), ‘swollen’ (Zartman 1995), ‘soft’ (Herbst 1996), ‘extrac-
tive’ and ‘parasitic’ (Clark 1998a), ‘premodern’ (Buzan 1998) and ‘post-state’ 
(Boone 1998).
The pervasiveness of  these labels speaks not just of  how accurate the framework 
of  coercion and extraction is, but also of  how it is applied to African politics. 
Therefore, a focus on the historical practices embedded in the present could 
bring about a richer view of  contemporary statebuilding. State-making should 
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be seen as an ‘ongoing and open-ended process’ rather than as a pathway to a 
particular institutional arrangement (Jung 2008: 40). These critiques also high-
light the need to contextualise in order to understand the particularities of  each 
process and place.
The Africanist approach
A focus on African states highlights that there are not different times in world 
history, but that different state configurations are the result of  their historical 
interconnections. This is best put by Achille Mbembe in his notion of  entangle-
ment. Mbembe is representative of  a heterogeneous Africanist school that has 
theorised African politics and social processes through their historicity. In theo-
rising the nature of  political power in Africa, Mbembe develops several useful 
arguments about state-making. Firstly, Mbembe argues that violence, extrac-
tion and symbolic representations are inseparable. Secondly, these take place 
across several divides that are ultimately irrelevant: dominants/dominated, 
formal/informal, local/global, public/private and historical/present. Finally, this 
can be grasped only through the notion of  ‘entanglement’, meaning mutual 
transformations and syncretism, not only of  actors and processes, but also of  
time and space. This notion includes practices, structures and systems of  rep-
resentation. These form the complex political space, called the ‘postcolony’. For 
Mbembe:
The notion ‘postcolony’ identifies specifically a given historical trajectory – that of  
societies recently emerging from the experience of  colonization and the violence 
which the colonial relationship involves. To be sure, the postcolony is chaotically 
pluralistic; it has nonetheless an internal coherence. It is a specific system of  signs, 
a particular way of  fabricating simulacra or re-forming stereotypes. [It] is character-
ized by a distinctive style of  political improvisation, by a tendency to excess and lack 
of  proportion, as well as by distinctive ways identities are multiplied, transformed, 
and put into circulation. But the postcolony is also made up of  a series of  corporate 
institutions and a political machinery that, once in place, constitute a distinctive 
regime of  violence. In this sense, the postcolony is a particularly revealing, and 
rather dramatic, stage on which are played out the wider problems of  subjection and 
its corollary, [in]discipline [– and of  the emancipation of  the subject]. (2001: 102–3, 
emphasis added)5
At its core, what characterises ‘the political’ in post-colonial Africa is its own 
historicity, its pluralism, its institutional structure and its practices simultane-
ously constituted by violence, symbolism and a modus operandi of  excess, improv-
isation and subjection. It is not surprising for Mbembe that the post-colonial 
state is ‘itself  a form of  domination’, due to the use of  ‘universal techniques (a 
state and its apparatus)’ (2001: 60). What has shaped post-colonial states’ ‘insti-
tutional machinery’ is the confrontation and symbiosis of  the new educated 
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elites (evolués) and the old colonial administration (Mbembe 2001: 40). Elites’ 
struggles were aggravated by foreign interventions and the new ways in which 
African economies were inserted into the global economy. During the Cold War 
great powers forcefully removed democratically elected leaders across Africa 
(e.g. Lumumba, Krumah, Sankara, amongst others). The introduction of  cash 
crops, of  economic adjustments dictated by the Bretton Woods institutions and 
corporate pressures fostered externally backed factionalism, social inequality 
and even wars (Mbembe 2001: 41). Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
dismantled much of  the state infrastructure that even minimally sustained 
public services such as health and education. They also consolidated the African 
rural environment as an export-orientated production area and peasants as 
consumers of  manufactured goods, including basic products like wheat and 
corn (Chossudovsky 1997).
The problem is that this historical trajectory, entangled with different actors 
and processes that are both national and international, is occluded by the 
accounts of  the sources of  conflict in the DRC and Africa in general. The litera-
ture on statebuilding, with the discourse of  state failure, and the Africanist lit-
erature, with the discourse of  ‘neopatrimonialism’, have made coercion and 
accumulation pathological practices of  statecraft (Migdal and Schlichte 2005: 
12–13; Wai 2012b). In fact, neopatrimonialism has turned into the fundamen-
tal characteristic of  state failure, and hence conflict, in peacebuilding policy in 
the DRC (ISSSS 2013).
These accounts, however, raise many of  the issues seen above in regard to 
the portrayal of  an idealised European model versus the depoliticised and pathol-
ogised African state. Neopatrimonialism is a contemporary application of  
Weber’s concept of  patrimonialism. What Weber wanted to conceptualise is a 
type of  authority which corresponds to what he calls ‘traditional’ societies, and 
captures the ways in which rule, distribution and accountability are exercised 
(Weber 1978: Ch. 12 and 13). The political and economic spheres are not auton-
omous rational, bureaucratised activities. These are enmeshed in social personal 
relations permeating the whole society. The problem is that Weber’s concept has 
been misused by conceiving it as a totalising regime, where forms of  accountabil-
ity and control do not exist (Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston 2009: 129). The 
outcome of  this approach has been to portray neopatrimonialism as an ‘inher-
ent’, ‘core’ and even ‘inevitable’ feature of  African politics and to see African 
politics as corrupt and backward (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994; Darnton 
1994).
Neopatrimonialism, and the particular version of  it that has been applied 
to account for the sources of  conflict in the DRC, premises the nature of  politics 
under a paradigm of  unproductiveness. The problem is not the fact that there is 
violence and extraction, nor that authorities exercise them, but that they do so 
in a self-gain-seeking way through informal personal networks of  patronage. 
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Violence no longer produces public order or political contestation that is later 
channelled as institutional development.
As Crawford Young notes of  the DRC, conflict is part of  a trend in which 
‘armed groups exhausted anti-colonial and socialist ideologies, turning into 
gangs and jumping on the bandwagon of  the resource revenues, fostered also 
by an increasing state weakness’ (2002: 28). Rulers, no longer able to count 
on the support they received during the Cold War, have been forced to engage 
in criminal strategies of  illegal trafficking and support of  armed groups and to 
depend on non-state economic alliances (Reno 1998b). ‘These rulers’, Reno 
argues, ‘reject the pursuit of  a broader project of  creating a state that serves a 
collective good or even of  creating institutions that are capable of  developing 
independent perspectives and acting on behalf  of  interests distinct from their 
rulers’ personal exercise of  power’ (1998b: 1). The underlying assumption is 
that this violence has not served a social revolution or a developmental project 
as in Europe, giving rise to the view of  the DRC as a ‘cancer’ (Dunn 2003: Ch. 5).
The argument about unproductive violence is closely related to the argument 
about unproductive rent extraction. Bayart argues that the ‘politics of  the belly’, 
that is, ‘the social struggles that make up the quest for hegemony and the pro-
duction of  the State bear the hallmarks of  the rush for spoils in which all actors 
– rich and poor – participate in the role of  networks’ (2009: 235). Taking 
account of  the historical trajectory of  African politics, Bayart’s argument con-
centrates on the failure of  elites to transform people into labour and capital into 
investment. Rent extraction is presented only as a tool for gathering elite support 
and foster kin-links. In other words, there is economic production but the surplus 
is ‘dilapidated’ (Mbembe 1991c: 14). Challenging these theses, Mbembe notes 
that they:
seem to argue that it is only in Africa that the economy is inserted in social relations. 
And that … [the economy] is not (as we imagine it must be) a domain separated, 
autonomous, of  the social organisation. The relations of  reciprocity, redistribution 
and circulation are, therefore, treated as ‘extra-economic’. (1991c: 15)
Not only are there ‘many economic regimes’ but also ‘[t]he processes of  accu-
mulation are, consequently, multi-formed’ (Mbembe 1991c: 16). Rent and pro-
ductivity, far from being incompatible, are a source of  authority (Mbembe 
1991c: 17). In the DRC as in other places, military and economic actors provide 
a presence of  authority.
Additionally, and taking Weber’s stricter meaning of  neopatrimonialism, if  
we look closely it is possible to see that ‘patronage’ is not a one-way approach, 
but is part of  a system of  mutual accountability. As Sophia Mappa points out, 
amongst most ethnic communities across Eastern DRC, authority is seen as an 
obligation that the chief  cannot avoid. Authority is then premised on its value 
to serve and not for its capacity to command (Mappa 1998: 57–9). The role of  
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reciprocity is not simply a matter of  who gets the most riches from whom; it is 
a question of  how the basis for distribution is established. Reciprocity could be 
seen as a contested and changing system by which a community establishes its 
norms of  political and economic distribution. This may not be the result of  leg-
islation, but it is the result of  negotiations in which a large part of  the commu-
nity, at the grassroots level, participates. This is not to argue that there are no 
corrupt politicians in the DRC who are actively promoting violence. The point 
here is to warn against making generalising descriptions of  ‘Congo politics’ as 
neopatrimonial, and against premising the solution to this ‘disease’ on the devel-
opment of  forms of  accountability and legitimacy that look like an idealised 
version of  Western states, politics and democracy. Neopatrimonialism remains 
as a powerful simplifying account of  both policy and literature, making the 
problems of  the DRC something localised (De Grassi 2008: 21).
Mbembe’s insights allow us to go beyond these simplifications and look 
further into the nature of  political authority and the nature of  domination. At 
the very least, we should understand that the DRC’s political infrastructure is 
still conditioned by those broader historical and international political-economic 
processes. The DRC is also still based on a dual customary and administrative 
system, conditioning present sources of  war, land conflicts and the deployment 
of  authority. Customary chiefs today play a role as agents of  state power in 
statebuilding strategies, or as necessary accomplices, either voluntarily or by 
force, for the extractive activities of  multinational corporations (MNCs), armed 
groups and foreign governments. They also play a role in conveying resistance.
Complexities and the challenge to resistance
However, these complex relations and blurred divides lead Mbembe to cast doubt 
on resistance and argue that political relations are convivial. For Mbembe this 
means that the political landscape is more defined by an agency of  subjection, 
of  accommodation and ‘entanglement’ than by conflict between a category of  
resisters and dominants. Mbembe provides us here with a fundamental chal-
lenge that should be addressed. But let us briefly take a look at the present 
context of  the DRC.
Since 1996, the DRC conflict has been characterised more by the targeting 
of  the civilian population than by a conflict between armed groups. The civilian 
population have been systematically subjected to different forms of  domination, 
through war, forceful displacement, killings, torture, sexual violence, forced 
labour and forced marriages (Human Rights Watch 2010; Pillay 2010: 289). 
This has at times been carried out by foreign and national armies, as well as by 
popular militias who were operating as part of  a broader government strategy. 
Throughout the different wars, the DRC has gone through the toppling of  a 
long-term dictator, two moments of  genocide and several international 
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interventions (by the African Union (AU), EU and UN). Although the most 
common strategy followed by the population against the war has been flight, 
civilians have actively participated in it in different roles, by either contesting or 
facilitating these forms of  violence.
When Mbembe calls the African post-colonial political space an ‘economy 
of  death’ and a ‘regime of  impunity’, it partly resonates with the cacophony of  
events in the present DRC. What Mbembe wants to capture is, on the one hand, 
a condition, which is that of  the nature of  the political space in Africa as one 
that has become cohabited by those who kill and get killed; and, on the other 
hand, a sort of  ‘agency’ of  subjugation (Mbembe 2001: 11–8; 200–5). Killing 
and being killed are no longer the domain of  any particular class or state agent 
or the domain of  power. They are entangled, meaning actual, even intimate 
hybridisation between domination and subjugation.
The result, however, is an exaggerated theory of  domination, or, as Judith 
Butler (1992) puts it, a sort of  ‘extravagant power’. While Mbembe rejects almost 
all social-theoretical concepts for doing violence to the nature of  African politics, 
society and culture, his notion of  domination as an inescapable desired ‘mas-
culine Thanatos’ projects a vision of  Africa that reproduces the assumptions he 
wants to challenge (Weate 2003: 39). Although this is a departure from earlier 
thinking, where he captured the fluidity of  relationships, the modes of  exercis-
ing domination and their subversion, here he is not only ignoring the capacity 
for insubordination within structures of  domination but also the important 
relations of  solidarity and mutual support that come to add to the relations of  
death and abuse.6
Resistance in colonial and post-colonial times has tended to subvert the 
terms of  such cohabitation. For example, Mamdani points out that whereas the 
colonial state apparatus relied on ethnic and religious authorities, ‘one finds it 
difficult to recall a single major peasant uprising over the colonial period that 
has not been either ethnic or religious in inspiration’ (1996: 24). Nzongola-
Ntalaja also argues that resistance in colonial times emerged in the ‘new struc-
tures that colonialism had itself  created: colonial army, workers, camps and 
compulsory agricultural labour’ (2002: 13). These analyses indicate the need to 
account for practices of  resistance in the daily experience of  relations of  domina-
tion. Mbembe shows that relations of  domination and resistance are not neces-
sarily a story of  good and bad, not even of  the advance of  an ethical agenda. 
This warning against simplifying an analysis of  resistance leads to embracing 
the ambiguous realms in which relations of  domination take place.
Peacebuilding and state-making in Africa in the twenty-first century
African states have generally been seen as the epitome of  state failure. The DRC, 
along with Sierra Leone and Somalia, has featured prominently under this 
42
Everyday resistance, peacebuilding and state-making
paradigm (Rotberg 2003). In the DRC the claims to legitimacy to carry out 
peacebuilding strategies have been built on the claim that peacebuilders have 
the capacity and knowledge to build the state apparatus and to enable policies 
that serve the goals of  peace, development and democracy. These practices have 
also tended to reproduce formulae of  indirect and shared government rather 
than crystallising in the centralised bureaucratic authority that peacebuilding 
policies have as a model. Authority has been shared, whether as a way of  extend-
ing state authority, as a way of  fostering alliances or as a compromise in the light 
of  external and internal pressures. The exercise of  coercion and extraction has 
been undertaken by a myriad of  state and non-state actors. Coercive practices 
have also ensued from the fact that, as Chapter 3 will show, war has been 
directed against the civilian population. This is not just a feature of  contempo-
rary African states; as Krasner argues, ‘rulers have frequently departed from the 
principle that external actors should be excluded from authority’ (1999: 8). This 
has been done through invitation, intervention or negotiation. Having outlined 
above a schema of  what the practices of  statebuilding are, this section contex-
tualises how plurality and decentralisation in the exercise of  authority, coercion 
and extraction take place in the DRC and links these to the ways in which the 
discourse of  statebuilding provides a legitimating mechanism for those practices 
and their actors.
Sharing authority, sharing coercive and extractive capacity
The forms of  private indirect government that Mbembe speaks of  have been 
a prominent way of  asserting authority. This is particularly the case of  the 
Kivus, where, aside from being a region that has traditionally been ruled 
through the power of  customary chiefs, conflict is ongoing, adding a variety 
of  actors that claim authority, coercive and extractive power. The DRC Govern-
ment has shared means of  coercion and tax extraction with armed groups, 
neighbouring countries and non-state actors. The UN and donors like the US 
and the UK have encouraged this option in order to have state representation 
in certain areas.
Both government and UN officials acknowledge that the presence of  peace-
keepers in those places where the Government is not present acts as a form of  
state authority.7 It is not uncommon to see multinational corporations, inter-
national non-governmental organisations (INGOs), UN mission representatives, 
the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) and poorly 
equipped government officials undertaking what could be seen as state func-
tions. They patrol, provide civil order, tax the population, build infrastructure 
and provide arbitration, amongst other things. As Raeymaekers, Menkhaus and 
Vlassenroot state, ‘the post-election security predicament in the DR Congo […] 
combines elements of  non-state governance such as military control over 
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resources and cross-border regulation’ (2008: 16). Hence, as shown in later 
chapters, they become targets of  resistance.
For instance, peace agreements, encouraged by donors, have granted the 
National Congress for the Defence of  the People (CNDP) – a Rwandan-backed 
armed group operating from about 2006 to 2010 – decision-making power in 
the Tripartite agreement to return refugees to the region.8 Although the DRC is 
the signatory to these agreements with the UN High Commission for Refugees 
(UNHCR) and the governments of  Tanzania and of  Rwanda, it was the CNDP 
that represented the DRC Government. In a US embassy cable, Ambassador 
Garvelink reported that
A UNHCR official candidly said that the Congolese delegation had signed the 
Tripartite ‘for the gallery’ and that much of  the refugee return process was ‘out of  
the government’s control’ – overseen by the CNDP parallel administration, which 
the official suggested would become even more entrenched following the recent 
GDRC [Government of  the DRC] cabinet reshuffle which excluded the CNDP. (2010, 
para. 7)
This statement represents the widespread acknowledgement of  Rwanda’s pres-
ence in Eastern DRC. It also shows that there are different statebuilding projects 
taking place simultaneously, each having a difficult relationship with the promo-
tion of  peace and stability in the region (Shepherd 2010). However, more than 
a political compromise, in so far as this geopolitical social engineering is acti-
vated under the premise that the alternative is war, it is coercive. And in so far 
as it has an impact on land access and local political representation, it also has 
an extractive effect.
Shared authority is seen in cases where public authority has been left to 
multinational corporations. This was the case of  Anvil Mining operations in the 
village of  Kilwa, Katanga.9 Most villagers worked for the company, which oper-
ated as a de facto government. When in 2004 villagers revolted against the 
mining company, they created a poorly armed group to start looting the mine. 
Their reason was that the mine was not providing the village with jobs. The 
company had expelled most local workers except for the security guards. Anvil 
Mining in this case retaliated by flying the army into the village and massacring 
up to 100 people. Although this case caused outrage, not only due to the number 
of  dead, but also due to how the MNC–army link operated as a despotic govern-
ment, the strategy of  allowing companies to operate as de facto governments is 
still in place.
In Twangiza, South Kivu, for example, the MNC Banro is the de facto govern-
ment (Banro Representative 2010). The old town was on the site of  a gold deposit 
that Banro wanted to mine. Negotiations with the customary chief  and the 
mediation of  a non-governmental organisation (NGO) whom Banro’s 
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representative was not allowed to name resulted in the moving of  residents to a 
newly built town a few kilometres away from the old one. This is nothing new 
in the DRC, whose ‘trinity’ of  colonial authority was exercised by the state, the 
corporation and the Church (Turner 2007: 28). However, in the context of  war, 
mining companies take on special security roles (Hönke 2012). These roles 
include putting in place an indirect form of  government by providing services to 
the population such as patrolling operations, recruitment of  private security and 
cooperating with government intelligence agencies to assure civil peace.10 This 
is actually promoted by international agencies, especially international financial 
institutions and MONUC/MONUSCO, which seek to reconstruct state sover-
eignty that is able ‘to legitimize deals with foreign firms and creditors’ (Dunn 
2001: 53). This strategy also ‘leaves in place an interlocutor who acknowledges 
debts and provides a point of  contact between foreign state officials and strong-
men’ (William Reno cited in Dunn 2001: 53). Still, the result is the plural con-
stitution of  political authority.
Authority is inseparable from its coercive and extractive capacity. As detailed 
more extensively in Chapter 3, the clearest example is the power-sharing agree-
ments that came out of  the 2002 Sun City agreements. Those who gained seats 
in government were not only warring parties but also those who had spoiled 
most resources during the war (UN Panel of  Experts 2001). There has also been 
a policy ever since these agreements of  reintegrating armed groups into the 
army but deploying them in the same areas where they had been operating 
before. This has officialised their tax levying, mine exploitation and informal 
order maintenance in those localities. This has been the case of  the FDLR in the 
area of  Shabunda in 2002, or the CNDP in 2007.
The military operations that have taken place since 2009 as an invigorated 
strategy against armed groups have had ambiguous effects in relation to the 
restoration of  state authority. On the one hand, military operations have had the 
effect of  giving the FARDC increasing control over mining (Global Witness 
2010b). On the other hand, this is a sign of  Rwandan interventionism. As Map 
1.1 shows, FARDC has control of  the greater number of  mines. However, as 
many of  the FARDC deployments in control of  the mines are in fact ex-CNDP 
troops, these continued to serve the CNDP structure until recently and have 
continued to grant Rwanda access to mineral exploitation (UN Group of  Experts 
2012a, 2012b, para. 141).
These arrangements are certainly a feature of  the political compromises 
necessary to end war, but they also go hand in hand with the strategy of  deploy-
ing the military and police as a representation of  state authority which has also 
largely been encouraged by the UN and DRC’s main donors. The FARDC has been 
identified as the biggest human rights abuser, yet the consequences of  having 
them deployed among the population are left for the population to deal with. 
Populations are claimed to give consent to this form of  authoritarianism, to 
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which the general response is either to negotiate or to resist. This is not a parallel-
state order but the one on which statebuilding in the DRC rests. Certainly, when 
the state is not particularly present, state agents and those on which consent is 
claimed can and do subvert roles. As is observed in Chapter 7, this means that 
subordinate classes might use the opportunity to enter into exchanges to mutu-
ally benefit from this relation, just as much as those representing authorities 
might use the opportunity to garner their support.
High modernism as legitimacy
The authority of  statebuilding stems from a discourse that defines it as the 
process necessary to foster peace, promote democracy and enable economic 
development after conflict. Embedded in this discourse is a claim that asserts the 
knowledge and capacity for undertaking the task of  statebuilding in addition to 
decision-making. This discourse portrays the state as an institution of  protection 
and social change. On the one hand, war, oppression and poverty are the effect 
of  state failure; on the other hand, the state is the embodiment of  liberty, peace 
and development. These two premises have provided a sort of  auto-generated 
legitimacy to statebuilders, making the state and their interventions public 
goods in themselves. Scott’s vision of  statebuilding as ‘high modernism’ fits here 
in that it is primarily a ‘faith’ and a ‘belief ’. In Scott’s words, high modernism is:
the belief  in the capacity of  technicians and engineers to design and implement 
comprehensive new forms of  living and production that would be superior – that is, 
more ‘progressive’, productive, healthy, and humane to anything thus far devised. 
(1999: 284)
Nevertheless statebuilding provides neither protection nor social change in the 
form that is stated. Chapter 4 will show how this failure gives way to a blame 
exchange between the DRC Government and the MONUC/MONUSCO. What is 
important to remark on here is that the discourse plays two important functions 
in terms of  legitimacy: (1) it turns statebuilding into authority without the need 
for popular consent; and (2) it maintains legitimacy in the face of  failure (Heath-
ershaw 2008). To undertake statebuilding for the maintenance of  international 
peace and security and for the protection of  the population does not need nego-
tiation or consent from the population. Since about 2010 in the Kivus an 
increased militarisation of  the region, a subsequent increase in violence towards 
the civilian population and the fostering of  networks of  patronage against eco-
nomic development mean that the effects of  military/corporate rule are exter-
nalised onto the population while leaving few mechanisms of  accountability 
standing.
Statebuilders, whether national or international, have no illusions that a 
Keynesian-type state will be built in the DRC in the near future, nor that their 
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own practices are totally representative of  what is stated in policy documents. A 
MONUC officer put it succinctly:
Our main focus is to build the minimum necessary for institutionalisation – the state 
will take 50 or 100 years to function. Civil society needs to play an advocacy role 
and also be a partner for reconstruction. We also need to rebuild the morale. 
(MONUC Political Affairs Officer (no. 7) 2009)
This is representative of  a discourse that is deployed as an authority claim but 
that externalises any failures or blames onto the actual target. In this sense, the 
DRC is an instance of  a pattern rather than an exception. Defining the problem 
as the lack of  the state allows the solution to be defined in both technical and 
ethical ways. The technocraticism infused in statebuilding is also based on an 
ethic of  ‘doing something’. As Chandler argues, ‘[t]his simplistic focus sets up 
an interventionist discourse where western governments are seen to have the 
solution to problems of  non-western states and where any western government 
action, regardless of  its outcome, can generally be portrayed as better than 
acquiescence and passivity’ (2003: 305). The underlying construction of  local 
inadequacy simultaneously reifies an image of  international responsibility, 
knowledge and capacity.
These practices are part of  a logic of  state authority assertion as much as 
a practice of  domination. These aspects identify post-conflict statebuilding as 
a combination of  the micro-politics of  the DRC, the politics of  the region and 
the politics of  post-conflict statebuilding. This interaction reflects factors of  
historical continuity and change. How they are present through governing 
arrangements, proxy wars and UN-supported military operations leads us to 
contextualise how these practices take place. One of  the distinctive features is 
that centralisation of  authority, of  coercion and extraction is not as central as 
the management of  state authority throughout the territory is. However, this 
opens new sources of  violence and does not always guarantee the extension 
of  state authority. In this regard, the discourse of  protection and social change 
provides a stronger mechanism for legitimacy, even in the face of  failure, than 
popular consent does.
Ambiguity and pluralism in peacebuilding and resistance
This chapter has consolidated three key ideas that run through the book. 
Firstly, that peacebuilding is a process of  asserting, consolidating and exercis-
ing state rule through coercive and extractive practices under a claim to legiti-
macy. This takes the form of  improvised discharge and peacebuilding becomes 
mediated by multiple actors that create plural authority. Its discourse of  social 
change and protection provides a way to claim legitimate authority. Sec-
ondly, the chapter has highlighted that resistance is rooted in the coercive and 
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extractive practices embedded in the exercise of  state rule and the assertion 
of  state authority. The outcome of  the peacebuilding process is not increasing 
rights and fostering of  development but the externalisation of  violence and of  
political agendas onto the population. Finally, and most importantly, the rela-
tionship between statebuilding and resistance speaks of  a historically contingent 
process rather than a dynamic of  liberal/international statebuilding and local 
resistance.
A critical reading of  historical-sociological accounts of  state formation, 
especially from an Africanist perspective, has provided the theoretical stand-
point from which to observe how the nature of  the political context determines 
practices of  resistance. To this extent, practices of  violence and extraction refer 
to patterns in state-making. However, it has been highlighted that not only 
concentration of  coercive means and accumulation account for statebuild-
ing. Following Mbembe, it has been shown that management, distribution and 
sharing can provide further coercive and extractive power and a way to exer-
cise state authority. The claim to legitimacy and symbolic capital allows for 
these practices to be carried out under the premise of  necessity and civilian 
protection.
The context of  power relations in which multiple statebuilding projects 
coalesce impinges on resistance. Plural forms of  domination give rise to a series 
of  resistance strategies that make resistance heterogeneous. The internationally 
led programmes under which government and NGOs operate do not reproduce 
a different structure of  authority or a different type of  resistance. Zürcher 
(2011) sees this as ‘the local’ being imposed on ‘the international’. But, as we 
have seen, it is more that these two spheres (international and local) do not 
provide adequate analytical categories for studying resistance or statebuilding. 
There is no ‘international’ statebuilding as an outcome. The insight that the 
DRC provides in this perspective is that peacebuilding is not so much a ‘hybrid’ 
of  international and local agency as it is a process of  state reconstruction that 
reflects the co-constituted nature of  any given political institution and order 
in world politics.
This resonates with an everyday framework of  resistance. The use of  eve-
ryday theory in peace and conflict studies has been done to theorise the ways 
in which local practices have subverted internationally led policies. The trade-
off  has been the loss of  significant historical and sociological depth, not only 
in regard to the state-making process but also in regard to the political spaces 
where these processes have taken place. As such, if  the everyday framework is 
to be fully applied, it would have to respond to the nature of  statebuilding not 
as an international policy but as a process entangled in the historicity of  Africa, 
muddled by ambiguities, improvisations, continuities and changes. The every-
day framework would have to live up to the challenge of  a ‘chaotically pluralistic’ 
political space and even become an insight into it.
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NOTES
 1 This book understands intervention in the broad sense that it has within peace and con-
flict studies. It includes forms of  interference in the domestic affairs of  another state, 
military acts of  aggression and collective security mechanisms activated by the UN Secu-
rity Council. It also includes a broad spectrum of  conflict and post-conflict formulas, 
including humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, peace-building strategies and 
capacity-building, amongst others (Brahimi 2000; Chandler, Chesterman, and Laakso 
2007; UN General Assembly 1945: 1.1 and 2.7).
 2 The centrality of  war in this account leads Centeno to speak of  it as the ‘bellicist’ account 
(2003: 11–26).
 3 Tilly differentiates states according to their organisational structure, including: city-
states, tribute-taking empires and nation-states (1990: 21–5).
 4 The last census dates from 1984. For electoral purposes, in 2011 a registry of  the adult 
population was undertaken (Carter Center 2012; Institut National de la Statistique 2012; 
UN Statistics Division 2010).
 5 Please also note that on p. 103 of  the cited English version the translation ends the quote 
with the word ‘discipline’. However, the French version is slightly different: ‘Voilà pour-
quoi la postcolonie pose, de façon fort aiguë, le problème de l’assujettissement, et de son 
corollaire, l’indiscipline ou, pour ainsi dire, de l’émancipation du sujet.’ It is an important 
nuance. It is more likely that, after having identified the characteristics, features and 
structures of  domination in the postcolony, Mbembe ends the paragraph reflecting on 
how subjection, indiscipline and emancipation play out in that political space (Mbembe 
2000b: 140).
 6 For Mbembe’s earlier thinking see Mbembe (1988, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c). In his latest 
work, Mbembe refines the argument, asserting that change and emancipation are pos-
sible through a reinvention of  the subject (Mbembe 2010).
 7 This was a common view amongst 17 UN officers interviewed. A UN officer stated in an 
interview something quite obvious in Eastern Congo: ‘in some places we are the only 
visible authority’ (MONUC Civil Affairs Officer (no. 14), 2009). This was also shared by 
some government officials (e.g. North Kivu Provincial Assembly Representative 2010).
 8 Discussed more extensively in Chapter 3.
 9 The information in this paragraph comes from Deneault (2008: 67–71). See also: ABC 
Radio (2005).
10 Speaking in general of  the link between businesses and the Government, a representative 
of  a security company said that it supported and sometimes took over policing tasks 
(Security Contractor 2010).
11 Please note that this map does not show all mining sites or all armed groups’ positions. 
For details on the compilation of  the map and a statement of  caveats please refer to the 
original source (Humanitarian Information Unit 2016).
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Patterns and practices of  everyday resistance: 
a view from below
What is everyday resistance?
The informalities, ambiguities and contradictions that peacebuilding runs into reflect the political nature of  the process. These become visible when examined from the everyday practices of  the actors involved. In IR the 
everyday has become synonymous with the makings of  actual subjects in their 
most quotidian roles (Autesserre 2014; Hobson and Seabrooke 2007; Mitchell 
2011b; Neumann 2002). This is not so much a new field of  study, as it repre-
sents a common call throughout the social sciences, and especially from critical 
theorists, to connect the micro-dynamics of  daily life with macro structures and 
processes, even as a way of  embodying them (Bleiker 2000; Davies and Niemann 
2009; Enloe 1989; Marchand 2000; Tickner 2005; Wilcox 2015). In peace 
and conflict studies, ‘practices’ and ‘everydayness’ have always been the epis-
temological choice. The emergence of  peace and conflict was already a kind of  
‘everyday turn’ against the focus of  strategic studies of  the 1960s and 1970s. In 
the 1980s, authors such as Andrew Mack, David Dunn, Richard Falk and Johan 
Galtung started shifting the focus of  strategic studies towards peace studies. They 
also advanced the idea of  security as relating not to the capacity of  the sover-
eign state to accumulate power and use military means, but to human security, 
justice and everyday life (Dunn 1985; Falk 1983; Galtung 1969; Mack 1985).
As was pointed out in the Introduction, the everyday in the liberal peace 
debates has been a methodological pathway to theorise peacebuilding’s content 
and format. It has also served to contextualise the research, taking into account 
the more complex texture and depth of  the processes societies go through. The 
focus on everyday resistance has identified a variety of  practices ranging from 
violent responses, protests and boycotts to acts of  non-compliance and unin-
tended actions with subversive outcomes. How these different acts relate to each 
other and to a concept of  resistance has remained limited to emphasising how 
these practices hybridise peacebuilding. Resistance has thus been theorised in 
relation to an outcome more than in relation to its practices and subjects. The 
tendency of  this critical literature to portray resistance as a response to the 
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international and liberal nature of  peacebuilding has missed important insights 
from examining resistance as a response to the coercive and extractive practices 
of  state-making.
Everyday resistance is generally associated with the work of  James Scott and 
Michel de Certeau, but they are by no means the only theorists. As Bleiker points 
out, one can trace the steps back to the satirical writings of  Rabelais (Bleiker 
2000: 203). Additionally, the intellectual genealogies of  the concept have to be 
traced back to the sources these authors draw on (Sivaramakrishnan 2005). In 
the case of  Scott, these are E.P. Thompson, Clifford Geertz and Eric Wolf, and in 
particular the concepts of  class, hegemony, moral economy, culture and lived 
experience in these authors. With these, Scott understands resistance as the 
conflict that emerges from the lived experience of  subordination when it is 
fought for or negotiated with elites to achieve better terms for subordinates and 
maintain dignity and autonomy. Certeau draws on Bourdieu, Foucault and 
Freud, but only to turn them upside down. Both Scott and Certeau see them-
selves as doing an anatomy of  the technologies of  resistance in the same way 
that Foucault does of  the technologies of  power (Certeau 1984: 96; Scott 1990: 
xv and 20). Foucault, after all, speaks of  resistance as a means to conceptualise 
power. For Foucault, to look at resistance serves ‘as a chemical catalyst so as to 
bring to light power relations, locate their position, find out their point of  appli-
cation and the methods used’ (2002: 329). And thus, as Banu Bargu states, ‘we 
lack a convincing Foucauldian theory of  resistance’ (2014: 55).
As has already been stated, an all-encompassing theory of  resistance is 
impossible without losing nuance and insight. What is needed is an account that 
is able to offer a clear delimitation of  what resistance is, who the subjects of  
resistance are, what their object is and what means they use. It needs to provide 
understanding about the intentions, motivations, acts and actors that resist in 
a relation of  domination. The everyday framework of  resistance does that by 
establishing the pattern of  acts of  individuals and collectives in a position of  
subordination against the everyday experience of  domination as defining ele-
ments. It is not possible to look at resistance outside power relations. This does 
not mean that resistance cannot break such relationships; it means that to study 
resistance implies an analysis of  power relations. Moreover, it is not limited to 
studying this or that act but observes patterns of  acts (practices) that take place 
regularly and are repeated over time. The relationship takes place within actors 
that are unequal both materially and symbolically, thus, as already examined in 
the introduction, everyday resistance is located in the actions of  subordinate 
actors. This does not deny that elites are also involved in power relations, but 
just limits what the framework can account for. This is the result, especially in 
the Scottian version, of  placing a greater emphasis on the relationship between 
actors and their aims than on the actual acts. However, different practices do 
not account for what resistance is, nor are they decisive in distinguishing 
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resistance, rebellion and revolution.1 Seen as isolated ‘acts’, slander, denigration, 
mockery and violence can be dominating strategies too. For these acts to be seen 
as resistance, they need to be explored as patterns of  behaviour in situations of  
subordination, where their intention is the stopping or the mitigation of  material 
or symbolic claims, whether those be labour, taxes, deference or obedience. In 
this sense, the intention does not go much further beyond the act itself  (evade 
taxes, mock authority, work less), but the motivation entails a particular under-
standing of  one’s own position of  subordination. These elements will become 
clear in the course of  this and subsequent chapters.
Yet the everyday framework also has limitations. Certeau’s notion of  resist-
ance is ambiguous and needs a more concrete explanation of  how some ele-
ments are to be interpreted (e.g. differentials of  privilege among resisters and the 
relationship between intended and unintended acts). He offers an account of  
subversive acts, but this subversiveness has to be grasped by the outcomes, once 
the act has taken place. This is a limitation, considering that the outcomes of  
resistance are often ambiguous, contrary to what they were trying to achieve, 
or there are simply no outcomes. Scott’s framework provides a definition of  
resistance that examines common and continuous practices of  domination and 
resistance from a more general angle of  class and state–society relations. This 
book draws more significantly on James Scott than the liberal peace literature 
has done so far, although making his framework more explicit in connecting 
patterns, intentions, motivations, acts and actors. Scott’s focus on intent is prob-
lematic, although Certeau does not entirely resolve the issue. In both cases, a 
translation is required between what is observed and how it is described. Whereas 
non-intentional acts are difficult to analyse, intent per se is difficult to grasp. 
Other critiques of  the everyday framework that need to be taken into account 
are the difficulty of  distinguishing resistance from egotistic acts and the over-
simplification of  relations of  domination. If  resistance can be any act, and power 
relations are complex and intersected, how is it possible to distinguish an act of  
resistance from any other act? When is it really motivated by the desire to avoid, 
tame or challenge domination?
The everyday framework of  resistance does not offer a measuring tape to 
ascertain unambiguously which acts constitute resistance and which ones do 
not. It offers a framework to understand patterns of  actions in a particular 
relationship. In the next chapter, it will be shown that the case of  the Great 
Lakes region, and the DRC in particular, provides a possibility for examining 
both generalities and particularities, making it suitable to exploring the frame-
work of  everyday resistance in a peacebuilding context. The DRC illustrates 
how the peacebuilding practice of  consolidating and extending state authority 
reflects practices of  state accumulation and violence. Pointing out how these 
practices are resisted should not be seen as stemming from a conception of  
the world as structured around a binary of  domination and resistance. Any 
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resistance framework has to embrace the ambiguity of  the context and the acts. 
The DRC also introduces the possibility of  exploring the relationship between dif-
ferent categories of  practices, including the ‘weapons of  the weak’ (e.g. mockery, 
slander/denigration and reworked statebuilding vocabulary), guerrilla warfare 
and survival tactics that largely subvert elite appropriation.
This chapter first explores Scott’s framework as the more explicit and con-
crete account of  everyday resistance. It is followed by a discussion of  the cri-
tiques leveraged against the everyday framework, discussing both Scott’s and 
Certeau’s work, and the challenges that a peacebuilding context poses to it. This 
is done in four subsections that examine, respectively: what is resistance, its 
subjects, objects and means. Here the notion of  claim-regarding acts and self-
regarding acts will be explained more extensively. As a guide to the subsequent 
empirical chapters and in response to a debate that places the complexity of  
resistance in terms of  its existence or not, violence or not, its oppositional nature 
or not, the last section provides a reworked account of  resistance, discussing 
how some of  its elements can be gradated to better grasp its complexities.
The art of  theorising resistance
As already mentioned, the turn to resistance in the liberal peace debates has 
primarily drawn on Michel de Certeau, post-colonial theory and Foucault. This 
section focuses on James Scott in order to examine closely why his work offers a 
more concrete framework. James Scott’s theory of  resistance has developed over 
30 years and four major publications: The Moral Economy of  the Peasant, Weapons 
of  the Weak, Domination and the Arts of  Resistance and The Art of  Not Being Gov-
erned.2 The main line of  argument in these works is that resistance is rooted in 
the daily individual and collective covert acts of  opposition and self-help against 
domination; it does not need recourse to political or labour organisations but, 
rather, to actions like foot-dragging, mockery and fake compliance. Several other 
propositions follow from these: that subordinates have their own political 
agendas which may differ or not from elites’ agendas; that, on those bases, they 
make political choices about their lives and about the daily experience of  differ-
ent forms of  power; that relations of  domination have material and ideological 
bases; and that consent is limited. Scott’s work is mainly driven by a response to 
a body of  Gramscian literature that saw domination as resting on consent, and 
to those who defined resistance as an area of  formally organised and revolution-
ary activity (Scott 1985: Ch. 6 and 8; 1990: Ch. 4). According to Scott, this 
literature assumed that subordinate classes acquiesced, that they were relatively 
disadvantaged in regard to the transmission and absorption of  hegemonic ideas 
and that they were not directly coerced (1990: 71). That Scott misunderstood 
or misused Gramsci has been an ongoing critique (Greenhouse 2005; Sivaram-
akrishnan 2005; Smith 1999). In a special issue of  American Anthropologist 
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reviewing Scott’s work, Scott provides ‘a belated apology to the ghost of  Gramsci 
himself ’ (2005: 398), acknowledging that all along he would have better spoken 
of  ‘domination’ and not of  ‘hegemony’. Still, Scott’s critique that resistance was 
elitist and partial is accurate. He argues that to see resistance only as a collective 
enterprise with a revolutionary end is to consign millions of  actions to the 
unwritten records of  history (1985: 30–6). Rather, Scott argues that modest, 
covert actions, concerned with immediate gains and self-help, constitute a per-
manent layer of  resistance in which struggle against domination takes place and 
in which class consciousness and even revolutions may take root. Scott’s conclu-
sion in Weapons of  the Weak summarises these arguments and is worth quoting 
at length:
Resistance in Sedaka[3] begins as, I suspect, all historical resistance by subordinate 
classes begins: close to the ground, rooted firmly in the homely but meaningful reali-
ties of  daily experience. The enemies are not impersonal historical forces but real 
people. That is, they are seen as actors responsible for their own actions and not as 
bearers of  abstractions. The values resisters are defending are equally near and famil-
iar. Their point of  departure is the practices and norms that have proven effective in 
the past and appear to offer some promise of  reducing or reversing the losses they 
suffer. The goals of  resistance are as modest as its values. The poor strive to gain work, 
land, and income; they are not aiming at large historical abstractions such as social-
ism, let alone Marxist-Leninism. The means typically employed to achieve these ends 
– barring the rare crisis that might precipitate larger dreams – are both prudent and 
realistic […] When flight is available – to the frontier, to the cities – it is seized. When 
outright confrontation with landlords or the state seems futile, it is avoided. In the 
enormous zone between these two polar strategies lie all the forms of  daily resist-
ance, both symbolic and material, that we have examined. (1985: 348–9, emphases 
in the original)
Scott does not mean that there is no acquiescence amongst the peasantry, or 
that peasants are all innate revolutionaries, but that there is no evidence to 
suggest that even when the dominant ideology is to a certain extent internalised, 
this limits the possibilities for social conflict (1990: 77). Scott identifies working 
relations, landownership and moral behaviour as the realm in which to observe 
the daily experience of  domination and resistance. This highlights the material 
basis of  resistance while noting that resistance as well as power operate on 
world-views, symbols and idealisations. Work, land and even social justice 
agendas are advanced through an idealisation of  the past or a future of  salva-
tion. These tend to simultaneously project an idea of  a good leader or king, the 
arrival of  god or a liberator.4 All of  these are ways of  de-legitimising present 
arrangements or changes implemented and articulating political alternatives. 
Although Scott’s work on resistance focuses primarily on the peasantry in South 
East Asia, it has expanded to generalise to other situations of  subordination, 
going from the relatively narrow class relations to state–society relations.5
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In constructing these arguments, Scott provided a categorisation of  two 
types of  resistance: the formally organised and the everyday forms of  resistance. 
At its core, this typology represents Scott’s response to the literature on hegem-
ony and false consciousness. In establishing such a distinction, he simultane-
ously outlined the nature of  everyday resistance as prosaic, covert, unstructured, 
individual or collective, informal and focused on modest demands and immedi-
ate gains (Table 2.1).
Although Scott later proved that the peasantry have greater ideological 
commitments and that they make use of  all kinds of  available figures (whether 
gods or kings) to think of  emancipation and long-term change, his point was 
that everyday resistance differed from formally organised resistance in that self-
centred and immediate gains did not dislodge the political element in these 
acts. As he argued: ‘[t]o insist on such distinctions as a means of  comparing 
forms of  resistance and their consequences is one thing, but to use them as 
the basic criteria to determine what constitutes resistance is to miss the well-
springs of  peasant politics’ (1985: 294). Scott was opening the ground for 
exploring politics and relations of  domination not in the open field of  structural 
and formal politics, but in the everyday relations of  the workplace, village life 
and the home.
Nevertheless, in this transition away from a narrow account of  resistance, 
Scott’s version has been seen as stretched (Abbink, Bruijn, and Walraven 2008: 
18; Hollander and Einwohner 2004: 534; Vail and Landeg 1986). Sherry 
Ortner, for instance, wonders: ‘When a poor man steals from a rich man, is this 
resistance or simply a survival strategy?’ (1995: 175). Beatrice Hibou defines 
the ‘infrapolitical approach’ to the study of  relations of  domination as the one 
that sees ‘resistance everywhere’ (2011a: 18). Underlying these critiques are 






Immediate gains/sustainable Long-term gains
Informal Formal/structured
Source: Based on Scott (1985: 33)
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questions about how to interpret different practices of  resistance, the possibility 
to grasp intentionality and the complexity of  power relations. The debates that 
the concept of  everyday resistance continues to generate demonstrate that this 
framework is not straightforward. Still, one of  the advantages of  the Scottian 
approach is that it provides a clear definition and a framework within which to 
categorise practices.
Defining resistance
For Scott, resistance is
any act(s) by members(s) of  a subordinate class that is or are intended either to miti-
gate or deny claims (for example, rents, taxes, prestige) made on that class by super-
ordinate classes (for example, landlords, large farmers, the state) or to advance its 
own claims (for example, work, land, charity, respect) vis-à-vis those superordinate 
classes. (1985: 290)
In this account, resistance is defined not so much by the particular ‘act’ used 
(which could be ‘any’) but more by its intention, that is, by the conscious use of  
that act to mitigate, deny or advance an agenda. The advantages of  this account, 
which Scott already notes, are the identification of  both material and symbolic 
underpinnings of  class relations and of  relations of  domination, which are 
present in both claims of  authority and resisters’ agendas (Scott 1985: 290–1). 
Resistance can be both individual and collective, and does not need to be organ-
ised or politically minded. The emphasis on intent is to point out that resisters 
may not be successful in their attempts. However, Scott also acknowledges the 
‘enormous difficulties’ in proving intent (1985: 290). Intentionally mitigating 
a claim does not mean the existence of  a developed class-consciousness; nor does 
it mean that these acts entail a struggle against capitalism or for socialism in the 
abstract. As such, intention is gathered from the actual practice of, for example, 
avoiding tax or increases in land rent (Scott 1985: 296). For Scott, these acts 
are political and their significance goes beyond not having paid the tax or having 
avoided rent increases. These practices do not exist in a vacuum, they represent 
the ways in which everyday mechanisms of  domination and resistance operate.
Although Weapons of  the Weak was written as an account of  class relations, 
Scott later extended this definition to a general theory of  resistance, arguing that 
‘similar structures of  domination, other things being equal, tend to provoke 
responses and forms of  resistance that also bear a family resemblance to one 
another’ (1990: 21). The context of  gender, racial and state–subject relations 
would foster similar responses. For Scott, then, a superordinate position, and 
more generally, domination, entailed a material and symbolic extractive capacity 
(land, rent, labour and taxes, as well as prestige, honour, deference) as well as a 
productive capacity delimiting the realm of  what is possible (to do, to aim or to 
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achieve) and not possible (delimit ‘the realm of  idle dreams [and] wishful think-
ing’) (1985: 326). These are not ‘given’ categories, nor do they represent a 
permanent state of  being, but are firstly rooted in the historical experience of  
the actors. For Scott, as for E.P. Thomson, class is not so much a structure as it 
is a relationship.6 A fundamental element to understand resistance is to locate 
it in power relations. It is this element that requires not the disambiguation and 
homogenisation of  actors but the understanding that their resistant actions do 
not fully define who they are, and that these actions can be contradictory to 
other sets of  actions in similar or different relations. As discussed below, critics 
see in this account unambiguous categories in a binary of  domination and 
resistance that do not grasp the complexity of  everyday life. Nonetheless, Scott’s 
framework is developed with close relationships in mind, allowing for a signifi-
cant degree of  ambiguity.
The political significance of  these individual acts of  self-help is not due to 
their capacity to change the structures of  domination that they aspire to miti-
gate or deny, but to their widespread prevalence and their amenability to the 
largest working class in the world: the peasantry (Scott 2005: 396). These forms 
are prosaic, and thus ‘[t]o understand these commonplace forms of  resistance 
is to understand much of  what the peasantry has historically done to defend its 
interests against both conservative and progressive orders’ (Scott 1985: xvi). So 
everyday forms of  resistance have a historical and present value for their preva-
lence, but they also have a future value. Later Scott said that everyday forms of  
resistance are a pre-history of  revolution (1990: 203). They are significant in 
themselves as the permanent layer of  resistance that illustrates the relative 
success of  domination and limited consent.
The problem is that, while opening the ground for an account of  common-
place forms of  resistance, it simultaneously becomes harder to account for what 
is not resistance, or as Ortner noted, distinguishing between resistance and 
simple egotistic acts. In this regard Scott argued:
To ignore the self-interested element in peasant resistance is to ignore the determi-
nate context not only of  peasant politics, but of  most lower-class politics … When a 
peasant hides part of  his crop to avoid paying taxes, he is both filling his stomach 
and depriving the state of  grain … When such acts are rare and isolated, they are of  
little interest; but when they become a consistent pattern (even though uncoordi-
nated, let alone organized) we are dealing with resistance. (Scott 1985: 295–6, 
emphasis added)
Scott argues that the aims to be achieved are not selfless but, by definition, self-
centred. Avoiding a tax, stealing part of  the crop, denigrating or slandering 
authority does not advance a collective agenda of  ‘the working class’ or of  ‘lib-
eration’; yet they are individual representations of  class struggle. Scott’s defini-
tion, nevertheless, by equating ‘agenda advancing’ with ‘mitigation’ and ‘denial’ 
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does not sufficiently recognise that pursuing an agenda is not just another aim 
but a permanent motivation. From Scott’s definition, ‘agenda advancing’ is 
resistance because it does so at the expense of  elite claims. Hence, agenda 
advancing necessarily mitigates and denies elite claims. This agenda has embed-
ded the values and modest goals that Scott describes, which tend to do with land, 
work and pre-existing arrangements. Therefore, agenda advancing, which pro-
vides an account of  motivations, needs to be understood alongside intentions. 
Ultimately, what is important is that beyond intentionality, these acts are not 
accidental, at the discretion of  one opportunistic individual; they become the 
individual opportunistic representation of  the patterns in which everyday resist-
ance takes place.
Critical analysis of  the everyday framework
One of  the limitations in the way the hybridity literature has used the everyday 
framework of  resistance is that it has not sufficiently addressed the critiques that 
the framework has received. Not only are these critiques important to articulate 
resistance in the context of  peacebuilding, they also need to be addressed to 
assess the suitability of  the framework in each particular context. There have 
been four main critiques, directed primarily to Scott: (1) The category of  resist-
ance is too broad, unable to differentiate resistance from coping strategies or 
whingeing without particular political significance (Geschiere 2000; Haggis et 
al. 1986; Hibou 2011a: 18). (2) Intentions are ungraspable (Ortner 1995). (3) 
Scott pays insufficient attention to peasant agendas, providing univocal readings 
of  certain acts as resistance (Bayart 1992: 14; Mbembe 1991b: 106; 2001: 110; 
Ortner 1995). (4) Scott conceives reality only through a binary of  domination 
and resistance, over-simplifying the dynamics and relations of  power (Ferguson 
2005; Hibou 2011a: Ch. 1; Mbembe 2001: 103–30).
These critiques overlap with the challenges that emerge from applying this 
framework to a particular context. The context of  the DRC poses three other 
challenges: how to conceive of  violence and the use of  different oppositional or 
non-oppositional practices; how to articulate resistance in a context of  plural 
authorities, where authority is ambiguously represented and where peacebuild-
ing is not a process of  social transformation; and how to grasp resistance in a 
context characterised in much Africanist literature by ambiguity and convivial-
ity. In response to these challenges, as has already been argued, this book pro-
poses that any account of  resistance needs to connect those who resist, their 
intentions and motivations with patterns of  social and political interaction 
around extraction, violence and privilege. This raises many questions about the 
interpretation that each one of  these elements is given within an account of  
resistance. Rather than examining the critiques one by one (a discussion that 
has been held over many years), this section analyses how the framework applies 
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and how these challenges can be addressed in the different elements of  the defi-
nition of  resistance, its subjects, objects and means.
Binaries, ambiguities and pluralism: what counts as resistance?
The focus on power relations and the fact that resistance can be any act could 
imply a reading of  the social and political world as a binary of  resistance and 
domination, where resistance can simply be anything that subordinate subjects 
do in front of  authority figures. This critique has been raised particularly against 
Scott, as Certeau has focused more on transformations from multiple acts. Three 
issues summarise the critique. Firstly, in order to understand the nature of  politi-
cal power and the post-colonial state, it is necessary to understand the hetero-
geneity of  social and political relationships and how power operates not just 
from above but also horizontally and from below (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). 
Secondly, the extent to which any strategy of  resistance could position anyone 
out of  the reach of  power is questioned, arguing that power relations are ambiv-
alent (Hibou 2011a: 19, 140–6; Mbembe 2001: 110). Thirdly, Scott’s frame-
work may not be applicable to a context where the state cannot be conceived in 
the ‘high-modernist’ terms of  Scott’s own account.
Representing these critiques, Béatrice Hibou argues that the exercise of  
domination is part of  the common ‘desire of  normality’ in which the pursuit of  
a ‘constellation of  interests’ may involve the co-production of  domination by 
dominants and dominated alike (2011a: 16). This echoes Mbembe’s arguments 
about domination operating through people’s self-subjectification, and the 
dynamics characterising the post-colony, as seen in the previous chapter. It is 
remarkable that from different perspectives all of  these critiques translate het-
erogeneity, ambivalence and ambiguities into a framework of  relative acquies-
cence. ‘Conviviality’ in the case of  Mbembe, ‘symbiosis’ in the case of  Bayart and 
‘accommodation’ in Hibou accentuate the consensual rather than the conflict-
ual elements of  the political space (Bayart 2009: Ch. 6 and 8; Hibou 2011a; 
Mbembe 2001). Even so, if  complexity means the denial of  resistance, there 
might be a problem with the methods and frameworks employed. However, to 
deny the relevance of  resistance or claim its ungraspability is a disservice to the 
heterogeneity that needs to be captured.
Analysing resistance as a political category entails an exercise of  simplifica-
tion, and hence a trivialisation of  society. Scott captures the fluidity of  social 
interaction to a certain extent. The context of  Weapons of  the Weak is a small 
village, Sedaka, which is in many ways a cohabited context. Village politics 
entails much tacit consent (something that is not far away from Hibou’s ‘accom-
modation’) not only of  ‘poor’ to ‘rich’ but of  ‘rich’ to ‘poor’. For instance, receiv-
ing and giving charity is, for Scott, an exercise of  power and resistance. Charity 
benefits the poor, yet it reproduces their subordinate condition, glorifying the 
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generosity of  the rich. While poor villagers dislike being patronised, if  the rich 
do not give charity they are systematically the targets of  a moral attack by the 
poor, who call them stingy and arrogant (Scott 1985: 197–204). Charity here 
represents a shared world of  moral values which not only does not impede class 
conflict but also facilitates it through the stretching of  its interpretation, sub-
verting the nature of  the obligation that such values entail and advancing sub-
ordinates’ agenda on the basis of  these values (Scott 1985: 204–8). Negotiating 
the conditions of  subordination to one’s advantage, including avoiding repres-
sion or upholding dignity is, for Scott, a signal of  everyday resistance. Scott’s 
idea of  the ‘third realm’, or the ‘pose’, and Certeau’s idea of  ‘trickery’ will provide 
in Chapter 4 the basis for observing the peacebuilding discourse as a platform 
on which power and resistance operate. Ambiguities are therefore not a reason 
to deny the existence of  resistance, but the space to explore between consent and 
opposition.
This is particularly useful to bear in mind in a context where the state-
making process is not characterised as aiming towards turning citizens into 
producing and consuming taxpayers. Yet, the ways in which the population are 
ignored, expelled from their lands, contained and repressed if  perceived to be 
rebellious, or used in order to provide social services, represent continuities and 
change in exercising domination. This is seen in the militarisation of  rural com-
munities; in the indirect discharge enacted by both the government and inter-
national actors through the different statebuilding programmes; and in the 
relative authority exercised by MNCs in some mining sites or in the areas where 
state revenue and expenditure are focused.7 Thus, patterns of  extraction and 
violence in building state authority are enacted by myriad of  actors, who lay 
symbolic and material claims on subordinate classes.
In later works, Scott also advanced that both forms of  governance by state 
authorities and forms of  resistance could also be seen as a form of  ‘reticence’ 
(2009: 32). As such, not just engagement but also disengagement, and negotia-
tion as well as imposition, are fundamental to grasping the full picture of  state-
making and resistance in the DRC. In Weapons of  the Weak, Scott argued that 
‘only those survival strategies that deny or mitigate claims from appropriating 
classes can be called resistance’ (1985: 301). In Seeing Like a State, high modern-
ism and its failure were also characterised by ‘state-initiated social engineering’, 
which was ‘transformative’, ‘muscle-bound’, ‘coercive’ and ‘authoritarian’ 
(1998: 4–5). The Art of  Not Being Governed, although opening with a paragraph 
in which ‘would-be conquering administrators were determined to subdue a 
recalcitrant landscape and its fugitive, resistant inhabitants’, advances a frame-
work not only of  mutual reticence but also of  mutual dependency (2009: 1). 
This later work captures better the current DRC context. For Scott, flight, oral 
history, nomad agriculture and remote settlement were all strategies to ‘keep the 
state at arm’s length’ (2009: x). This connects with Certeau’s ‘ways of  operating’ 
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by which people trick the state, shaping the environment to their needs (1984: 
xix).
Self-provision of  security and strategies of  survival could be seen as bridges 
towards this end of  state evasion. They allow subordinate classes to mitigate 
poverty, taxes and a militarised environment and also allow avoiding or bypass-
ing the state. The experience of  the state as a predator, as partly absent and as 
another armed group generates a reliance on personal solidarity networks and 
relations of  reciprocity. The family, the clan, the ethnic group, the neighbour-
hood and INGOs allow for covering certain needs without turning to the state. 
Yet, survival and armed struggle are determined by an unequal, violent and 
extractive context as much as by reciprocity and solidarity. Exchanges, especially 
amongst unequal parties, can involve deceit, scamming, abuse and coercion. But 
this may in turn generate increasing social conflict. If  relations are muddled by 
an exchange in conditions of  ‘conviviality’, ‘horizontality’ and ‘co-habited 
space’, they may be open to interpretation, but do not rule out resistance (Fer-
guson 2005; Mbembe 2001). Everyday forms of  resistance establish a frame-
work that connects subjects, objects and means as they take place in the regular 
patterns of  behaviour within power relations. That is, it is more a framework to 
theorise and think about resistance than it is a rigid definition, establishing 
categories of  acts and actors to delimit unambiguously every single act. That 
said, as will be explained below, the everyday framework offers some limits to 
treat resistance as a helpful analytical category. Let us first go through the cri-
tiques to observe what other limitations and advantages this framework offers.
Multiple agendas, multiple subjects? Who is the subject of  resistance?
In the liberal peace debates, everyday resistance has been applied to elites and 
non-elites, as was mentioned in the Introduction. Resistance has been used to 
observe the transformations and challenges that the liberal peace has experi-
enced. In turn, these debates have not only afforded a hazy account of  resist-
ance. As already examined, this is partly the result of  drawing primarily on a 
thin study of  Michel de Certeau as well as of  seeing resistance through the para-
digm of  locals against internationals. Taking material and symbolic privileges 
into account is a necessary step not only to getting out of  this binary but also 
to having a more nuanced understanding of  resistance.
Judith Butler criticised certain streams of  feminism for having made ‘women’ 
the ‘subject’ of  feminism. For her, ‘the feminist subject turns out to be discur-
sively constituted by the very political system that is supposed to facilitate its 
emancipation’ (Butler 2006: 2–3). Feminism and the feminist movement were 
themselves involved in the reproduction of  the dominated subject. This critique 
could apply to the argument that the subjects of  everyday resistance are subor-
dinate subjects (they are the subordinated element of  class, gender, race, ethnic 
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and age relations). In this sense, opening up the framework to examine the 
transformations caused by resistance, regardless of  the subjects that undertake 
it, could be a way to expand the notion of  resistance rather than constrain it 
with the difficulties and contradictions that ascribing subjectivity entails.
Yet, in the case of  everyday resistance the ‘representation’ of  subordinates 
as its subject is not a claim for the emancipation of  such subjects, but a critique 
of  precisely the condition that the ‘juridical systems of  power’ have created (cf. 
Foucault cited in Butler 2006: 2). Narrowing down the account of  resistance to 
subordinate subjects means to be more precise about what their objectives are 
and the means they have available to challenge their condition. The framework 
understands that resistance originates in the subjects’ reading of  their position 
of  subordination and exploitation. This does not imply seeing these subjects in 
a permanent state of  being, nor as ‘victims’ or as such subjectivity being exclu-
sive of  others. Quite the contrary, it is a way to establish these subjects in their 
temporal and plural contexts. They have multiple subjectivities and they too 
create their own oppression. Workers, peasants or women shall not evoke a uni-
versal common identity among those. Contrary to the universal category of  
‘woman’ that Butler criticises, to focus on subordinate subjects is to highlight 
the intersectional identities and experiences they have according to their class, 
race, ethnicity, gender, age and other sources of  power.
From this point of  view too, what becomes fictitious is to examine resistance 
from the discursive category of  ‘the local’, although, as Butler rightly indicates, 
being a product of  discourse does not foreclose the possibilities for agency (2006: 
195). Identifying the ways in which interventions have created a default bulked-
up identity of  ‘locals’ can be a pathway to understand the power that such 
interventions exercise. However making the ‘local’ the subject of  resistance is 
too broad and vague a signifier from which to establish a study of  resistance, let 
alone derive a framework of  resistance more broadly. Resistance needs to be 
contextualised. This goes for who the subjects of  resistance are, as much as for 
the context they are embedded in. The everyday framework of  resistance addi-
tionally requires an account of  the forms of  material and symbolic domination 
in a disaggregated manner. It requires an examination of  the positionality of  the 
subject and how that affects agency. Once again, it is not that subjects at the top 
of  the hierarchy cannot be agents of  resistance; it is an imposed limit of  the 
framework to highlight that the positionality of  the subject affects power rela-
tions and that resistance needs to be contextualised to make better sense of  it. 
Resistance should be a way to observe acts and behaviours of  real people, beyond 
abstract and aggregated categories.
This is important for International Relations as it has a tendency to macro 
accounts in which actors are generally abstract. As Bleiker states ‘[t]o get 
closer to the objective of  theorising the practical dimensions of  discursive and 
transversal forms of  dissent it is necessary to remove one more layer of  
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abstraction […] from mobile subjectivities to the practices through which they 
turn into vehicles of  dissent’ (2000: 200). However, while Bleiker states that we 
have to move beyond the levels of  problem analysis, in focusing on ‘forms of  
thought and action that not only transgress, but also challenge political order’ 
he leaves the actors ambiguously defined (2000: 9). They can be individuals, 
groups, networks, and for him it is not bodies and people that embody such forms 
of  dissent but their discourses: ‘[l]anguage embod[ies] the relationship between 
people and their environment’ (Bleiker 2000: 218). Lack of  attention to the 
positionality and role of  different subjects within the building blocks of  state 
power and international order produces a view of  resistance that erases impor-
tant elements in power relations.
Connecting intentions and motivations: the object of  resistance
The relation between intentions and motivations needs to be established. Intent 
may be defined as the aim of  denying or mitigating an authority claim or the 
effects of  domination. Motivations are the reasons, justifications and agendas 
behind those aims. Both have been raised, determinant to establishing what is 
and what is not resistance. Abbink, Bruijn and Walraven argue that ‘resistance 
must be defined not so much as a set of  concrete acts but by the intent of  those 
acts, with the object of  defending preexisting sociopolitical situations’ (2008: 
22). They note how the historiography of  African resistance changed from stud-
ying nationalist elites in the 1960s to studying unorganised individual resist-
ance, including silences and dreams, in the 1970s.8 The inclusion of  unintended 
and unconscious acts had broadened the definition of  resistance ‘too much’ 
(Abbink et al. 2008: 17). In the early debates in anthropology, in the 1980s, for 
instance, Brian Fegan (1986) already argued that intent was a necessary element 
of  resistance.
Although Scott also defines resistance in terms of  intent, he is less categori-
cal. Scott draws attention to the fact that despite these acts failing in their 
intent more often than not, they are politically significant. These aims may or 
may not be expressed that way by the actors; the acts themselves are a way to 
gather intent (Scott 1985: 296). The intent of  tax avoidance may be no more 
than not paying tax, but it denies the state its taxes. The intent of  an insult 
might be denigration or delegitimisation, but it denies authority deference and 
legitimacy. Additionally, cultural and historical elements may be more impor-
tant than intention. For instance, Homi Bhabha argues that ‘[r]esistance is not 
necessarily an oppositional act of  political intention’ (1994: 110). Scott is close 
to Bhabha, in that intentionality should be seen not as reflecting an already 
formulated ideology against power, but as a collective memory and a culture of  
insubordination to authority.9 The meaning of  ‘practice’ itself  reflects that his-
torical legacy.
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However, this also raises a tension that is most distinct in Certeau’s analysis. 
Certeau’s notion of  consciousness partly originates as a critique to how Foucault 
and Bourdieu understood power as pervasively present, even in the minuscule 
aspects of  the accent acquired in speech or bodily control in prison. Certeau 
criticises Bourdieu for painting his subjects as having ‘no intention’, living in an 
‘assumed world’ and their actions being simply a habitus, ‘a repetition of  the 
past’ (1984: 56).10 For Certeau, Bourdieu compromised his work, leaving sub-
jects without agency, history or decision-making capacity. He reproaches Fou-
cault for providing little distinction between rationalities, mechanisms, dispositifs 
and apparatuses, resulting in a set of  ‘scattered technologies’ and creating a 
false problematic ‘dichotomy between “ideologies” and “procedures”’ (Certeau 
1984: 45). For Certeau, discourse does not require practice and not all dis-
courses are based on practice. However, it is possible for discourse and practice 
to be the same thing (Certeau 1984: 46, 1988: 147–8). For Certeau it is impor-
tant to understand what procedures might respond to other logics, outside or 
even subverting the logic of  power. Certeau’s concepts of  practice and resistance 
rely on the meaning of  tactics. They are a ‘calculation’, hence conscious, but 
they are also millenarian and hence ingrained in the subconscious, provoking 
simultaneously an unconscious use.11 They are a form of  subversion of  the logic 
of  power, more than an attack. Walking following one’s logic or writing a letter 
to a friend in ‘company time’ are conscious activities in the sense that they are 
done in full knowledge of  the agent (Certeau 1984: 50–60). Certeau draws 
attention to the possibility of  seeing resistance as a self-regarding practice, where 
authority claims may not be directly confronted, but ignored, reappropriated or 
subverted.
The difficulty of  gathering intent and linking with the debates about motiva-
tion was the core of  the critiques of  Scott that were made within anthropology 
studies in the 1980s. Ortner, a primary representative of  these critiques, argues 
that resistance studies are limited because they lack ethnographic ‘stance’ – a 
commitment to grasp the ‘thickness’ and ‘depth’ of  complex relations (1995: 
174). According to Ortner, ‘[r]esistance studies are thin because they are ethno-
graphically thin: thin on the internal politics of  dominated groups, thin on the 
cultural richness of  those groups, thin on the subjectivity – the intentions, 
desires, fears, projects – of  the actors engaged in these dramas’ (1995: 190). The 
critique is that resistance studies simplify reality excessively by not considering 
the web of  relations where subjects are embedded. Following on from this, 
Ortner argues that scholars disregard how practices and meanings evolve for 
both resisters and scholars, and thus how ambiguous and subjective these acts 
are (1995: 175). Ortner ends up with a final objection, to the category of  resist-
ance more generally, which resonates with Africanist critiques seen above (Hibou 
2011a; Mbembe 2001: Ch. 3; Mbembe in Weaver Shipley 2010: 666). Because 
resistance, and especially its intentions, is ambiguous, Ortner proposes to 
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account for the multiple ways in which practices can be ‘creative and trans-
formative’, yet be the result of  contradictory and mixed intentions (1995: 
190–1). By this account, intentions may not be central and may provide a richer 
account of  other aspects in everyday human relations, but doing away with 
intention undermines an account of  agency against the experience of  
domination.
The implications of  Ortner’s argument are that to claim that a category of  
resistance is irrelevant because one cannot grasp all desires, hopes, cultural 
constraints and aims in an individual, let alone in a collective, is to reduce resist-
ance to a psychological category and to empty it of  its historical, political and 
social meaning. Additionally, the existence of  a myriad of  agendas, and of  a 
self-centred element, do not necessarily point to ‘conviviality’ or to a lack of  
conflict in relations of  domination. Similarly, the absence of  principled motiva-
tions does not rule out resistance. It becomes necessary to link intent with 
motivations, that is, the reasons, agendas and justifications behind those acts. 
Often, practices have both self-centred and selfless motivations.
Self-centred and selfless acts
Self-centred acts may not necessarily entail self-gain, but the prioritisation of  
one’s own agenda in detriment to the fulfilment of  authority claims. In Certeau’s 
account, where intent is not present, prioritising one’s self  suggests ‘an alterna-
tive socio-political ethic’ that antagonises the logic of  profit, whether represented 
in the factory or in patterns of  consumption. The examples Certeau discusses 
(pilfering ‘a lathe to make furniture at home’ or ‘writing to a friend while at 
work’) imply a loss considering the impact that being caught would have (1984: 
25). This makes more meaningful the fact that this ‘risk’ is taken not out of  a 
logic of  self-profit but out of  solidarity with one’s friends and family (1984: 25). 
Behind this account, and similarly to Scott, is the fact that resistance is not just 
the realm of  public, collective and seemingly selfless agendas but also the realm 
of  quotidian self-help acts.
The problem is that whereas the former seems to be straightforwardly ame-
nable to inferring a political argument, the individual covert, self-centred acts 
are not. Yet by looking at the interaction between self-centred and selfless 
motivations as examined in resistance studies, the lines are blurred even in 
revolutionary organisation. Wolf, for instance, in his studies of  peasant revolu-
tions in the twentieth century, argued that peasants ultimately acted for them-
selves and that they carried a deep sense of  injustice (Wolf  1971, 1982). 
Barrington Moore also argued that battles over land and its uses symbolise 
battles over power, morals and ideas about how society is best organised (1978). 
Similarly, Scott thought that peasants tend to be more radical at the level of  ideas 
than at the level of  action (1985: 331). Self-serving acts may not go as far 
as envisioning a new society, but they do not preclude it. They could, rather, be 
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seen as underlined by an idea of  what is legitimate and an interpretation of  one’s 
own position of  subordination. The presence of  an aspiration to change the 
effects of  domination is a marker of  resistance.
Heterogeneity and ambivalence of  the practices: violence, hiddenness and  
subversion as means of  resistance
The fact that resistance should be understood as a practice – a pattern of  acts 
– makes ‘acts’ central to the account of  resistance. Yet ‘acts’ on their own do not 
define resistance; in fact, as previously noted, acts are ambivalent – they can 
serve both the purpose of  domination and resistance. What makes an act of  
resistance is the fact that it is embodied and represents the challenge of  a posi-
tion of  subordination. It follows that different types of  acts, whether confronta-
tional, violent, subversive, covert or evasive, can account for how resistance 
takes place.
One of  the ways in which Scott’s account provides both guidance and flex-
ibility to analyse resistance is the idea that ‘any act’ can be resistance if  fulfilling 
certain criteria. However, this requires putting both power and resistance in 
relative terms. With the example of  discourses, Scott clarifies that:
Power relations are not, alas, so straightforward that we can call what is said in 
power-laden contexts false and what is said offstage true. Nor can we simplistically 
describe the former as a realm of  necessity and the latter as a realm of  freedom. 
What is certainly the case, however, is that the hidden transcript is produced for a 
different audience and under different constraints of  power than the public tran-
script. (1990: 5)
More than the boundaries between these two transcripts, the real conflict takes 
place in the space in between. Scott premised his central argument on the exis-
tence of  a ‘third realm’, a ‘pose’, where the ‘politics of  disguise’ and ‘double 
meaning’ are a hint to understand the ambiguity of  resistance (1990: 18–19). 
Previous applications of  this framework to the study of  peacebuilding have 
analysed the dynamics of  domination and resistance while representing the 
levels of  ambiguity and complexity of  the context. Heathershaw, for instance, 
deploys a Scottian framework to observe how multiple public transcripts repre-
sent multiple selves that create and recreate statebuilding and peace, despite its 
failures (Heathershaw 2008, see also 2009). These transcripts provide knowl-
edge and shape practices, whose contradiction of  the rhetoric is a feature rather 
than a problem or a deviation of  peacebuilding as such (Heathershaw 2008: 
331). This is what Heathershaw captures with the idea of  peacebuilding as a 
‘simulation’ (Heathershaw 2008: 346). The high-modernist rhetoric of  protec-
tion and social change is a pose on which both agendas of  state authority and 
resistance are premised.
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Violence/non-violence
The relationship between resistance and violence has not been well explained 
in the liberal peace debates. For scholars such as Mac Ginty, Mitchell and Kelly, 
resistance can imply violence (Kelly and Mitchell 2012; Mac Ginty 2011; 
Mitchell 2011a). Richmond, by contrast, has equated everyday resistance with 
non-violent practices. Richmond’s account of  resistance as hidden and dis-
guised leads to identifying what he calls emancipatory forms of  critical agency 
with non-violent forms of  resistance. Like Scott, Richmond does not argue that 
everyday resistance is literally invisible (2011a: 89, 94). He sees resistance as 
covert discourses and non-confrontational activities against the standardised, 
locally unaware promises of  the international community (2011a: Ch. 3). Case 
studies include local NGOs which refuse to be compliant with the dictates of  
the peacebuilding vision of  civil society and are marginalised as a result in 
their lobbying efforts towards reform and welfare demands (Richmond 2011a: 
Ch. 3). These often non-violent forms of  resistance, as they are developed in 
Richmond’s work, resemble more the politics of  organised movements than the 
infrapolitics of  the weak that Scott developed (2011a: 117). For Scott, who has 
analysed the possibility of  violent resistance more than Certeau, hidden acts 
and the politics of  disguise, or the ‘pose’, have to do with the politics of  repres-
sion and the relation that resisters have to power, not to an ethic of  non-violent 
resistance.
Nothing captures better the meaning of  hiddenness and the infrapolitical 
than the Ethiopian proverb with which Scott opens his Domination and the Arts 
of  Resistance. It reads as follows: ‘When the great lord passes the wise peasant 
bows deeply and silently farts’ (Scott 1990: v). That before authority those in a 
subordinate position may act as showing respect to such authority should not 
be mistaken for acquiescence or consent. Rather, the scripted roles in which 
authority and subordination are enacted in front of  each other should be con-
trasted with the ways in which actors behave when they are among their equals. 
These acts are visible, even public, but not confrontational. Yet, taking violence 
out of  resistance provides a Manichean analysis. Richmond’s political agenda 
ends up creating a good and bad peacebuilding and a good and bad form of  
resistance. However, this does a disservice to the analysis, for not only can resist-
ance not be sanitised, as violence is a central aspect of  the constitution of  state 
authority, but violence cannot be excluded from either power or resistance in 
this context.
The Brechtian or Schweikian forms of  resistance Scott identifies are those 
generally available to the ordinary peasant: ‘foot dragging, dissimulation, deser-
tion, false compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and 
so on’ (1985: xvi). They are covert, latent and unorganised, using informal 
channels and avoiding direct confrontation with authorities, but that does not 
necessarily mean non-violent.
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Everyday resistance needs to be read in a continuum of  different practices 
of  resistance, which reflect the larger political context in which they are embed-
ded. It is therefore problematic to equate everydayness with non-violence. While 
Scott was writing from a pacific context of  South East Asia, he did not mean to 
outline a framework of  pacific resistance. He noted that ‘low-grade, hit-and-run, 
guerrilla action’ was not unusual in everyday resistance (1985: 241), and also 
made clear that peasants were ready to oppose landowners and employers, vio-
lently if  necessary, to stop changes in property law, salary losses, social arrange-
ments and living standards (Scott 1985: 98, 254–9). In later work, Scott explored 
the ways in which peasants engaged in armed rebellions, violent actions, ban-
ditry and crime as a form of  resistance (Scott 2009: 146–50). Similarly, analys-
ing violence as amenable to the practice of  resistance does not necessarily equate 
or reduce ‘violence’ to dynamics of  power and resistance.12
The choice of  acts deployed for resistance is determined by the possibilities 
available to political action. Everyday resistance is ultimately carried out in the 
safety of  anonymity and at the lowest risk of  repression. Selbin, who has exam-
ined the relationship between resistance, rebellion and revolution, argues that 
the covert – ‘I obey but I do not comply’ – type of  acts ‘often form the basis of  
resistance’ (Rowe and Schelling cited in Selbin 2009: 11). For Selbin, whereas 
revolution is rare, resistance is commonplace, integrating acts that defy author-
ity, mostly in covert ways. However, as in the debates around intent, lack of  
confrontation has generated doubt as to whether these acts can be seen as oppos-
ing domination, and, indeed, as resistance. On the contrary, emphasis on the 
hidden, latent and covert nature of  everyday resistance has created a tension 
between the everyday framework and more confrontational, even violent 
practices.
Still, this raises the question of  the extent to which resistance should neces-
sarily be an act of  opposition in the form of  a direct attack, or whether it can 
also be grasped in its subversive capacity. Subversion may be understood as a 
form of  aikido, meaning ‘self-defence [or self-help] using the strength of  the 
dominant group’ (Bigo 2011: 233). Seen from the differences between Scottian 
‘acts’ and Certeau’s ‘tactics’, different practices may have different referents. For 
Certeau, resistance tactics are ‘innumerable practices by means of  which users 
reappropriate the space organized by techniques of  sociocultural production’ 
(1984: xiv). Resistance is not so much an attack against and a confrontation of  
power as a transformative force that produces its own outcomes. For Scott, ‘acts’ 
are intended to mitigate or deny domination.
This means that whether the primary referent of  an act is ‘opposing’ a 
claim, or whether the primary referent is one’s self  (individual or collective), they 
can be seen both as ways of  denying or mitigating those claims and as the effects 
of  domination. The condition of  relative statelessness of  the population in the 
high plateaux of  South East Asia, described in The Art of  Not Being Governed, was 
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due to their long historical patterns of  escaping state power (Scott 2009). Here, 
residents have managed to preserve a way of  life that is relatively protected from 
state interference by using tactics including escapism, agricultural nomadism, 
oral history and, when necessary, armed resistance. It follows that resistance 
does not always need to be an attack, let alone in a violent form, but, rather, an 
‘act’ upon one’s position of  subordination. Yet, as context and availability of  
means are determinant, everyday resistance is not necessarily always covert, 
especially in militarised contexts.
Three important consequences follow in order to develop a framework of  
everyday resistance in peacebuilding. First, putting together Certeau and Scott’s 
framework provides a good foundation, although with a critical analysis. As 
previously noted, any framework needs to connect patterns, intentions, motiva-
tions, acts and actors. This does not mean to pre-empt a particular account, but 
it requires justification for its core elements. A final consequence is that resist-
ance cannot be conceptualised in terms of  all or nothing. As will be explored in 
the next section, some elements of  resistance such as intentionality, the intensity 
and exposure of  its acts, and how directly authority claims are targeted can be 
gradated in order to provide a rich account that captures the complexity and 
ambiguities of  resistance.
A reworked account of  resistance: gradients of  intentionality, intensity, 
exposure and engagement
Bearing the above in mind, the account of  resistance that I propose in this book 
is as follows: ‘Resistance is the pattern of  acts undertaken by individuals or col-
lectives in a subordinated position to mitigate or deny elite claims and the effects 
of  domination, while advancing their own agenda.’ This definition establishes 
resistance as a practice (a pattern of  acts). It follows Scott in identifying both 
individuals and collectives in a position of  subordination as the bearers of  this 
practice, thus presenting it as part of  a relation of  domination. This means that, 
similar to Scott, those acts are directed towards elite claims and the experience 
of  domination, and it adds an explicit link between intent (denial or mitigation) 
and motivations (agenda advancing). It does not represent any kind of  perma-
nent position that individuals are in, nor does it claim to capture all daily interac-
tions that take place in a complex environment like peacebuilding in the DRC. 
However, it represents resistance as an analytical and political category.
The definition also sets some limits to what counts as resistance. Resistance 
is not an effect; it is a patterned practice, and unintended acts sit at the edges of  
its scope. This is different from accounting for the fact that self-regarding actions 
may have a less clear intent. What it means is that, for instance, forgetting to 
pay one’s taxes could hardly be seen as resistance. Similarly, random acts that 
do not target authority claims or the effects of  domination do not qualify as 
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resistance. However, as mentioned above, the discussion is rather unhelpful if  
couched in terms of  the actual existence or absence of  resistance. This definition 
is not intended to provide an all-or-nothing measure of  resistance; rather, it 
identifies the core elements of  an account, some of  which can be gradated.
Hollander and Einwohner propose not to become trapped in futile definitions 
and to account for resistance directly through a typology. The one they provide 
follows what they consider to be the pith of  cross-disciplinary debates on resist-
ance: intention and recognition. In their typology, they combine resisters’ inten-
tions and the recognition of  resistance by resisters, targets and observers. 
Hollander and Einwohner categorise seven activities according to whether the 
resister intended there to be resistance, and how this is recognised by the targets 
and the observer (Table 2.2).
One of  the greatest achievements of  this typology is to represent ‘the fact 
that the concept of  resistance is socially constructed […] and that resisters, 
targets, and observers all participate in this construction’ (Hollander and Ein-
wohner 2004: 548). Nevertheless, the typology reflects more the relationship 
between the practices and the literature than the nature of  resistance. Hollander 
and Einwohner see resistance as concerning primarily action and opposition, 
Table 2.2 Hollander and Einwohner’s types of  resistance
Types of  resistance
Is act intended as resistance by actor? Is act recognised as resistance by
Target? Observer?
Overt resistance Yes Yes Yes
Covert resistance Yes No Yes







Missed resistance Yes Yes No
Attempted resistance Yes No No
Not resistance No No No
Source: Hollander and Einwohner (2004: 544)
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and fundamentally as a relational concept. As they argue, ‘the interactional 
nature of  resistance also highlights the central role of  power, which is itself  an 
interactional relationship, not a characteristic of  individuals or groups’ (Hol-
lander and Einwohner 2004: 548). It is precisely this interactional nature that 
categories should attempt to grasp. Despite the basic conceptual framework 
provided, based on ‘action and opposition’, Hollander and Einwohner’s typology 
does not reflect this, nor does it show what makes each actor or the observer 
recognise the act as resistance. There is still a need to provide an account for the 
‘acts’ themselves; however, Hollander and Einwohner’s proposal of  categorising 
acts according to different aspects of  resistance and levels of  intent can set the 
basis for a typology that encapsulates both the conceptual framework and these 
different aspects.
Taking stock of  the core arguments advanced in this chapter, and as an 
introduction to how different practices of  resistance will be discussed in the fol-
lowing chapters, Table 2.3 categorises the different elements of  resistance and 
their gradients. Whereas all the elements (patterns, intentions, motivations, acts 
and actors) need to be present, these can be categorised and display different 
gradients (clarity of  intentionality, intensity of  acts and how directly claims have 
been opposed). Categories in the table respond to the now familiar arguments: 
elite claims and resistance can be symbolic and material; resistance practices 
may attempt to deny the claims entirely or mitigate them partially; resistance 
can be individual and collective, and use different acts. Gradients reflect both 
Scott’s and Certeau’s accounts; they can affect intentionality, appearing to the 
observer in a visible or less visible form. Acts can have different gradients of  
intensity, as they confront authority ‘face to face’, in an overt manner, or even 
violently. The different ways in which Scott and Certeau understood resistance 
as a practice of  engaging against authority claims or as a practice that follows 
self-logics illustrates two different kinds of  practices: (1) those that engage 
against authority claims more directly (claim regarding) and that take the form 
of  a more oppositional form of  resistance and even of  attack; and (2) those that 
mitigate or deny claims by a self-serving action or in the form of  ‘aikido’, actually 
using the claim to one’s advantage and generally taking the form of  subversion 
(self-regarding).
Table 2.3 illustrates how these different categories and gradients relate to 
the practices discussed in the empirical chapters. Although, as stated, outcomes 
are not relevant to an account of  resistance because acts may have no impact 
or may result in the opposite of  what was intended, the table offers a category 
of  possible outcomes, which also reflects the relationship between claims and 
resistance practices as discussed in the next chapters. These do not exhaust other 
practices that may be more prevalent in other peacebuilding contexts.
These examples and the way they are interpreted above are not meant 
to be read in absolute terms, implying for example, that in all situations an 
Table 2.3 Overview of  the everyday framework of  resistance applied to current practices in the DRC
Act Nature and object of  
claim
Nature of  practice Possible 
outcomeNature of  intent Nature of  confrontation Actors 
involvedType of  
intent
Is the intent 
visible?
Has there been ‘face 
to face’ confrontation?
How directly has the 
claim been opposed?











Mockery Symbolic – 
legitimacy/deference







Symbolic – agenda 
setting






Mai Mai attacks Material and 
symbolic – authority, 
monopoly of  violence






Use of  Mai Mai 
for security
Material and 
symbolic – authority, 
monopoly of  violence










































symbolic – social and 
political organisation, 
extraction
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‘insult’ may be more overt than slandering or self-management. Ultimately, as 
there are no unambiguous acts of  resistance, and there are plural intersect-
ing relations of  domination, which are changing and contingent, any frame-
work of  resistance needs to embrace heterogeneity and ambiguity and to be 
contextualised.
The way forward
We have come full circle in that, as stated in the Introduction, one of  the most 
problematic aspects of  the accounts of  resistance in the liberal peace literature 
was that they provided a series of  arguments about its practices, its nature and 
how it affected peacebuilding, without having fully elaborated what resistance 
is. Methodologically, it has been stated that while focusing on practices is a rich 
ground for theorising, generalisations have to be limited. The practice of  state-
making and resistance is, as seen in Chapter 1, necessarily affected by the politi-
cal space of  which they are a part. This means to acknowledge that practices of  
resistance in a peacebuilding context are not peculiar to this context, but are the 
continuation of  practices of  resistance that were in place before, except that a 
series of  peacebuilding actors are now part of  the claimants and the claims tend 
to be justified as advancing peace, statebuilding, democracy and development. 
As such, although certain features of  resistance may apply generally to all cases 
and certain practices will be similar, they will recover meaning once they are 
contextualised.
From the above, there are two important ideas to retain for the empirical 
chapters. Firstly, an everyday framework of  resistance is not necessarily one of  
non-violent invisible action but, rather, an account of  the quotidian practices of  
subordinate individuals and collectives that deny or mitigate domination. This 
quotidian element means that these practices aim to be repression-proof  and 
easily applicable without the need for a special political organisation. Despite 
their self-help character, they represent a political category. They can have 
different gradients of  intensity, exposure, engagement against claims and 
intentionality.
Secondly, Hollander and Einwohner’s point that resistance is ultimately 
socially constructed needs to be borne in mind. Having a conceptual framework 
becomes imperative for any account of  resistance. Only through the discussion 
of  how the observer sees patterns, intentions, motivations, acts and actors as 
interrelating, necessary, prevalent or gradated can one account for resistance 
and be able to respond to the different challenges that theorising and researching 
everyday life generate. Despite the complexities and ambiguities that theorising 
resistance entails, it is a necessary category in order to understand social rela-
tions in any political process, and particularly during peacebuilding and the 
reconstruction of  state authority.
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NOTES
 1 E.g. Eric Selbin argues that what distinguishes resistance from rebellion and revolution 
is its less-threatening character in relation to power, and its actions’ being linked to long-
term processes and to societies’ memories of  social struggle. Rebellion, by contrast, is ‘a 
type of  insurgency or uprising which rarely seeks to change the entire system’ but 
manages to threaten it generally with violence. Revolution is a ‘dramatic upheaval involv-
ing a group of  united people overthrowing their government’ (Selbin 2009: 11, 12 and 
13).
 2 In Seeing Like a State, Scott (1998) outlines a theory of  ‘practical knowledge’ about state-
making, where resistance is present but is not the central focus.
 3 The name given to the small village in Malaysia where Weapons of  the Weak’s fieldwork 
takes place.
 4 Especially developed in Domination and the Arts of  Resistance and in the Art of  Not Being 
Governed.
 5 From the exclusive, narrow focus on Malay and Burmese peasantry in The Moral Economy 
of  the Peasant and Weapons of  the Weak, to an overall argument about subordination in 
Domination and the Arts of  Resistance. State–society relations are explored most notably in 
the Art of  Not Being Governed and in Seeing like a State.
 6 Scott asserts, to ‘subscribe wholeheartedly to the judgment reached by E. P. Thompson’, 
that class struggle precedes class and class-consciousness (1985: 296).
 7 E.g. at the peak of  Africa’s World War, 80 per cent of  the DRC’s revenue was put towards 
the war effort (ICG 2000: 41).
 8 With reference, respectively, to Donald Crummey and Achille Mbembe (Abbink, Bruijn, 
and Walraven 2008: 17).
 9 Similar formulations can be seen in: Browdy de Hernandez et al. (2010); Selbin (2009: 
Ch. 3).
10 I am simplifying here Bourdieu’s notion of  habitus and Certeau’s critique of  it. The essence 
of  the critique is that Bourdieu has stripped the individual of  consciousness, decision-
making and transformative agency.
11 Underlying Certeau’s use of  the unconscious is Sigmund Freud (Certeau 1984: 2–6).
12 Das (2007: 78) argues that violence is part of  everyday life experience and that this daily 
experience has surpassed a narrow framework of  power and resistance. This is the frame-
work adopted by Mitchell (2011a, 2011b).
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The ‘failure’ of  the DRC and the militarisation of  peace
Speaking in 2010 of  the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS) for the DRC, a MONUSCO officer argued that the escala-tion of  violence in the Kivus over the last few years was caused by the DRC 
state being ‘inexistent’ (MONUSCO – ISSSS/STAREC liaison officer 2010). For 
this MONUSCO representative, some functions of  the state did not work properly. 
So the task of  international actors was to operationalise the state towards 
making ‘the police, police, the judiciary, judge … get the software … the public 
servants, pay them!’ The image of  the DRC as a failed state looms large over 
policy-making, but also over academic research. This is added to by activist 
media campaigns that portray the DRC as a place of  desperation, war, neglect 
and tragedy: ‘the world’s worst country to live in’ (War Child 2011), ‘a Zaire-
shaped hole in the middle of  Africa’ (The Economist cited in Reno 1998a: 14) 
and ‘the world’s largest failed state’ (Fisher 2009).
The complexities of  the multi-state wars that have taken place since 1996, 
and the ongoing conflict in the eastern provinces, defy a single causal explana-
tion, although these explanations have been the tendency rather than the 
exception, as the standard recourse to the failed state shows. An analysis of  
resistance brings out different aspects of  the history and present of  the conflict. 
The war that started in 1996 was seen by popular classes as an opportunity to 
realise their long-awaited dreams of  change. In addition to the multi-state 
wars, coups and internal military revolts, there was a popular uprising. The 
violence that is experienced today still shows aspects of  those several layers of  
conflict.
The various forms of  resistance linked to how conflict and peacebuilding 
have affected the everyday lives of  popular classes predate the conflict. Looking 
at the coercive and extractive practices of  states writ large, resistance shows that 
it follows patterns in state–society relations. Resistance also shows the particular 
configuration the that Congolese state has taken as a result of  colonisation, 
decolonisation and the Cold War. For Schatzberg, this configuration made the 
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Zairian state ‘a congeries of  organized repositories of  administrative, coercive, 
and ideological power subject to, and engaged in, an ongoing process of  power 
accumulation characterized by uneven ascension and uneven decline’ (1991: 
142). It also made state power relative, that is, ‘weak to international donors 
intent on implementing reforms, but massive and overwhelming to the citizenry’ 
(Schatzberg 1991: 142). Neither the colonial Bula Matari and its trinity of  state, 
Church and corporation, nor its post-colonial version, used those repositories for 
the purpose of  producing wealth and infrastructure for the enjoyment of  the 
majority of  residents in Congo, Zaire or the later DRC (cf. Turner 2007; Young 
1994). Modernity has made the DRC a low-income country that exports copper, 
petrol and ore at low value and imports refined oil, technology, medicines, iron 
and meat at high prices (Observatory of  Economic Complexity 2014). There is 
an outward flow of  resources and debt repayments, and an inward reception of  
manufactured goods and aid. Similarly, as will become apparent in the next few 
chapters, the use of  coercion is more effective in repressing dissent than in pro-
tecting the population.
In this context, both historically and in the present, popular resistance is 
not only important but constitutive of  political order (Maindo Monga Ngonga 
2004; Renton et al. 2007; Young 1994: Ch. 1). In the context of  the present 
war, popular classes have been exposed to new demands of  the global market, 
changes in security interests in Africa at the end of  the Cold War and the 
reconfiguration of  the global security agenda. So, while the war has trans-
formed the political and economic landscape, thereby directly impacting on 
livelihoods, significant sections of  the popular urban and rural classes have 
turned the war into an opportunity for revolt. Although identity and belong-
ing have marked the discourses of  rural militias, these are underpinned by 
long-term political aspirations: dignified living through the enjoyment of  their 
own resources and participation in political decision-making on an equal 
basis.
The peacebuilding strategies of  different national and international actors 
have consolidated a militarised extractive context of  plural authorities. Along-
side the already militarised environment caused by the wars of  1996 and 1998, 
both North and South Kivu have been targets of  unilateral UN and UN-backed 
military operations of  the DRC and Rwanda against remaining armed groups. 
This is in addition to continuous proxy wars between the DRC and Rwanda, 
which both cooperate and antagonise at multiple levels, and a corresponding 
mushrooming of  popular Mai Mai militias. Militarisation has also followed from 
the tendency to deploy the military as representatives of  state authority and as 
the administrators of  certain mines in the eastern territories. Beyond Eastern 
DRC, the rivalries and alliances between countries seen during the wars have 
continued, particularly those between Angola, Rwanda, South Africa and 
Uganda. Nyaxo Olympio summarises these dynamics well when saying that 
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regional politics, reaching from the Great Lakes region to Angola and the South-
ern cone, have become relations of  posturing, antagonisms and vendettas, more 
so than relations of  cooperation and peaceful resolution (2013: 466). Resistance 
in this context is targeted towards the conditions of  living that result from these 
historical and present issues, and is a continuation of  the long-term aspirations 
of  Congolese subordinate classes.
Whereas the next chapters focus on the different resistance strategies, this 
chapter provides the basis for understanding the context of  peacebuilding in the 
DRC. First, it will analyse the major accounts of  the DRC conflict as they have 
affected peacebuilding policy. Second, it will provide a general background of  
the Congo wars since 1996 to observe distinctive features that remain today. 
Third, the chapter analyses the UN strategies used in the DRC since the UN’s 
deployment.
The sources of  conflict and the role of  resistance
The complexities developed during two decades of  war and peacebuilding in 
the DRC mean that state and non-state actors alike are engaged in processes 
of  authority assertion, war and accumulation. The few accounts on resist-
ance provide detailed and historically grounded analyses but have not theo-
rised resistance itself. Rather, they have captured the responses of  Congolese 
people to the imposition of  war conditions and domination from different per-
spectives: the informal arena as a source of  alternative economic and politi-
cal arrangements (De Goede 2012; Mac Gaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000); 
the Mai Mai militias in Eastern Congo (Acker and Vlassenroot 2001; Vlas-
senroot 2002); DIY strategies to provide social services and survival (Trefon 
2004b); and the historical perspective, covering from the colonial period until 
the present (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002; Renton et al. 2007). These analyses 
provide a sense of  the historical and present political activity of  Congolese non-
elites, illustrating that people’s responses to deteriorating living conditions can 
be seen as patterns of  actions that attempt to transform or evade the social 
order.
The absence of  a theorisation of  resistance from the peacebuilding context 
of  the DRC does not stem from the lack of  resistance but, rather, from the 
accounts that have been given of  the conflict itself. Three of  these accounts stand 
out. On the one hand, focusing on the motivations for war, is the resource wars 
thesis. On the other hand are two approaches that focus on the actors involved: 
localist and regionalist. With the spectre of  the failed state underpinning all of  
them and the absence of  a broad political movement, these analyses examine 
the actions of  subordinate groups, both as victims and as co-producers of  a 
context of  domination, plunder and violence, thereby undermining important 
political implications.
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The resource wars thesis
The resource wars thesis has driven mainstream academic, policy and activist 
research. Though disputed, the DRC has been one of  the paradigmatic cases used 
to argue that the access and commercialisation of  natural resources fuels and 
protracts conflict.1 UN strategy in the DRC has, until now, followed this thesis. 
A series of  high-level reports have consistently linked resource exploitation and 
the continuation of  wars (UN Group of  Experts 2015b).2 The thesis has applied 
to the first period of  inter-state war, as its cause, and to the continuation of  
conflict in Eastern DRC. Although this thesis undermines the political motiva-
tions for war, it rightly identifies exploitation and accumulation as important 
dynamics for conflict. For instance, between 1998 and 2002, US$5 billion worth 
of  state assets from the mining sector (especially diamonds, cobalt, copper and 
germanium) were transferred to private companies under Zimbabwean control 
with no compensation paid to the DRC treasury (UN Panel of  Experts 2001: 7). 
Eighty per cent of  Rwanda’s military expenses (about US$320 million) were 
financed by the Congolese spoils (UN Panel of  Experts 2001: 15). Although 
Uganda does not produce gold, gold exports became its second-largest income 
source (Clark 2002b: 152). In recent years, mining has become Rwanda’s 
‘largest foreign exchange earner’, with up to 30 per cent of  these earnings 
coming from illegal mining in Congo (Stearns 2012a: 57). Groups such as the 
FDLR and several Mai Mai groups have continued to operate, thanks to resource 
trafficking and their occupation of  mines.
Despite the wide embracement of  this thesis, implementation of  policy has 
been slow and inconsistent, especially when applying sanctions and prohibitions 
on neighbouring countries and large corporations. The Kimberley Process, 
although a significant step towards eliminating illegal trade of  diamonds, has 
been dubbed ‘toothless’ and is said to continue to exist ‘in name only’ (Elving 
2012: 10–11; Harvey 2009: para. 4). Instead of  the sanctions and embargoes 
against Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi that the final report of  the UN Panel on 
Illegal Exploitation suggested imposing, the World Bank and the IMF granted 
Rwanda and Uganda debt-reduction benefits due to their good economic perfor-
mances (UN Panel of  Experts 2001: 38–9).
The resource wars thesis has informed UN policy towards statebuilding, 
reflecting not only the vision of  the DRC as failed but also the influence of  neo-
liberal understandings of  how states and their economies should work. Neo-
liberal approaches to statebuilding have called for contradictory approaches. 
They have pursued a policy of  rebuilding the state while deregulating its indus-
tries, delinking forms of  economic control from the central apparatus of  the state 
and fostering market self-regulation. For example, mining management has 
been carried out through several attempts to formalise private control 
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(Kuditshini 2008).3 The reliance on private actors means that, despite the 
shaming and finger-pointing contained in these reports, some sensitive material 
was removed from the final report and few judicial procedures have been started 
(Johnson and Kayser 2005: 146). Moreover, some of  the companies, govern-
ments and individuals that these reports accused of  fuelling the conflict have 
continued to work, if  not in direct government positions, as forms of  subcon-
tracted authorities in parts of  the territory.4
This lax approach has changed since about 2010, encouraged by activist 
and policy endorsements (Bafilemba, Lezhnev, and Zingg Wimmer 2012; BBC 
2010; Global Witness 2011; The Enough Project Team and Grassroots Recon-
ciliation Group 2009; UN Group of  Experts 2010a). The OECD guidelines and 
the Dodd-Frank Act of  the US, whereby companies have to publicly disclose their 
mining sources, have made an impact on the mining dynamics of  the DRC,with 
ambiguous results (OECD 2012; US Congress 2010). While establishing mecha-
nisms for the tracing of  resources, they have also pushed many investors out of  
the DRC, impacting on thousands who depend on mining for a living (Cuvelier, 
Van Bockstael et al. 2014). The impact on conflict has been limited as armed 
groups have other sources of  funding such as taxation, robbery, support from 
the civilian population and contributions from the diaspora.5
While the resource wars thesis unearths important dynamics of  conflict in 
the DRC, it portrays practices of  accumulation as a criminal rather than a politi-
cal undertaking. It taps into the image of  the DRC as a neopatrimonial failed 
state, immersed in a Hobbesian state of  nature, where armed actors do not have 
political motivations or values (Autesserre 2010: 72–3; Wai 2014: 144–5). 
Something that the resource wars thesis does not point out is that, as Johnson 
and Kayser note, informal exchanges and trafficking are part of  a longer trend 
of  bypassing state regulations, of  confronting poverty and of  building local 
influence (2005: 169). Many have noted that merchant elites who are part of  
larger networks succeed in providing the community with much-needed 
resources outside of  state channels (Kabamba 2011; Mac Gaffey and Bazenguissa-
Ganga 2000; Raeymaekers et al. 2008; Titeca and De Herdt 2011; Tull 2003). 
These practices may have fuelled the continuation of  war and may not have 
fostered industry. However, they have made the DRC and other neighbouring 
countries’ economies grow (Bayart 1998; Straus and Waldorf  2011). Addition-
ally, as the localists and regionalists have argued, the resource wars thesis neglects 
important identity, political and security concerns that go hand in hand with 
economic motivations. These criticisms have resonated strongly in the most 
recent policy strategies, to the point of  embracing them (Day and Ayet Puigar-
nau 2013; Framework Agreement 2013; ISSSS 2013; UN Security Council 
2015). Yet, as seen below, this has not helped substantially in leading to a politi-
cal solution to the conflict.
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Localists
Localists argue that sources of  conflict are rooted in local dynamics regarding 
belonging and access to power and land, which long predate the conflict itself. 
There is a broad spectrum between those who see violence in Congo as a pre-
colonial issue (Bøås 2010) and those who see historical and localised dynamics 
to be disrupting national and regional ones (Autesserre 2010; Lemarchand 
2003; Reyntjens 2009). Séverine Autesserre (2010) is a primary representative 
arguing that violence in the Kivus is the consequence of  issues of  migration, 
claims of  citizenship and belonging and land disputes since the 1930s. The 
problem with the peacebuilding strategies is that they have been aimed only at 
national and regional levels, ignoring the local dimensions.
Autesserre rightly warns against the depoliticisation of  villagers, chiefs and 
local administrators and seeing them as simple followers manipulated by national 
or regional elites. She offers a detailed account of  political and ethnic agendas 
that operate autonomously and that end up causing or fuelling conflicts at 
national and regional levels. She also highlights the importance of  historical 
events in shaping the present DRC. Yet, in so doing her account reveals several 
other limitations. Autesserre evades history by tracing an unchanging continu-
ous line between the 1930s and today. The ‘locals’ and ‘the local level’ become, 
in her account, a homogenous sphere of  individuals whose only differentiation 
is their ethnic identity. This way of  defining the local not only sees ‘ethnic’ identi-
ties as rigid and prominent when they are not, it also ignores the enormous 
complexity of  identities and relations based on class, gender and age.
From here, several important aspects of  the causes of  conflict and the his-
toricity of  the DRC are undermined. The period between 1914 and the 1930s 
was characterised initially by World War I and later by an economic crisis that 
affected most colonial powers. Tax extraction increased 400 per cent between 
1917 and 1924, and an increasing number of  peasants were forced into cotton 
cultivation (Bézy, Peemans, and Wautelet 1981: 35–45; Davidson, Isaacman, 
and Pélisser 1985: 690). Some of  the most famous peasant revolts and religious-
political movements took place during this period, including that of  Simon Kim-
bangu. In rural areas of  the Kivus, the Kitawala movement had taken root, 
threatening to kill Europeans and African allies (loyalist chiefs in particular) in 
its quest for an ‘Africa for the Africans’ and ‘equality of  races’ (Davidson et al. 
1985: 692). The economic crisis endured as most parts of  the world were at war 
just over a decade later. This crisis again produced revolts in the colonies against 
the increase of  taxes and conscription. The DRC saw, for instance, the Manono 
and Masisi revolts and the Luluaborg mutity in 1944 (Emoungu 1986: 168; 
Mazrui 1993: 195).
The dual system of  accessing land, based on administrative and customary 
law, has remained in place until the present time, not just until the 1990s 
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(Autesserre 2010: 130). If  property is in question, whoever has the land title is 
recognised as the owner. Mere belonging to an ethnic community is not a guar-
antee of  access to land: the chief  needs to grant access, and for this to happen 
personal and village politics come into play. When Belgium took control of  the 
Congo from Leopold II, the political and economic basis of  authority in the DRC 
changed from a slavery system to one of  waged labour (Coquery-Vidrovitch 
1985: 356–8). Subsistence farming has existed in parallel with cash-crops ever 
since as a marginal low-income activity, increasingly dependent on farmers 
being able to rent rather than own land. This is a feature not just of  the way the 
Belgian colonial administration dealt with the distribution of  wealth and rights, 
but also of  the particular value of  exchanges in the global market.
The violence of  the 1960s, 1980s and 1990s analysed by Autesserre needs 
to be understood beyond the scope of  ethnicity. In the 1960s, revolts in Kwilu, 
South Kivu and Northern Katanga took place as a result of  the assassination of  
Lumumba and the secession of  Katanga (Renton et al. 2007: 116). The Mulele 
rebellion in 1964 lasted about a year and took control of  40 per cent of  the ter-
ritory, with Bunia and Fizi being two of  the last territories to resist the advance 
of  the army (De Witte 2001: 163). According to Ludo De Witte, conservative 
estimates of  the number of  people killed in the rebellion and the subsequent 
repression were ‘about 300 whites and more than 200,000 Congolese’ (Marlair 
cited in De Witte 2001: 164). For the next 30 years or more this movement 
was continued by Mulele allies such as Laurent Desirée Kabila, resulting in con-
siderable violence by Kabila’s Parti Revolutionaire du Peuple (PRP) and the 
Government.
The 1980s were marked by continuous violent opposition to Mobutu, 
violent repression of  dissent and an incipient organisation of  non-violent oppo-
sition with Etienne Tshisekedi (Ndaywel è Nziem 2011: 253–62; Schatzberg 
1991: 58). These dynamics continued into the early 1990s, a period of  time 
also characterised by the effects of  the dismantling of  state and economy as 
carried out by Mobutu and the SAPs. In addition to the kleptocratic enterprise 
of  Mobutu, who went into exile with a US$5 billion fortune but left the country 
bankrupt, the SAPs made all aid and debt rescheduling conditional on state 
withdrawal from public services and investments, the elimination of  subsidies 
and the liberalisation of  trade (Devarajan, Dollar, and Holmgren 2001; Moyo 
2009: 48). The result was exacerbated poverty. In Zaire, the 1991 pillages 
extended throughout the country. Rank and file soldiers, who were paid US$1 
per month, started looting and a revolt ensued. They were joined by others in 
the population, many of  whom had just been scammed after putting their 
savings into financial pyramid schemes as last attempts to access money (Mar-
riage 2013: 22). The looters destroyed public and private property and infra-
structure throughout the country, and the pillages dilapidated an already 
damaged economy. ‘There was an estimated US$1 billion worth of  damage in 
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the first 72 hours’ (Ransdell cited in Marriage 2013: 23). Zaire’s GDP fell by 30 
per cent, unemployment went up to 80 per cent, companies like Gecamines fell 
in their GDP contribution to 0 per cent by 1992 and public sector workers went 
on strike (Human Rights Watch 1993: “Zaire” para. 4; Marriage 2013: 25). 
This violence, and that of  mid-1996, was exacerbated by the fact that much 
leftover stock from the Cold War went to Zaire (Hartung and Moix 2000). For 
Marriage, the pillages represent a conflict between the leadership and the popula-
tion, which ‘crystallised’ identity conflicts (2013: 28). This does not mean that 
the conflicts over land, power and citizenship started here, but that analyses of  
conflicts over land, power and citizenship need to take these other factors into 
account.
Ethnic identities are not rigid, nor are they historically unchanged.6 Willame 
argues that identity, in the way that it has played out in the Kivus, is something 
from the democratisation period (1997: 62–8). For Kankwenda, although the 
institutionalisation of  ethnic identities arrived with the Belgians, the post-
colonial period amplified it (2005: 279). As ethnic groups became more 
entrenched, they became a way to access political and economic goods and a 
strategic form of  defence, resistance and refuge, but not the only one (Kank-
wenda 2005: 288). The system of  predation in the DRC includes an ethnic 
dimension alongside two other elements. Socially, it is also sustained by the 
intelligentsia congolaise, that is, an informal social body that seals the system with 
a rubber stamp of  technical knowledge, moral authority, notoriety and social 
prestige. It is also sustained by the alliances made externally between individu-
als, institutions, corporations and groups (Kankwenda 2005: 280).
The ethnic aspect is a receptacle for multiple political, economic and social 
identities that primarily worked to simplify the administration of  the colony 
(Vansina 1966). Hutus and Tutsis, for instance, were not originally ethnic iden-
tities but designated socio-economic classes (Vansina 2004: 134–9). The ethnic 
divisions created by the Belgians were imposed, generating resistance and con-
flict not only towards the Belgians but also towards those seen as their allies 
(Kankwenda 2005: 282–4). Pre-existing identities were not fixed. They had as 
much to do with parental ties and birth locations as with different social net-
works such as religious, mystical, political and economic. These changed simul-
taneously, depending on whether or not they had been subjected to a kingdom 
or an empire (e.g., Rwanda and Buganda kingdoms or the Kongo, Luba and 
Lunda empires) and whether or not they were subjected to a tribute or slavery 
system (Kankwenda 2005: 283–5; Muiu and Martin 2009: Ch. 6; Vansina 
1966: 118–19). Importantly, not all of  these identities had to do with access to 
land and power; they also had to do with norms, customs and roles within dif-
ferent groups and were not all territorially linked. Additionally, it would be 
wrong to see ethnic divisions only in terms of  animosities or as clear cut. The 
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long history of  the DRC, including the pre-colonial period, is defined by cohabita-
tion (Vansina 1966).
Lastly, the separation of  the local from the national and regional is an arti-
ficial device that resembles the resource war thesis from the bottom up. The 
politics of  villagers in the localist version seem to be confined to the access of  
land and political power. From this view, the history of  revolt for social change 
and the constraints imposed by the global economy are out of  the picture. Yet 
land and power are inextricably linked to the global market and to notions of  
social justice.
Localists ultimately portray the image of  a violent inside that disrupts a 
more pacified outside, remaining within a framework in which the right kind of  
interveners with the right kind of  sensitivity could apply policies that would 
build the right kind of  state. But, as seen in previous chapters, and as will be 
observed in later ones, any state is the outcome of  the entanglement between the 
global and the local. This is visible once again in the present peacebuilding 
process. At the local level, it is possible to find actors as disparate as the UN, the 
military, a corporation or an externally backed armed group playing state-like 
roles in the absence of  an administrative state-based authority. These actors 
contribute either directly or indirectly to practices of  coercion and extraction, 
and only very limitedly to the realisation of  the liberal state of  peacebuilding 
policies. Armed militias may be linked to particular ethnic groups, but this does 
not reduce the conflict to land or to an ethnic conflict. The fluidity of  other 
identities, the diversity of  power relations, the history of  the struggle for better 
conditions of  living and the dynamics of  the global economy impinge on the 
local context and are necessary elements for understanding the conflict.
Regionalists
It is this greater set of  elements that regionalists capture. Most regionalists do 
not disregard the local features intervening in the continuation of  conflict. What 
they argue is that the dynamics in the DRC are linked to the dynamics of  the 
Great Lakes region. In this view, it is not just state actors like Rwanda and 
Uganda who have affected the development of  events, but also their intercon-
nections with their corresponding diasporas in each country, their common and 
conflicting commercial interests, their links to non-state actors, including armed 
groups, as well as their common security threats. Regionalists also consider 
other factors that have to do with global politics, the global economy and social 
hierarchies (Ndaywel è Nziem 1998; Prunier 2009; Raeymaekers 2014; Vlas-
senroot and Raeymaekers 2004a).
A vivid example of  the differences between regionalists and localists has 
been exposed by Jason Stearns’s criticism of  an article published by Séverine 
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Autesserre in the New York Times. The journal piece summarises the arguments 
Autesserre has made over the last 10 years:
The international community has failed to help Congo achieve peace and security 
because it fundamentally misunderstands the causes of  the violence [ – ] distinctively 
local conflicts over land, grassroots power, status and resources, like cattle, charcoal, 
timber, drugs and fees levied at checkpoints. Most of  the violence in Congo is not 
coordinated on a large scale. It is the product of  conflicts among fragmented local 
militias, each trying to advance its own agenda at the village or district level. Those 
then percolate and expand. (2012b: para. 7)
Jason Stearns responded with the following:
While [Autesserre] is right to emphasize the local dynamics of  conflict, her argu-
ment is flawed. She falls victim of  her own critique: she, too, ends up being overly 
reductive, failing to account for the different kinds of  armed actors, each with its 
unique underlying dynamic, in the Eastern Congo. In fact, reading her op-ed, one 
might think that the reason for the uptick in violence in the Kivus this year is due 
to land conflicts and struggles for power at the village level. But the main protago-
nists since the beginning of  the transition in 2003 have not been fragmented local 
militia with parochial concerns, but rather armed groups that are tightly linked to 
regional political and business elites, such as the CNDP, PARECO, and, most recently, 
the M-23. (2012c: para. 4)
In developing his response, Stearns gives a brief  background of  the CNDP, which, 
as he notes, was formed ‘by senior members of  the RCD [Rassemblement Con-
golais pour la Démocratie] military, in coordination with officials in Kigali and 
Goma’ to safeguard their interests (2012c: para. 6; see also: Stearns 2008; UN 
Group of  Experts 2012b: para. 103–7). Even when local grievances about land 
are at the root of  certain armed groups, Stearns argues that they ‘have since 
become integrated into regional business and political networks’ (Stearns 2012c: 
para. 9; see also: Sylla 2010). Regionalists provide a moderate argument that 
includes regional transborder dynamics, the impact of  donor policies and inter-
nal dynamics, without considering them solely as a Congolese transhistorical 
affair (Stearns 2013a). There are important differences amongst regionalists, 
depending on whether the emphasis is put on the role of  external countries, even 
if  from the region, or on the internal factors of  the DRC as a failed state.7 For 
instance, Nzongola Ntalaja speaks of  factors of  instability in the region, of  which 
state weakness is paramount (2002: 214). Turner affirms that both the 1996 
and 1998 wars were the work of  Rwanda, with involvement of  different regional 
and continental actors, but the underlying factors of  the war are a combination 
of  state failure, cultural and socio-economic issues and the political economy of  
the DRC (2007: 17–19). The regionalist account highlights the need to prob-
lematise local–global relations and societal divides among elites and non-elites. 
The regionalist account suffers, however, from maintaining the paradigm of  the 
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neopatrimonial failed state and from not linking the dynamics of  the region with 
the general patterns of  state behaviour and with the constraints of  the global 
economic order.
An exploration of  resistance precisely takes this complexity into account, 
considering the different levels on which actors operate and seeing local and 
global, present and history as co-constituted. The analyses explored above also 
underline that a lack of  more organised movements is seen as an absence of  
resistance; instead, state failure, ethnic alliances, patronage and self-seeking 
individuals are seen as the main causes of  conflict. Yet, neither patronage nor 
the figure of  the failed state illustrates how political authority is exercised. Eth-
nicity is just one element among many identities and factors that impact on 
conflict. Additionally, as will be shown in the next chapters, these factors impact 
on resistance but they do not define it.
Landmarks of  a multi-layered conflict
In spite of  the complex dynamics of  conflict and the long history of  structural 
and physical violence in the DRC, it is helpful to retain a basic chronology of  the 
actual conflict. This can be divided into three phases. First, a period of  large-
scale war from 1996 until 2003; second, a period of  transition between 2003 
and 2006, ending with the first democratic elections since independence; and 
third, a decade of  cyclical conflict localised mainly in the eastern part of  the 
territory. Every time conflict has erupted during this last decade there has been 
a similar response: a process of  negotiation, mainly based on reintegration and 
disarmament – but not followed by either party – and a military response gen-
erally involving the FARDC, the UN and the Rwandan army. DRC–Rwandan 
relations have also marked this last period as they have engaged in mutual 
instrumentalisations and confrontations through proxy wars, which have 
carried the mark of  both countries’ statebuilding projects. Although Jason 
Stearns and Christopher Vogel argue that since the M-23 defeat and later 
changes in the FARDC Rwanda has lost most of  its military allies and there has 
been a decline in the regional dimension of  the conflict, these dynamics are 
likely to continue (2015: 5).
Multi-state war and revolt in the first large confrontations (1996–2003)
The immediate context of  war, resistance, state-making and peacebuilding in 
the DRC has been marked by four events: the ousting of  Mobutu, which suffo-
cated an important democratic movement; the Rwandan genocide; the AFDL 
(l’Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo) war of  
1996–97; and the RCD rebellion, which turned into ‘Africa’s First World War’ 
(1998–2003). These four events have created a militarised extractive context of  
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plural authorities, which explains why resistance generally takes both a covert 
and a militarised form.
The first event was the ‘elbowing’ out of  Mobutu (Erlanger 1997: 15). The 
choice of  a military solution was underpinned by a series of  factors related to 
the end of  the Cold War, a serious crisis in Zaire and the Rwandan genocide 
(Young 2002). The Rwandan-initiated military campaign in 1996 gathered 
regional and international support, but suffocated a democratic movement 
(Pomfret 1997). The efforts of  thousands of  civil society organisations, dissi-
dent parliamentarians and political parties long opposed to Mobutu culminated 
in the 1992 Conference for National Sovereignty (CNS) (Nzongola-Ntalaja 
2002: 171). This was a conference of  over 2,000 delegates representing opposi-
tion parties and a plethora of  civil society organisations, which managed to 
appoint a new government.8 However, Mobutu’s coup three months later and 
the 1996 international campaign against him meant the ushering in of  a new 
authoritarian regime and the loss of  the more vocal and formally organised 
resistance.
The second event was the spilling-over of  the Rwandan genocide into the 
DRC. The Rwandan genocide needs to be understood in two stages: the first, in 
which the Hutu Interahamwe killed up to 800,000 Tutsis, Twa and moderate 
Hutus in Rwanda and the Congolese aftermath; and a second, in which the 
Tutsi-led AFDL along with the APR (Armée Patriotique Rwandaise) killed 
300,000 Hutu refugees, militias and civilians during the 1996–97 military 
campaign in the DRC (Young 2002: 13–14). As such, its effects were regional, 
not only as an ignition factor for the Congo Wars, but also as an impact on how 
politics and war in the Great Lakes region began to be determined by a pro-anti-
Kagame-–Tutsi division (Prunier 2009: xxxi; Stearns 2011: 8). Since then, the 
genocide has marked Rwanda’s need for security in Eastern DRC, in addition to 
its economic agendas. For Rwanda, the fulfilment of  these security and eco-
nomic agendas largely depends on intervening in the DRC. Yet the two wars that 
Rwanda has led in the DRC have both bolstered and endangered Rwanda’s 
interests.
The third and fourth events were the two complex, multi-state wars of  1996 
(AFDL/APR war) and 1998 (RCD War) or war of  liberation and war of  aggres-
sion, as Ndaywel è Nziem prefers to call them (2011: 268–72). The full-blown 
militarisation that these two conflicts provoked was due not just to the circum-
stances of  inter-state war, but also to the fact that civilians were extensively 
targeted and engaged in the war effort. The AFDL campaign was aimed at: (1) 
dismantling the refugee camps where Interahamwe genocidaires from Rwanda 
were living, to prevent them reorganising; and (2) ousting Mobutu, who had 
become a source of  insecurity in the region.9 The campaign had US support, but 
also crucial to its success were the interventions of  Angola and France and the 
mobilisation of  Mai Mai militias and factions of  the Congolese military.
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The RCD war began as a US-backed Rwandan–Ugandan–Burundian effort 
to oust Laurent Desirée Kabila, allied to an internal movement called the Rally 
for Congolese Democracy (RCD). It then encountered the response of  the 
Angolan, Namibian, Chad, Zimbabwean armies and Mai Mai militias. These 
militias sided with Laurent Desirée Kabila because they had a historical and 
ideological connection with him as a revolutionary figure.10 They also responded 
out of  nationalist sentiment to what they saw as an invasion. The Map 3.1 pro-
vides an orientation to the complex system of  alliances in the region.
This map does not include the broader international alliances. Aside from 
the already mentioned US support of  the Rwandan-led coalition, Chad and the 
CAR supported Kabila with the help of  France, Namibia and Sudan and with 
Libyan aid (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 240; Scherrer 2002: 255). In the east, it 
was the Mai Mai militias, mainly those of  General Dunia and General Padiri, 
which were able to contain the actions of  Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi. 
Despite this, Mai Mai representation was subsequently undermined in the 
peace negotiations. This has created resentment amongst those who fought for 
Kabila, and after various failed DDR (Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Rein-
tegration of  national armed groups) attempts many have rejoined the Mai Mai 
militias.
The dynamics of  foreign occupation, the involvement of  popular classes in 
the conflict and different conflict management solutions have created what 
Ndaywel calls a ‘giant octopus’ (2011: 282). The significance of  these four 
events goes beyond a dynamic of  war and state-making. They combine genocide, 
the toppling of  Mobutu’s dictatorship and two multi-state wars, with one of  the 
highest civilian death tolls since World War II.11 A common pattern has been 
the conquest of  territory, typically through raids, and the usual response of  
civilians has been flight (Pillay 2010: Ch. 2; Redress 2006: 20–2).12 However, 
this has also been a main reason for people to engage in war, making civilians 
rely on their own devices for protection. Additionally, the AFDL and the RCD 
wars, which were brought under the rubric of  national liberation, first against 
Mobutu and then against Laurent Desirée Kabila, have also been factors in fun-
nelling political aspirations through the participation in war.
Violent transition (2003–6)
The transition brought significant hope, especially around the ratification of  the 
new constitution and, in 2006, the first democratic elections since independ-
ence. But it also consolidated the positions of  the strongest actors and was 
marred by violent episodes. The more meaningful peace agreement was achieved 
in Sun City (South Africa) in 2002. Earlier, the Lusaka peace agreement of  
1999, signed at the instance of  the AU, Zambia and South Africa in particular, 
and of  the UN Secretary General, from which the UN authorised MONUC, just 
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Map 3.1 Regional alliances and interventions in the DRC wars of  1996 and 1998
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‘froze the armies in their positions, but did not stop the fighting’ (ICG 2000: iii). 
It was not until the assassination of  Laurent Kabila in January 2001, when his 
son Joseph Kabila took his place, that the different warring parties felt a renewed 
stimulus for negotiation.13 Shortly after, Joseph Kabila met Rwandan president 
Kagame in Washington and, within days, Rwanda, Uganda and some rebel 
groups agreed to a UN-backed withdrawal.
The Sun City peace agreement managed to reunite the country, establish a 
transitional government, expel most foreign parties and pacify the western part 
of  the country. It was also the first agreement to see the realisation of  an Inter-
Congolese Dialogue. However, despite the fact that from this agreement onwards 
the DRC was officially dubbed a ‘post-conflict context’, conflict has continued, 
leaving a situation of  ‘formal peace and informal war’ (Marriage 2013). The 
transitional government formula of  1+4 placed Joseph Kabila as president, sup-
ported by four vice-presidents, each representing one of  the warring parties: 
RCD, Mouvement de Libération du Congo (MLC), the Government and the 
opposition.14 The main hierarchy of  the newly created FARDC was also made 
up of  representatives of  these parties. As Ahamed notes, the UN and EU’s strat-
egy of  peace from very early on was one of  sustaining warlords (2006: 288). 
Despite the participation of  over 360 organisations and historical opposition 
parties in the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the agreement was largely a settlement 
amongst armed men, leaving the civil society as a passive spectator (Hoebeke 
2006).
During the transition, other significant conflicts took place. In the Ituri 
district, violence between the Hema and Lendu communities had begun 
in 1999, and by 2003 fears of  a possible genocide prompted the first ever 
EU-led peacekeeping operation outside Europe (European Union 2003; Fahey 
2011; Veit 2008; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2004b). Between 2006 and 
2007 post-electoral violence took the lives of  300 people (MONUC Human 
Rights Division and OCHA 2007). Some significant events were the clashes 
between Kabila’s Republican Guard and MLC supporters in Kinshasa in 
August 2006 and March 2007 and the shooting of  Bundu dia Kongo follow-
ers in several towns of  Bas-Congo. Additionally, the formation of  the CNDP 
and the FDLR signalled that the main political stakes in the conflict were 
still largely unresolved.
Cyclical conflict and repetitive responses (2006–16)
The decade following the 2006 elections has been marked by three dynamics 
feeding back into cyclical conflicts. The protagonists have been Rwandan-backed 
armed groups (CNDP/M-23); the Mai Mai militias, which mushroomed around 
the failure of  the first significant demobilisation process in 2007; the FDLR; 
the Government; and the FARDC. The first dynamic is the confrontation/
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instrumentalisation between the DRC and Rwanda, which has fuelled the crea-
tion and maintenance of  armed groups fighting proxy wars for economic, politi-
cal and security gains. The second and third dynamics go together as they form 
the pattern of  responses addressing the conflicts. One is the repeated shallow 
and uncommitted negotiations; the other is a reliance on military means. The 
post-transition period, which needed to consolidate state authority and peace, 
has, rather, pluralised state authority, and in the eastern provinces has seen an 
increasingly militarised environment. In order to better understand this complex 
decade, this section examines the three dynamics separately.
DRC–Rwanda instrumentalisations and confrontations
One source of  the sour relations between Rwanda and the DRC has been the 
FDLR. Ever since the AFDL war in 1996 Rwanda has claimed that a weak DRC 
is a threat to its security, providing refuge to dissident FDLR-Interahamwe (Brae-
ckman 2012; Clark 2002a; Pomfret 1997). The FDLR is a group created in 2000 
from Rwanda’s ex-army officials, members of  the Habyarimana Government 
and the old Rwandan Hutu-dominated Interahamwe militias that crossed the 
border into Zaire at the time of  the Rwandan genocide. Although it states its 
ultimate aim to be the ousting of  Kagame and the re-establishment of  a plural 
and social government in Rwanda, its presence and evolution in the DRC relates 
to a series of  complex factors. Despite its fears of  being tried in Rwanda for crimes 
of  genocide, during its almost 20 years in the DRC it has managed to establish 
rule in many areas, formed families and created a series of  military and com-
mercial networks with the DRC Government, the FARDC and some Mai Mai 
militias (Group Jeremie Representative 2 2010; Hege 2009). In several locations 
in North and South Kivu it has been in symbiosis with the FARDC to exploit 
mines (UN Group of  Experts 2005: para.158–169; Global Witness 2010a). For 
the populations of  South Kivu and Shabunda in particular, the fact that a self-
defence group (Raïa Mutomboki) has been able to expel the FDLR is evidence 
that neither the DRC, nor Rwanda, nor the diplomatic community present in the 
DRC has a real commitment to stopping it.
In its 20 years in the DRC, the FDLR has not only consolidated its standing 
as a destabilising factor, accused of  committing atrocities against the civilian 
population, but has also consolidated its standing as an exchange currency in 
the DRC–Rwanda relations. The DRC has used it to confront and maintain lever-
age against Rwanda. Observers note that the problem of  the FDLR may be over-
stated, facilitating a justification for intervening politically and militarily in the 
DRC in pursuit of  other agendas (Autesserre 2006: 6–7; Lemarchand 2009: 
275–6; Prunier 2009: 322; UN Group of  Experts 2002: para. 69). Although 
this group once claimed to represent the legitimate Rwandan Government and 
numbered 20,000 troops, today the threat that it represents to Rwanda is more 
political than military, as it has only about 1,500 members (ICG 2003: 5; UN 
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Group of  Experts 2015a: para.47). The presence of  the FDLR has underpinned 
the justifications for the two main revolts of  the post-transition period, supported 
by Rwanda (UN Group of  Experts 2004: paras 65–7; 2005: paras 185–6; Stearns 
2012a; UN Group of  Experts 2012a, 2012b). One was led by the CNDP and the 
other by the M-23, taking place in the two post-electoral periods of  2007 and 
2012, respectively.
The CNDP was created in 2006 by General Nkunda and several other ren-
egades after a failed reintegration process.15 It claimed the need to protect the 
Tutsi population against the FDLR and to guarantee their access to land and 
political participation. General Nkunda, who had already fought under the APR 
and RCD in 1996 and 1998, became the perfect solution for Rwanda to maintain 
a political, military and economic influence in the Kivus, and Rwanda’s support 
afforded him the capacity to rise as a defender of  the Tutsi community (Prunier 
2009: 322). As a charismatic, university-educated evangelical pastor and mili-
tary leader with a national discourse for the defence of  minorities, Nkunda 
gathered as much popular as elite support, especially from within his Tutsi com-
munity of  Rutshuru and Masisi (Mazanza Kindulu and Nlandu Tsasa 2009: 
200; Prunier 2009: 323). This support and Nkunda’s own personality reflect 
that he was no pawn operating within anyone else’s agenda. Additionally, por-
tions of  the DRC Government have also supported Nkunda. For instance, Vice-
President Ruberwa and Governor Serufuli supplied arms (Stearns 2008: 248; 
US Ambassador Haykin 2009). Public support in Masisi and Rutshuru, linked 
to the network of  elite alliances that go as far as Kigali, made Nkunda both a 
threat and a necessary ally for the DRC Government.
Nkunda had been operating a parallel administration in Masisi, Rutshuru 
and Nyirangongo (three territories of  the North Kivu province) since 2004. 
This entailed a parallel decision-making structure, parallel police, a parallel 
army and different regimes of  labour and taxation. The formal launch of  the 
CNDP comprised several thousand troops. This strength was seen in the violent 
attacks they were able to carry out. In 2004, General Nkunda and General 
Mutebusi attacked Bukavu, the capital of  South Kivu, which was host to one of  
the largest MONUC deployments in DRC. Claiming to stop the genocide against 
the Banyamulengue, they subjected Bukavu’s residents to systematic crimes 
against humanity for a week (Zeebroek 2008: 9). The most destabilising of  
these attacks came in the post-election period between 2006 and 2007, when a 
series of  clashes between the CNDP, the FDLR, Mai Mai militias and the Govern-
ment threatened to tear apart the transition. As observed below, the agreements 
reached in order for this violence to cease were the cause, six years later, of  the 
CNDP transforming into the M-23 and of  one of  the most severe crises in the 
post-transition period.
The second CNDP uprising, under the name of  M-23, followed a similar 
path. After elections in 2012, Bosco Ntaganda (instead of  General Nkunda), led 
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a movement of  desertion within the army, taking command in several territo-
ries in North Kivu (Masisi and Rutshuru) and seizing the town of  Goma in 
November 2012.16 The responses to this uprising were familiar. Rwanda and 
Uganda denied any involvement, while UN and Human Rights Watch reports 
argued the opposite (Human Rights Watch 2012; Rwandan Foreign Affairs 
Ministry 2012; UN Group of  Experts 2012a). The DRC Government entered 
into discussions with Angola to secure support in case of  a full-on invasion by 
these governments (Radio Okapi 2009). Up to 650,000 people were displaced, 
war crimes were reported and Kabila called on the population to attend to 
the ‘obligation to resist the imposition of  war [and] for everyone to participate 
in the defence of  the national sovereignty’.17 Several armed groups were formed 
as a popular response to this uprising. Some of  these were attached to the 
DRC and neighbouring governments, others were part of  the ongoing popular 
response to the constant instability of  the preceding decade. The official 
responses from the DRC Government and the UN, aiming for the reintegration 
of  troops, have been claimed to be ‘dead-ends’ precisely because the old reinte-
gration strategies have weakened the army, incentivised the taking up of  arms 
and ultimately increased militarisation and reproduced violence (Eriksson Baaz 
and Verweijen 2012).
The DRC response to these two uprisings has been contradictory. On the one 
hand, encouraged by the UN and the diplomatic community, there have been a 
series of  programmes to integrate Nkunda’s troops in the FARDC. On the other 
hand, the DRC Government has supported the FDLR and Mai Mai groups, espe-
cially PARECO and the Alliance des Patriotes pour un Congo Libre et Souverain 
against Nkunda and Ntaganda, respectively, in an attempt to confront Rwanda’s 
hegemony (UN Group of  Experts 2008b: para. 18). As discussed below, this 
enters into the logic of  giving primacy to military means and the assertion of  
state authority over political negotiations.
Negotiations without commitment18
The second dynamic characterising the 2006–16 decade is flawed political 
agreements. Negotiations have been sought by all parties, including the diplo-
matic community, but they have lacked commitment. Particularly notable are 
the 2007 agreement with the CNDP, the Goma Accords of  2008, the 23 March 
agreements and the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSCF). 
Their focus on demobilisation and the reintegration of  armed groups in the 
FARDC has created a lose-lose scenario. When successful, these agreements have 
contributed to the mosaic of  armed groups which comprise the FARDC and have 
offered warring parties a privileged standpoint from which to continue pursuing 
their agendas; when they have been unsuccessful, conflict has erupted again. 
Additionally, as seen below, negotiations have almost always implied an agree-
ment to use military means, which has increased instability.
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In the 2007 negotiations between the DRC government and the CNDP, it 
was agreed to reintegrate CNDP members into the army under the name of  
mixage,19 but the outcome was the following:
Nkunda’s commanders continued to respond to their own chain of  command, 
meeting regularly in Nkunda’s headquarters and launching operations indepen-
dently […]. Most importantly, they were put back on the army payroll. With 3,500 
declared soldiers at the beginning of  mixage, Nkunda benefited from over US$70,000 
each month in salaries. (Stearns 2008: 253)20
Thus, CNDP consolidated its positions, especially along the border with Rwanda, 
and caused further violence (Stearns 2008: 254). Two subsequent referent 
agreements were agreed to as a result. First, the Goma Accords of  January 2008 
were a comprehensive strategy for reintegration of  all armed groups including 
CNDP, PARECO and several Mai Mai militias. They established the Amani Leo 
programme in which the Programme de Stabilisation et de Reconstruction des 
Zones sortant des Conflits Armés (STAREC) came to light, and a series of  military 
operations in which the DRC and Rwanda and the DRC with MONUC/MONUSCO 
targeted the FDLR and Mai Mai militias. Despite the initial hype about the value 
of  these agreements, by August 2008 the CNDP had withdrawn from the Goma 
Accords and was threatening to take over Goma. A second agreement was 
reached on 23 March (the 23 March agreement) as a bilateral agreement 
between the CNDP and the DRC Government. Similar to the mixage process, the 
23 March agreement established that CNDP troops would integrate with the 
FARDC but would not be deployed outside the Kivus, essentially provoking a 
change of  uniforms only (MONUSCO – ISSSS/STAREC liaison Officer 2010; 
MONUSCO Political Affairs Officer (no. 149) 2010). For Rwanda this meant the 
fulfilment of  important security and economic agendas; for the DRC it was a 
compromise, encouraged by the diplomatic community, to reinforce state pres-
ence in the area.
As already seen in Chapter 1, it was not just the military positions CNDP 
members were granted; they were also granted oversight over refugees return-
ing to the region. Through the Amani Leo programme, the Permanent Local 
Committees for Reconciliation were set up to ensure the peaceful return and 
accommodation of  refugees in North and South Kivu. The need for a negotiated 
approach was due to the fact that the land holdings and even the houses of  
these refugees may have been redistributed by the customary chief, occupied 
by the military or the police, sold or taken by an authority (Batenda 2010; 
UN Habitat representative 2011; Université Catholique de Bukavu Professor 
2009). Particularly in North Kivu, negotiations at the grassroots level turned 
into a geopolitical exercise. This was due to the fact that identification and 
nomination of  refugees is made through the UNHCR/DRC/Rwanda Tripartite 
Agreement, but is enacted locally. So nominations were largely done by the 
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CNDP on behalf  of  the DRC Government. As such, many so-called autochtho-
nous residents of  Masisi, as well as of  Walikale and Rutshuru, have argued that 
it is a tactic for settling Rwandan populations in Congo (President of  Civil 
Society Masisi Centre 2011).
Interestingly, residents are not the only ones to have this perception. Accord-
ing to a UNHCR officer, Rwanda is using this strategy to such effect:
The people that want to come into Walikale and Lubero are not Congolese; it is Kigali 
that dictates that. There is not a lot of  population there, so those who live there feel 
really threatened. There is a lot of  space. The strategy is that they allow for those 
new settlers to come in and compensate them with development projects. We need 
to do that very slowly. People in Walikale are the people from the hills, with provincial 
characters, we need to convince them. We need to reduce the dependence of  people 
on the customary chief. We need to give a land title to each of  them and create the 
conditions so that investors can come to bring development. But for that we need to 
train the customary chief  and give him an alternative also. It is a political but also 
a humanitarian project. It is the only way, otherwise we risk that there is war again. 
We can put pressure on Rwanda in regards to the FDLR but their policy of  establish-
ing themselves in Congo is not possible, they receive 50 per cent of  their budget from 
overseas, but if  the West stops their aid, they can always go to China. Rwanda has 
a de facto occupation of  Rutshuru and Masisi, and it is now trying to take Walikale 
and Lubero because there are a lot of  minerals there, we can only try that this is 
done in a calm and peaceful way. (UNHCR Officer 2010)
Shared authority is fundamental to the practice of  deploying state authority. Yet 
it externalises violent consequences onto the population. The M-23 uprising was 
a wake-up call to many that a serious peace agreement was needed for the politi-
cal issues underlying the conflict to be addressed. The failed state thesis and the 
turn to the local sources of  conflict have continued a trend in which Congolese 
endogenous factors of  conflict are the ultimate target of  policies. In February 
2013, the PSCF was signed by eleven countries (DRC, Angola, Republic of  Congo, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Central African Republic (CAR), Burundi, 
Rwanda, South Sudan and Zambia) with UN, AU, Southern African Development 
Community and International Conference on the Great Lakes Region representa-
tives as witnesses (Framework Agreement 2013). This agreement recognised the 
need for greater commitment to peace on the part of  the DRC, countries of  the 
broader region and donors. It placed particular responsibilities on each party: 
the DRC to undertake security sector reform, to consolidate state authority, 
reforms, development and democratisation; the countries of  the region to stop 
meddling in each other’s affairs and stop supporting armed groups; the donors 
to renew their commitment. This agreement triggered several developments. 
Significant international pressure from donors was applied on Rwanda to stop 
financing armed groups in the DRC. Ntaganda surrendered at the US embassy 
in March 2013 and is currently being tried by the International Criminal Court 
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(ICC 2015). This was a step forward in comparison to the case of  Nkunda, who, 
despite the indictment the DRC has against him, has lived under house arrest in 
Rwanda since January 2009. However, there has been limited progress on several 
fronts. Armed groups continue to operate, an increasing number of  ex-M-23 
members have been granted amnesty and the democratisation process is cur-
rently threatened by an uncertain third round of  elections.
A common feature of  these agreements, from the Goma Accords to the 
PSCF, is their reliance on military means. Looked at from the perspective of  the 
challenges the political path has faced, it seems that military means have gath-
ered greater commitment. Yet military operations have created greater insecu-
rity, and armed groups have not been neutralised (Human Rights Watch 2015; 
UNSG 2015). Agreements have achieved greater militarisation while fuelling 
conflict.
Peace through military means
The third and final dynamic of  the decade after the 2006 elections has been the 
reliance on military means. For rural populations, military operations and the 
continuation of  armed groups have added to the perception that self-defence 
militias are the only recourse to achieve security. The continued existence of  
these militias has justified the need to increase military intervention. Further, 
political compromises through the negotiations seen above and the lack of  
means to deploy state administrators have also entailed the deployment of  the 
military (at times ex-armed groups) as a representation of  authority. This has 
increased the reliance on self-defence militias for the purpose of  protection both 
against the military and against other armed groups.
The 2008 Goma Conference formalised a rapprochement between the DRC 
and Rwanda, encouraging a series of  formal military operations against the 
FDLR backed by MONUC, and giving the operations special powers, funding and 
immunities. The fact that a military operation was prioritised illustrates a 
strengthening of  statebuilding, but through sharing means of  coercion and 
extraction and informalised governance formulas based on scattering the army 
across the territory of  North and South Kivu.
Between January 2009 and April 2012 three military operations were 
launched: Umoja Wetu, Kimya II and Amani Leo (Radio Okapi 2012a) 
(Table 3.1). These operations provoked an outcry. Although they managed to 
dismantle certain FDLR chains of  command and camps, as well as dislodging 
them from the mine sites they had occupied, they did so with a big toll on civil-
ians (Oxfam International 2009). The FDLR retaliated against the population in 
areas where the FDLR had set up a parallel administration. The FARDC and the 
RDF, for their part, engaged in severe human rights abuses in the course of  their 
military action. Several NGOs, local and international, called for their suspen-
sion, and some for the demilitarisation of  villages (Radio Okapi 2010). The 
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popular rejection of  these operations led the Government to introduce operation 
Amani Leo. In the eyes of  a commander deployed in South Kivu, the problem 
with the previous operations was that the population was not involved or con-
sulted (FARDC Colonel (no. 129) 2010).
Nevertheless, with or without popular support, these operations represented 
one of  the backbones of  the restoration of  state authority. An Amani Leo FARDC 
operations officer defined the strategy as follows:
It is not about exterminating all FDLR like saying – there is no one FDLR member 
that breathes – no, that is not possible; what we mean is that in one or two months 
we can eradicate the FDLR phenomenon, as a military organisation here in our 
country, with all its capacity to operate, to set up barriers on the roads and get taxes, 
to continue exploiting the minerals like they want, to have the political control of  
certain localities. Once eradicated, we can restore state authority all across the 
country. (Amani Leo Operations Officer 2010)
MONUSCO’s founding mandate supports this vision with its goals, including the 
termination of  military groups, support for the Government to better protect the 
population and support for the restoration of  state authority in areas held by 
armed groups (UN Security Council 2010: 3). The question is whether state 
authority has indeed been restored or, as seen in Chapter 1, shared or delegated, 
with coercive and extractive effects externalised onto residents.
Table 3.1 Features and achievements of  the 2009–11 Goma Accords operations
Name of  
operation
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North Kivu







3 months South Kivu FARDC/
MONUC













in judicial process. 
Several groups 
relocated and still 
operating as allies 
with Mai Mai 
militias
Source: ICG (2009, 2010)
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During the last few years, and especially since the M-23 uprising, new 
rounds of  operations have been approved, signalling a ‘clean slate’ policy in 
regional and international approaches to the DRC conflict. Aside from the politi-
cal commitments discussed above, the UN Security Council has given the green 
light on unilateral offensive operations. To this was added the presence of  Martin 
Kobler as the representative of  the UN Secretary General in the DRC between 
2013 and 2015. A German politician who understands the military means à la 
Clausewitz, as an extension of  the political, Kobler recognised the mechanisms 
that give way to conflicts of  citizenship, identity and land, but firmly believed in 
the military neutralisation of  armed groups. The deployment of  over 3,000 
troops from South Africa, Malawi and Tanzania managed to clear out the M-23 
with the Intervention Brigade (IB). The initial hype created with this first round 
of  operations clashes with the overall picture of  instability (Vogel 2014b).
The conclusion that is derived from the over 20 years of  conflict is that a 
truly engaged political process has yet to be seen. Without it, conflict keeps erupt-
ing and military means are prevalent. After the last major crisis, different 
national, regional and international actors seem to have renewed their commit-
ment to more serious solutions, tackling the conflict on several levels. Yet the 
everyday life of  the rural classes has not changed substantially. The proxy wars 
between the DRC and Rwanda, their mutual instrumentalisation, the reliance 
on the military to assert state authority in a political context that has an impor-
tant democratic and development deficit have only entrenched the conflict. 
Peacebuilding strategies, however, have not been external to these processes.
The UN and the contradictions of  peacebuilding
The UN’s peacebuilding strategies in the DRC are more reflective of  the evolution 
of  frameworks for conflict resolution than of  the actual evolution of  the conflict. 
Having been reluctant to intervene for a number of  years, the UN turned the 
DRC into one of  the first ‘laboratories’ for post-conflict statebuilding (Zeebroek 
2008). After the more significant deployment of  UN peacekeeping forces in 
2001, the two missions – MONUC (until 2010) and MONUSCO (from 2010) – 
have been the epicentres of  international peacebuilding in the DRC. Although 
the UN declared the DRC a threat to international peace and security in order to 
justify its intervention, a late and controversial arms embargo and a lack of  
response to a war of  aggression against a member state were evidence that the 
image of  Zaire/DRC as a failed state had become the guidance for action (UN 
Security Council 1996; 1999; 2003).21 The UN’s actions have been contradic-
tory. Its main priorities of  civilian protection and the reconstruction of  state 
authority have been compromised by improvised and experimental approaches. 
Further, its role has been instrumentalised and ‘marginalised’ by member states 
in the pursuit of  side agendas.22
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The priorities of  civilian protection and reconstitution of  state authority are 
seen in both MONUC and MONUSCO landmark resolutions (UN Security Council 
1999, 2000, 2010). The weight and responsibilities of  MONUC/MONUSCO have 
consistently grown, making it one of  the largest missions in UN history. Its tasks 
include civil administration reform, democracy promotion, civil society capacity-
building, demobilisation (DDR(RR)) and SSR. MONUC helped to maintain the 
integrity of  the DRC and was a major actor behind the democratic elections of  
2006. MONUC/MONUSCO has been, in many instances, the sole guardian of  
peace and security in parts of  the Kivus. However, its impact remains limited. 
The graphs in figures 3.1–3.4 illustrate how the DRC ranks highly on the list of  

























































Figure 3.1 DPKO uniformed and total personnel
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personnel, military deployment and budget. Yet, when taking other aspects into 
account and, in comparison to other missions, the patchy, contradictory and 
multidimensional character of  peacebuilding is revealed.
Englebert and Tull’s figures represent a period in which the war was coming 
to an end. Yet, when compared with other missions, they continue to show a 
relative commitment. In 2016 the UN spent an average of  $17.9 per year per 
capita in the DRC in comparison to $22.23 in Kosovo, $91.15 in South Sudan 
and $111.3 in Lebanon.23 Even at the peak of  the conflict, between 1998 and 
2003, the DRC did not rank highly in the amount garnered by the Office for the 
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Figure 3.3 Peacekeepers/100,000 people
Source: Englebert and Tull (2008: 130–1)
Table 3.2 Comparison of  private contributions to OCHA appeals
DRC Great Lakes SE Europe East Timor Afghanistan Iraq
January 1999–June 2003 (millions of  US dollars)
1.4 0.5 77.2 2.7 65.4 10.3
Total humanitarian assistance, January 1999–June 2003 (millions of  US dollars)
349 574 1,493 180 1,741 1,044
Source: Hawkins (2004)
Coordination of  Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) appeals for humanitarian assis-
tance (Table 3.2).
The disparities between needs, goals and actual funding reflect the political 
nature of  aid.24 What is relevant is that the agenda of  social and political trans-
formation stemming from the definition of  the DRC state as non-existent, where 
statebuilders start ‘from scratch’, is contradictory to some donor agendas 
(MONUC Political Affairs Officer (no. 7) 2009). A complex political environment 
and long-term objectives also largely exceed the resources at hand. This has 


















































Figure 3.4 Reconstruction budget 2004
Source: Englebert and Tull (2008: 130)
been noted in the shortcomings of  civilian protection and state authority recon-
struction. Despite the large deployment of  peacekeepers and despite being 
authorised to use force, MONUC/MONUSCO only started military operations in 
conjunction with the FARDC in 2005. Until the authorisation of  the IB in 2013, 
it only once launched an operation autonomously, in September 2010 (UN 
Security Council 2013; Zeebroek 2008: 9).25 Although the DRC Government 
has the primary responsibility for providing security to its citizens, there have 
been particular situations where MONUC/MONUSCO has been seen as directly 
responsible for failing to provide civilian protection. In 2004, MONUC failed to 
stop the aforementioned attacks in Bukavu, which lasted for one week. In 2008, 
the Kiwanja massacre entailed the killing of  67 people 3 km away from the 
MONUC military camp (UN Joint Human Rights Office 2009: 3). For several 
weeks in 2010, at a location just over 32 km from the MONUSCO base, a coali-
tion of  Mai Mai Cheka and FDLR combatants committed 387 rapes, mostly of  
women but also of  men, girls and boys, in addition to other forms of  torture and 
abuse (UN Joint Human Rights Office 2011: 4). In 2014, a massacre in 
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Mutarule, in South Kivu, resulting in the deaths of  34 people and injuries to 25 
more, was ignored until two days later, ‘despite repeated requests for assistance’ 
(Human Rights Watch 2014; UN Group of  Experts 2015a; para. 140). The fact 
that peacekeepers obey their own countries’ rules of  engagement makes them 
subject to the risk that each country wants to expose its soldiers to (Amani Leo 
Operations Officer 2010; FARDC General (no. 146) 2010; Informal Conversa-
tion with Pakistani Battalion Blue Helmet, Bukavu 2010; MONUSCO Political 
Affairs Officer (no. 63) 2010). Even so, failure to respond in these situations is 
linked to the UN’s strategy of  not engaging except when in support of  the DRC 
Government or against specific armed groups.
The aim of  reconstructing state authority has seen the UN and donors 
entering the same logic of  informal politics that they were trying to tackle. Ever 
since its first deployment, MONUC has prioritised strategies which are conducive 
to the formation of  government and the restructuring of  the security sector. This 
has relied on power-sharing agreements between the warring parties, which has 
not only given an incentive to take up arms but also created a contradiction to 
the aims of  fostering peace and promoting democracy (Barrios and Ahamed 
2010; Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009: 474). As declared by the Deputy 
Special Representative of  the UN Secretary General Heile Menkeros: ‘MONUC 
[is] buying peace’ (cited in Alden, Thakur, and Arnold 2011: 125). This is not 
just a matter of  asserting trade-offs in a difficult political process, but one of  
articulating the contradictory relationship that state-making has with peace. 
The UN has been instrumental in providing legitimacy and, to some extent, 
logistics to articulate patchy formulas of  informal and shared authority with 
neighbouring states and through the military. The result has been the creation 
of  new sources of  violence. From different positions, Verhogen, Vlassenroot and 
Raeymaekers illustrate how peacebuilding has relied on forms of  privatised gov-
ernance, which have been constitutive of  structural violence dynamics, ulti-
mately producing and reproducing sources of  insecurity (Verhoeven 2009: 406; 
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2009: 484). For Trefon this is due to peacebuild-
ing in the DRC being a strategy of  ‘mismanagement, hypocrisy, powerlessness 
and sabotage’ (2011: ix). Reform and aid strategies, both intentionally and unin-
tentionally, either fail or reproduce the problems they were trying to solve (Trefon 
2011: 9). This is facilitated by a culture of  secrecy and impunity and a climate 
of  mutual instrumentalisation and competition between national and interna-
tional actors (Trefon 2011: 14–18).
State-making and peacebuilding as seen in the actions of  MONUC/
MONUSCO are contradictory: there is a disconnect between aims and funding 
and the conflicting agendas of  member states. This has been further challenged 
by the fact that processes and certain policies for building state authority 
have themselves been contradictory to other priorities such as civilian protection 
and peacebuilding. The fact that the main sources of  legitimate authority for 
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intervention rely on these priorities, yet are also its main shortcomings, points 
to deeper incoherencies in the nature of  the processes.
Militarisation, plural authority and extraction: the context of  resistance
Africa’s World War could be seen as a series of  violent conflicts that started with 
a coup against Mobutu orchestrated by a multi-state coalition and joined by a 
popular revolt. What followed was an even greater multi-state war which has 
continued, after a violent peace transition, with a series of  cyclical conflicts until 
today. These latter conflicts are the result of  the continuous desire by popular 
classes for change; of  changes and continuities in the security, political and 
economic interests of  different countries in the region and their allies; and of  
the specific local dynamics around land, resources, political participation and 
commercial networks that were in place before the war but which have been 
exacerbated and crystallised through the war. During these periods, war and 
state-making have been determinants for the militarisation of  the environment. 
This explains that the nature of  resistance has been violent as well as covert. 
The plurality of  new authorities, elites and alliances that has been forged across 
ideological and ethnic lines has fragmented both rule and resistance. The context 
has been marked by the use of  violence in the pursuit of  state security and eco-
nomic agendas, even if  through proxy armed groups. Resistance, as we will see, 
is not an anti-state or an anti-war movement but, rather, a negation, or at least 
a mitigation, of  the everyday context of  domination. Analyses of  the sources of  
conflict tend to see the conflict as stemming from the particular dynamics of  the 
DRC. This not only detaches the DRC from its history, it evades the interconnec-
tion of  global political and economic dynamics. These are particularly important 
in understanding the conflict in its full political scope.
Throughout the whole period, multiple actors, including the UN, have fos-
tered governance arrangements that have not always led to the creation of  
state authority or provided civilian protection. Although the UN has at times 
played a secondary role to donor countries’ agendas, an examination of  its poli-
cies illustrates that having statebuilding as a primary peacebuilding strategy 
has not only missed important dynamics of  conflict but has also fostered vio-
lence inherent in the state-making process. An increasing reliance on military 
means, despite political agreements, has undermined these agreements, fuelled 
militarised resistance and exacerbated the dynamics of  authoritarian milita-
rised state power that is at the root of  many current problems. An important 
implication of  these multiple periods of  conflict is that alongside multiple wars 
there are multiple statebuilding agendas. These have been mutually reinforc-
ing, but also mutually undermining. In the DRC, war does not necessarily make 
the state, nor is the state the only actor in war; war has been seen as a useful 
and effective tool to pursue certain state agendas. Rather than centralising state 
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power and military power, wars have acted primarily against the population. 
They have left, at times, a scattered presence of  military authority and have 
forced state and non-state actors to form contingent alliances. Although this is 
part of  a continuing process, the dynamic of  fostering informal governance 
arrangements has generated a cohabited context of  citizens and military, expos-
ing the inextricable relationships between war, state-making and resistance.
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 1 For an overview of  academic debates see: (Autesserre 2012a; Cuvelier, Vlassenroot, and 
Olin 2014; Turner 2007 Ch. 1).
 2 Its latest mandate was extended until August 2016 (UN Security Council 2015).
 3 A more general overview can be found in Pugh (2005); Williams (2008); World Bank 
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 4 E.g., ex-Minister Katumba Mwanke and Banro (UN Panel of  Experts 2001: Annex II, p. 
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Horowitz (2000).
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 8 Etienne Tshisekedi of  the UDPS was elected prime minister, though overthrown by 
Mobutu three months later (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002: 195).
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and Burnet Institute (2010).
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Democratic Republic of  the Congo 2012a).
13 Kabila was shot by Rachidi Kasereka, one of  his bodyguards. However, the real hand 
behind this murder is still discussed, not least because Kabila had created many enemies. 
Some strong theses point to the murder being attributable to Angola, some others point 
to more direct involvement of  the US, inaugurating a period of  more intense Western 
intervention.
14 Commission politique (RCD); Commission économique et financière (MLC); Commission 
pour la reconstruction et le développement (Gouvernement); Commission sociale et cul-
turelle (Opposition and some Mai Mai groups) (Sun City Agreement 2002: Art. 1.c).
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15 Unless noted, general information in this and subsequent paragraphs in this section relies 
on Stearns (2008, 2012a); UN Group of  Experts (2010b; 2012a; 2012b).
16 There has been debate as to whether they were the same movement or not. However, all 
official communiqués are signed as CNDP–M-23 (M23 2012). Jason Stearns argues that 
their leadership, funding and positions, especially in Masisi and Rutshuru, make them 
the same, with the M-23 having less social support than the CNDP in its heyday (Stearns 
2012a: 48).
17 The UNHCR noted that there had been 650,000 new displaced since the beginning of  
2012 and that its partners had reported extra-judicial killings and pillage (UNHCR – 
Democratic Republic of  the Congo 2012b). Kabila’s statement: Digital Congo (2012).
18 For the background and text of  the agreements this section relies on Minani Bihuzo 
(2008).
19 Mixage is a process of  demobilisation and reintegration in the army without redeploy-
ment. Troops are allowed to remain in their area but are mixed up with FARDC.
20 It is noteworthy that Jason Stearns was the coordinator of  the Group of  Experts on the 
Arms Embargo at the time.
21 Calls for action were based on the nature of  Zaire as a failed state and not on the nature 
of  the conflict (Kiwanuka 1996). Herman Cohen, the Assistant Secretary of  State for 
African Affairs at the time, stated that ‘To say that [Congo-Kinshasa] has a government 
today would be a gross exaggeration’ (cited in Young 2002: 24).
22 Trefon (2011) speaks of  mutual instrumentalisations of  national and international 
actors. Stearns (2012a: 63) argues that the UN has been ‘politically marginalised’ since 
2006.
23 Calculations were made from the following: budget figures (DPKO 2016); total population 
per country, except for Kosovo (World Bank 2016); for Kosovo (UN Population Fund 
2013).
24 These disparities reflect the intersecting political agendas of  interveners and the chal-
lenges of  coordination between different UN agencies, donors and aid agencies. These are 
widely researched issues. In relation to the DRC see: Pouligny (2006); Trefon (2011). 
Some of  these issues have been addressed by MONUC/MONUSCO with its status as an 
integrated mission, which means ‘to have a clear chain of  command and central decision-
making authority from which all UN country-activities can be coordinated’ (Hänggi and 
Scherrer 2008: 8).
25 In September 2010 MONUSCO launched a unitary operation called Shop Window against 
the FDLR for the first time (OCHA information meeting, Kinshasa 2010).
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Claims to legitimate authority  
and discursive attacks
We don’t believe in the authorities anymore. When you say … ‘there, that’s the new 
administrator, everyone may clap but with a certain mockery …’ Him also, what is 
he going to do? (Peasant Union Member (no. 151) 2010)
We could wonder about the role of  that whispered language within the political 
system of  unanimity. It is, to my mind, a way of  softening the overwhelming and 
restrictive official language in order to make it more bearable; it is an antidote. Irony 
and humour are the weapons of  the powerless in the face of  arbitrary ruling … We 
can also see in it a runaway reaction … But I think that it is more just to consider 
derision as a consciousness-raising exercise, and as a consequence, a way of  social 
contestation. (Toulabor 2008: 112)
[I]t is in fact more plausible to contend that so far as the realm of  ideology is con-
cerned, no social order seems inevitable … the imaginative capacity of  subordinate 
groups to reverse and/or negate dominant ideologies is so widespread – if  not uni-
versal – that it might be considered part and parcel of  their standard cultural and 
religious equipment. (Scott 1985: 331)
Statebuilders and state-recipients, a pose
Authority is generally claimed with an underlying morality. Peacebuild-ing, and the reconstruction of  state authority, is deployed as the best solution to the problems of  war, authoritarianism and poverty (Chan-
dler 2010a: 1). In Eastern DRC this authority claim has materialised as a dis-
course of  protection and social change. Against this discursive construction, 
mockery, denigration and slandering operate as an intentional mechanism to 
deny the legitimacy and authority of  peacebuilding. Resistance is not necessarily 
against the ideals of  the good state, democracy, development and peace, but to 
the fact that neither protection nor social change is being delivered. By using the 
same language of  peacebuilding, referring to the state, democracy, peace and 
development, the discourse is used as a platform for advancing alternative 
agendas. Peacebuilding discourse is not only resisted, but also subverted.
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The three quotes above capture three ways in which discursive resistance 
takes place in the DRC. First, the union representative articulates what Scott 
calls the ‘pose’ (the roles that the powerless and the powerful adopt towards 
each other). The act of  not clapping at a politician in a parade would be an act 
of  denial of  his/her share of  pomp and deference, and with that, a de-
legitimisation of  his/her authority. What Scott and this union representative 
convey is that resistance does not often operate as a direct defiance in front of  
authority. Generally, one may clap at the parade, but express reticence and dis-
content somewhere else. Secondly, resistance is to be found in how Congolese 
non-elites judge authorities from their lived experience, even if  this is shown 
only in the ‘whispered language’ far from the hype of  a politician’s parade. 
Thirdly, discursive resistance illustrates that criticism is a form of  resistance to 
the unanimity that peacebuilding claims, subverting the official discourse and 
revealing dissent.
Ideals constitute a platform on which both power and resistance operate. 
The claims to construct the good state, bring democracy, development and peace, 
become long-term claims on which peacebuilders and state-makers legitimise 
their interventions and demand consent. They are also discursive formulas to 
justify ‘failure’. As John Heathershaw argues, the ‘survival’ of  peacebuilding is 
due to the resilience of  its discourse. Seen from the goals of  transforming society 
through the construction of  a positive peace, democracy and state–society rela-
tions, peacebuilding ‘fails’, and becomes a ‘simulacra’ of  its own discourse 
(Heathershaw 2008). This captures the situation in the DRC, where, despite the 
continuation of  war, the increasing authoritarianism and the deterioration of  
living conditions, peacebuilding survives on its discourse as a long-term claim 
to rearrange society under a particular worldview.1 Simultaneously, these ideals 
become a way to hold statebuilders to account, to voice discontent and elaborate 
a vision of  how things should be.
In Scottian terms, these ideals correspond to the battleground on which elite 
and non-elites’ public and hidden transcripts are enacted. Although, as Heath-
ershaw (2008) argues, peacebuilding contexts generate multiple transcripts, 
these two serve as a standpoint to observe how authority claims are laid out and 
how they are denied or mitigated. The dynamics of  claiming authority while 
justifying and externalising failure turn peacebuilding’s public transcript into 
what Barrington Moore calls the moral authority of  suffering (1978: Ch. 2). 
Peacebuilding’s discourse is projected with a sense of  inevitability and unanim-
ity, demanding consent, despite continuous armed conflict and deteriorating 
living conditions. These conditions, however, generate criticisms and political 
alternatives.
Although the hidden transcript cannot be simplistically seen as an arena of  
freedom, it provides a safer audience among relative equals.2 The public tran-
script has several functions, including: concealment (hiding the nasty aspects 
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of  power and elites’ disagreement), unanimity (giving a sense of  agreement 
between elites and non-elites and denying dissent), euphemism and stigma 
(beautifying power and uglifying dissent) and public parade (dramatising the 
grandeur of  power) (Scott 1990: 45–66). These functions are visible in that 
peacebuilding’s claim to authority is done by projecting an image of  una-
nimity and grandeur. It also operates as concealment and stigma, as a way 
of  externalising blame for failure and as a way to stigmatise dissent. They 
create a pose, illustrating that authority claims generate mutual constraints 
of  behaviour on both authorities and subordinate classes and that consent 
is not ‘the whole story’ (Scott 1990: 2). In the DRC, although counter-
discourses are part of  the public domain, they are constructed in the safety 
of  anonymity.
The chapter will proceed as follows. Firstly, it analyses peacebuilding’s 
public transcript and its construction of  a moral authority. Secondly, it analy-
ses non-elites’ hidden transcript. This latter part will be done in two sections, 
the first of  which analyses mockery, denigration and slandering as ways of  
negating legitimacy and demanding accountability. These are illustrative 
of  a more direct engagement with an authority claim and represent claim-
regarding acts. The second analyses the redefinition of  standard peacebuild-
ing vocabulary, such as the ‘state’, ‘democracy’, ‘peace’ and ‘development’, 
where the creation of  alternative political agendas is particularly visible. These 
are illustrative of  self-regarding acts in so far as they subvert peacebuilding 
goals by simultaneously voicing how they are not being achieved and advanc-
ing alternative political agendas. Taking these factors together offers non-elites 
what Certeau sees as the ‘opportunity’ of  transforming ‘“belief ” into “mis-
trust”, into “suspicion”, and indeed “denunciation” […] to manipulate politi-
cally what serves as circular and objectless credibility for political life itself ’ 
(1984: 189).
Elite claims and the moral authority of  suffering
For Moore, authority implied obedience to the social arrangements by which 
‘some human beings extract an economic surplus from other human beings 
and turn them into culture’ (1978: 17). In turn, ‘pain and suffering [become] 
to a degree morally desirable […] unavoidable or even inevitable’ (Moore 1978: 
80). Although Moore theorised this moral authority as the basis for obedi-
ence to some of  the most tyrannical systems, in the DRC this moral author-
ity enables elites to demand obedience and justify the continuation of  war 
on the basis that they can provide the goods of  peacebuilding, even if  not 
right now.
The discordance between discourse and practice gives peacebuilding the 
moral justification to exercise its agenda and its power. The sense of  inevitability 
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and necessity with which statebuilding is deployed serves two main functions: 
as a discourse of  legitimacy and a justification for failure. Firstly, it has the capac-
ity to create a shared vocabulary and meaning on which to justify authority. 
Subsequent claims attached to the position of  authority (i.e. extracting taxes, 
negotiating international agreements, allowing foreign investments or articulat-
ing military operations) are premised on peacebuilding actors delivering the 
good state, democracy, development and peace. Secondly, the public transcript 
functions as a projection of  state-making as necessary and inevitable in order to 
demand consent. Its failures, which are explained in previous chapters, relate to 
the continuation of  conflict, worsening of  living conditions, a militarisation of  
social and political life and increasing authoritarianism, and are externalised in 
a dramatisation of  power doing all it can against an extremely adverse context. 
This section examines these two functions of  authority claims and the justifica-
tion of  failure found in two main actors: the MONUC/MONUSCO and the 
Government.
MONUC/MONUSCO
MONUC was set up with the legalistic wording of  the UN Charter for the main-
tenance of  international peace and security, but this was in the spirit of  
addressing the ‘well-being and security of  the population’ as well as the 
‘adverse impact of  the conflict on the human rights situation’ (UN Security 
Council 1999: 2). Similarly, Resolution 1925, which changed MONUC to 
MONUSCO, established its priorities as: civilian protection, peace stabilisation 
and consolidation, and restoration of  state authority (UN Security Council 
2010). More than ever before, Resolution 1925 put the responsibility for peace 
and order on the Congolese Government, while defining the UN mission as an 
external supportive actor, primarily concerned with civilian protection and 
political oversight.
The success in civilian protection nevertheless remains limited. As seen in 
the previous chapter, the same peace agreements that have brought about a 
relative truce have legitimised armed actors and armed struggle as a vehicle for 
political power. Many of  these agreements are at the basis of  an almost blanket 
impunity operating in the DRC. Peacebuilding provides, in this case, the capacity 
to claim authority while externalising responsibility. One of  the most criticised 
cases of  neglect was the massacre in Kiwanja in 2008. The CNDP attacked the 
town, killing approximately 150 people ‘half  a mile’ from the MONUC’s base, 
hosting 138 peacekeepers (Human Rights Watch 2008: 1). The population pro-
tested against these events and the failure to protect them by throwing stones 
and Molotov cocktails at the UN compound in Goma (BBC 2008; CNN 2008; 
MONUC Civil Affairs Officer (no. 14) 2009; OCHA – MONUC 2008). For MONUC 
Civil Affairs, easing the intensity and persistence of  these protests and criticisms 
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is about the population understanding what the UN mandate is about and its 
limits. As an officer in Kinshasa stated:
This is what we try to do now because there was lots of  criticism towards MONUC 
from civil society on protection issues. Hopefully that is why we also have the logistic 
part as one of  our pillars. We try to take them [civil society organisations] with us 
as much as we can on the ground, so that they see the situation on the ground and 
they can also inform the population and see how we can better protect people. We 
do that with the Government, so that they take responsibility and they don’t just sit 
and criticise. (MONUC Civil Affairs Officer (no. 1) 2009)
The fact that protection depends on Congolese actors understanding ‘the situa-
tion on the ground’ and providing solutions reveals the dynamics of  a discourse 
of  legitimacy in the face of  failure. But, contrary to the overall aim stated in the 
quote, criticism has not gone away.
In fact, a substantial review took place at the end of  2012, just after the 
crisis of  the M-23 movement. A new ‘robust mandate’ was put in place, author-
ising the use of  force for the purpose of  attacking armed groups, together with 
a new political strategy aimed at addressing conflicts over land, corruption and 
impunity. This was due not only to pressures in the UN Security Council, whose 
‘P-3 were pushing for a quick exit strategy’ (MONUSCO Officer (no. 166) 2014), 
but also to a realisation of  previous mistakes in which, as a MONUSCO officer 
acknowledged, ‘MONUSCO had been supporting a predatory state’ (MONUSCO 
Officer (no. 166) 2014; MONUSCO Officer (no. 190) 2014). This illustrates the 
capacity for self-criticism and that reviews are done towards improvement. But 
the fact that responsibility for the continuation of  war and statebuilding is 
placed on the Government allows for the portrayal of  MONUSCO as a neutral 
third party mediating between political and military authorities and the civilian 
population, while establishing a rationale for its presence and command. The 
factual veracity of  these claims is not as important as what they represent for 
the capacity to define the problem and the solution. For instance, speaking of  
the success of  the IB that was authorised by the UN Security Council in response 
to the M-23, a MONUSCO officer indicated that: ‘The UN is claiming that we 
won, but it is the FARDC that did most of  the fighting, the IB was only support-
ing. The M-23 was defeated because it didn’t have Rwandan support, Western 
FARDC commanders were brought in and the Eastern ones were taken back to 
Kinshasa, troops were well supplied’ (MONUSCO Officer (no. 166) 2014). Still 
the public discourse is that lack of  a proper army is the major obstacle for peace 
and one main reason for the UN presence.
Similarly, the new International Support Strategy for Security and Stabilisa-
tion, drafted in 2013, is based on errors committed by MONUC and MONUSCO 
in previous years (ISSSS 2013). Whereas this strategy had been operating as 
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counter-insurgency (clearing roads and points where armed groups operated, 
implanting socio-economic recovery and building state infrastructure), it is now 
focused on organising local community dialogues to make authorities more 
accountable (MONUSCO Officer (no. 163) 2014). The ultimate aim of  this strat-
egy is to build relations between state and society on trust, transparency and 
due process. Failed strategies constitute in themselves an argument to reproduce 
a discourse of  authority and external blame.
The need to reconstruct how society works highlights the hidden transcript 
of  the UN in the DRC and its underlying image of  the DRC as dysfunctional. 
This dysfunctionality is seen in statements like ‘elections are still tribal here’ 
(MONUSCO Political Affairs Officer (no. 45) 2010); ‘the Government does not 
even have figures of  its own population’ (MONUSCO Civil Affairs Officer (no. 
158) 2011); ‘there is no sense of  progress’ (MONUSCO Electoral Division Officer 
2010; MONUSCO Political Affairs Officer (no. 45) 2010; MONUSCO Political 
Affairs Officer (no. 46) 2010); ‘here, there are no political parties or real civil 
society’ (MONUC Political Affairs Officer (no. 7) 2009).3 In several informal 
conversations with UN officials, UN agency members and other international 
representatives there is a commonly held view that civil society is a collection of  
individuals who attempt to access international money by acquiring the vocabu-
lary that funding bodies and international organisations want.4 In a similar way 
that popular classes negate the existence of  the state, creating an image of  what 
the state should be, elites’ negation of  civil society is a way to de-legitimise ‘civil 
society’. This works as a hidden transcript, redressing international actors and 
demonising those who, in the public transcript, were the heroes of  government 
and peacebuilding policies. Furthermore, underlying this criticism there is an 
assumption about the Congolese being corrupt, not really interested in under-
taking such noble aims as ‘democracy’ and ‘good governance’, but instead using 
the vocabulary to access international funding.
A MONUC officer, for instance, affirmed:
We are dealing with people who are helpless … The mass of  the people in this country 
are illiterate … there are no real political parties here, we are trying to build this 
country from scratch, there is no real civil society … it is in a state of  infancy. 
(MONUC Political Affairs Officer (no. 7) 2009)
Portraying the Congolese as helpless only justifies the strategies of  the interven-
tion. Other common tags used by MONUC/MONUSCO and diplomatic officials 
in interviews and informal conversations were ‘corrupt’, ‘lazy’, ‘opportunistic’, 
‘selfish’ and ‘backward’. This implies that it is the fault of  the Congolese, both 
elites and non-elites, for being in the situation they are in. As previously 
noted, whether these analyses are accurate or not does not reveal their primary 
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function, which is to reaffirm the rightness of  the strategies, and the difficulty of  
the task.
Government
The vocabulary of  the state as an engine and receptacle of  peace, democracy 
and development is deployed in a similar manner by the Government. Peace-
building, with its state-making ethos, provides a model to mirror the Govern-
ment’s public image and justify action. Electoral campaigns have illustrated 
peacebuilding vocabulary very clearly. The programme of  each political party 
has revolved around its capacity to restore state authority and bring peace, 
democracy and development. For instance, Joseph Kabila based his 2006 cam-
paign on the ‘five pledges’ (cinq chantiers) referring to development (Nzazi Mabidi 
2006). This was pushed forward in the 2011 elections with the ‘Revolution of  
modernity’ (Na Raïs 2011). The programme is based on the promise of  develop-
ment, to make the DRC an emergent country by 2030 and a world power to join 
the BRICS countries by 2060 (Na Raïs 2011: 2).
Kabila’s media platforms also revolve around the cohesiveness of  state 
authority. Kabila TV, which is linked to the presidential website and his own 
private media platform, DigitalCongo, which includes a TV channel and a news 
website, both display a focus on developmental projects and on the official and 
solemn acts of  Kabila as president (Kabila TV 2012; Multimedia Congo s.p.r.l. 
2012). State unity, development and peace have been Kabila’s discourse drivers. 
Not only do these resonate with people’s political aspirations, they have also been 
presented as arguments to ask the UN to leave. In December 2009, in a confer-
ence broadcast by the Congolese National Radio and Television (RTNC), Kabila 
emphasised ‘the good relationship between the UN and the Congolese Govern-
ment’ but stated that there should be ‘a plan of  progressive UN retreat and dis-
engagement’ based ‘on the net improvement of  the security situation in the 
Eastern part of  the country’ (RTNC 2009). The unnecessary presence of  the UN 
has been a regular argument of  the Government, up until the point where Kabila 
rejected the support of  MONUSCO in its 2015 attacks against the FDLR (Anon 
2015; Radio Okapi 2015). The image that the Government projects reflects the 
broad foundations of  peacebuilding discourse. These include the cohesiveness 
of  state authority in being able to maintain its territory, to secure its population, 
to be the democratically elected representatives and to have an economic devel-
opment and modernisation plan. For the DRC Government, peace, democracy 
and development operate as a shared vocabulary on which to premise legitimate 
state authority.
The responsibility for not achieving these goals is a matter of  blame 
exchange. For instance, when the complaints heard from MONUC/MONUSCO 
officials and those of  the population were put to a few Government 
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representatives, the response was usually to blame the ‘international commu-
nity’. Speaking about the M-23 rebellion, an MP and customary chief  stated:
The occupation of  Goma was done by the RPF [Rwandan Patriotic Front], not the 
M-23, they have entered through the Great Barrier [formal border] with no issues, 
under the visible sight of  the UN. What are they [UN/Internationals] doing if  not 
allowing that Congo is maintained as a subordinate of  Rwanda and their allies? 
(Masisi MP 2 2014)
Speaking more broadly, another representative stated:
The DRC needs social democracy but it is not possible because of  lack of  investment 
and lack of  financial means. The DRC is asphyxiated because the policy from the big 
powers is ‘you pay us first before we give you the money’ … also everyone is having 
a piece of  the cake here. The US and France take the petrol, the US and Belgium take 
the cobalt, Germany operates in the Katanga mining, the gold is taken by Canada 
and the UK and a bit by the US, diamonds are taken by Israel, Holland and South 
Africa. I have no problem with investment in resources, but in the context of  a neo-
colonial model, there is no hope for the Congolese. (Government Representative (no. 
31) 2009)
The narrative is not simply one of  political elites absolving themselves of  respon-
sibility, but of  pointing out the constraints they suffer to fulfil their promises to 
their electorate. Similarly, for a member of  the North Kivu National Assembly, 
the DRC was a place for everyone to get rich through programmes of  develop-
ment and peacebuilding. He complained that MONUC’s vehicles always seemed 
to be parked and that they were not travelling to the interior of  the country. He 
added:
We don’t understand MONUC’s politics. After 2005, they are there, we see them 
patrolling with the helicopters during the night, if  the enemy is in the skies, we don’t 
know … they come for example to support elections, or giving some bureaucratic 
support to the Government, but regarding security, in comparison with the arsenal 
they have, the weapons … if  we had such capacity all the problems will be finished 
by now. (North Kivu Provincial Assembly representative 2010)
The image this representative presents is of  the Congolese being victimised while 
not having the necessary capacity to face the problem. Peacebuilding’s discourse 
is enacted as a public transcript that serves as a tool to legitimise action and 
inaction and to externalise blame. A common vocabulary is created around 
idealised versions of  the state, democracy, development and peace that serve as 
a platform for authority claims. In the view of  Congolese officials this is not an 
appropriation of  “international” vocabulary but represents their own aspira-
tions. Thus ‘democracy’, ‘decentralisation’ and many strategies for reform are 
the initiative of  the Congolese Government, and not of  the ‘international com-
munity’ (Beni MP 2010; DRC Government Advisor 2013; Masisi MP 2 2014; 
Ministry of  Planning Representative 2010; STAREC Representative 2 2014; 
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Uvira MP 2011). Yet, as long as they remain a discourse, these are better seen 
as claims which have embedded symbolic and material demands on Congolese 
subordinate classes. There is a demand for recognition, consent and legitima-
tion, in spite of  the reality of  hardship. The creation of  ideals, the justification 
of  power on moral grounds and the normative commitments deployed with the 
peacebuilding process are part of  the tools that authority uses. Conversely, these 
are turned into weapons of  de-legitimisation and into a platform from which to 
advance alternative agendas.
The denial of  legitimacy
If  peacebuilding operates as a claim to legitimacy and consent, and resistance 
is defined by the denial of  these claims, what follows is that de-legitimisation and 
disobedience should be seen as primary areas of  resistance. For Scott, it is here 
that the hidden transcript develops. Mocking, denigrating and slandering 
authority, in the claims both of  MONUC/MONUSCO and of  the Government, are 
widely used tools. Although these discourses take place in the open, they are 
done through the safety of  privacy or anonymity of  the crowd. They are not 
necessarily hidden, so much as they are non-confrontational.
Toulabor’s quote above argues that humour and derision are often used as 
methods for confronting the established social order and, as such, should be seen 
within a sphere of  social contestation. Mockery, denigration and slander consti-
tute a form of  resistance in that they configure a pattern of  action that denies 
the legitimacy of  power, turning its claims to authority into an exercise of  domi-
nation. That is, if  power is justified by its capacity to create the good state that 
can deliver peace, democracy and development, resistance denies this claim by 
pointing to the hypocrisy of  power, to other possible agendas and to the lack of  
commitment to peacebuilding’s own discourse. Mockery, denigration and slan-
dering are hidden transcripts. They run beneath official proclamations, chal-
lenging, or at least contrasting with, the image of  unanimity that authorities 
wish to project in regard to their actions.
Mockery
Mockery reflects a critique in which politicians, MONUC/MONUSCO and author-
ities in general are pictured as lazy and corrupt. This practice constitutes a 
pattern. Any visitor to the DRC can identify how the MONUC/MONUSCO is 
mocked, almost to the extent of  arguing that it is thanks to the Congolese people 
that UN officers have a job. For example, at the peak of  violence by renegade 
soldier Nkunda a popular saying against MONUC was: ‘no Nkunda, no job’ (Ex-
MONUC Officer (no. 2) 2010; Group Jeremie Representative 1 2009; Group 
Jeremie Representative 2 2010; MONUC Civil Affairs Officer (no. 1) 2009; 
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MONUC Civil Affairs Officer (no. 14) 2009).5 This inferred that MONUC needed 
seemingly artificial justifications for being in the country. It was not that the 
threat from Nkunda was not real, but that people saw the emergence of  the likes 
of  Nkunda as a consequence of  MONUC’s not doing its job properly, thus per-
petuating the need for the mission to be there.
This was already the case with the initial deployment of  MONUC. The 
authorisation of  MONUC as an observation mission6 prompted people to state: 
‘its name says everything, they are just here to observe how we are killed’ 
(AFEPADE 2010; Bukavu Resident 2010; COJESKI 2010; Masudi 2009). The 
‘they do nothing’ criticism has not stopped, and it is not uncommon to hear 
people complaining ‘they just run up and down [in] their cars’ or inquiring 
‘what do they do?’7 The criticism is made from lived experience, illustrating how 
the popular classes see themselves as bearing the suffering that arises from the 
shortcomings of  the decisions and strategies of  power. From this criticism it is 
possible to observe an articulation of  ‘what should be happening’, or ‘what 
MONUC should be doing’. In Kinshasa, the same day that MONUC changed to 
MONUSCO, with a change of  mandate, the mission was renamed ‘MONUSKOL’ 
(as in the beer Skol, portraying a vision of  UN workers as more interested in 
alcohol and night-life than in peace) (MONUSCO Electoral Division Officer 
2010).8 In Bunyakiri and Bukavu, MONUC or MONUSCO were said to be abbre-
viations for ‘Milice Onusienne au Congo’ (UN Militia in Congo) (Bukavu Resident 
2010; Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant 2 2010; Femmes Père Saint-
Simon Representative 2010; Focus Group Young People Bunyakiri 2010; Group 
Jeremie Representative 1 2009). This not only refers to the multiplicity of  armed 
groups that the UN and the government cannot stop, but also to a common 
criticism levelled at the UN that it is not there to make peace.
Criticism not only follows an international/local divide, but represents 
several imaginaries of  authorities and subordinates. The president and the Gov-
ernment are not exempt from mockery. Joseph Kabila is called ‘Kinyago’ (mari-
onette) or ‘Kanambe’, implying that he has ‘Rwandese origins’.9 Portraying 
Kabila as manipulated to serve external agendas or denying his Congolese 
nationality is a direct challenge to his legitimacy. A flipside of  nicknames is the 
technique of  refusing to say Kabila’s name. Kabila becomes ‘that one’, ‘him’ or 
‘the one you know’. Although this could represent voting preferences, it is strik-
ing that this is consistently observable in Kinshasa, the two Kivus and Equa-
teur.10 This silence seems to be both a protest and a defence, which simultaneously 
deny and mitigate authority.11
In addition to nicknames and silences, jokes are a common way to mock the 
Government. For instance, very soon after the Government committed to its ‘five 
pledges’, people renamed them the ‘five songs’, effectively portraying the Gov-
ernment as not being serious in their realisation.12 In Goma, a common joke asks 
‘what has changed?’ and people respond, ‘well, BunaZa [Zaire’s beer] is now 
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BunaCo [Congo’s beer] and the market CadeZa now it is called CadeCo’. The joke 
implies that nothing substantial has changed and people continue to experience 
hardship.
Justice is one of  the domains in which there have been fewer improvements 
(EU PAG Representative; Trefon 2011: 14; UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon 
2012: paras 57 and 81; UN Security Council 2012: paras 8–9 and 12; Vircoulon 
2009: 87–102). It is also a site of  mockery and critique.13 An evaluation study 
of  UN Development Programme activities in 2006 asserts that ‘the justice 
system is […] distrusted and reputed to be corrupt’ (Faubert 2006: 9). In the 
study, ‘most respondents stated that they would rather put their trust in institu-
tions such as churches and human rights organizations or proximity commu-
nity leaders’ (Faubert 2006: 9).14 During the 2006 election campaign Kabila 
promised to reform the justice sector through the slogan ‘the doors of  prison are 
big’ (Kayembe 2006). For Kabila this statement conveyed his Government’s com-
mitment to ‘zero tolerance’ against corruption and to prosecuting crimes, no 
matter who was responsible. As corruption is seen as one of  the biggest obstacles 
to conflict resolution and access to justice, people added a simple sentence to the 
slogan to change its meaning. The slogan then read: ‘the doors of  the prison are 
big, to take all the big thieves out’.15 The expression was a critique of  the lack of  
justice, in particular of  the impunity of  those who commit the major crimes 
(UPDI Representative 2010; Participant Observation III 2009). This slogan was 
reflected in many forms and shapes in Bukavu, and in other cities and territories. 
A Group Jeremie representative complained that ‘one could go to prison for steal-
ing a chicken while big thieves are out’ (Group Jeremie Representative 1 2009). 
In Bunyakiri, where a prison had just been built next to an almost-ruined hos-
pital, one of  the doctors complained that the prison would be just for ‘the poor’, 
while the real thieves enjoyed ‘the benefit of  power’ (Informal Conversation 
Bunyakiri Hospital Doctor 2010).
This mockery expresses in humour what otherwise is a violent experience. 
As seen in the previous chapter, the military strategies that have taken place 
under the programmes of  Umoja Wetu, Kimya II and Amani Leo have succeeded 
to a certain extent in demobilising thousands of  combatants. But this has come 
at a high price for the civilian population. People in local villages not only have 
to host and feed soldiers with special privileges under these operations, but also 
to take care of  the daily needs of  demobilised soldiers deployed in the villages 
without resources for their reintegration into civil life. Those combatants that 
join the army or the national police are also likely to keep settling ethnic rivalries 
while living off  the population, not least because of  a lack of  salary payment 
(Global Witness 2009: 16–17). Further, issues of  land, housing and ethnic 
rivalries brought by the return of  refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) are left for the villagers to deal with. As such, when people on the ground 
mock the programme ‘Amani Leo’ (Peace Today), calling it ‘Amani Kesho’ (Peace 
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Tomorrow), this reflects an underlying reality of  armed conflict, poverty and 
impunity.
Denigration, slandering and ‘radio trottoir’16
A less humorous way to de-legitimise and criticise the actions of  both the Gov-
ernment and MONUC/MONUSCO is through rumours and insults. Whether 
about particular politicians, blue helmets or, in general, MONUC/MONUSCO and 
the Government, rumours portray them as purposely continuing the conflict or 
trafficking with resources. In Bunyakiri, for example, many residents believed 
that MONUSCO was giving food and clothes to the FDLR.17 The story was devel-
oped in more detail in a focus group held with young people of  the town. One 
of  the participants stated: ‘Not long ago one FARDC shot a FDLR, and when they 
were going to recuperate the body, he was dressed with the MONUC uniform and 
had biscuits and even the shoes of  MONUC’ (Focus Group Young People Bunya-
kiri 2010). When this story was put to a MONUSCO official, she responded by 
acknowledging that such rumours are commonplace and that the problem is 
that ‘there is not good public information’ (MONUSCO Civil Affairs Officer (no. 
145) 2010). These rumours are, for MONUC/MONUSCO officers, evidence of  
the manipulation of  politicians;18 yet what they show is that people are not 
willing to see MONUSCO in a positive light. Rumour resonates with a deeper 
political agenda. Whether these stories are true or not, whether they originate 
from a specific politician’s agenda or even FARDC, they are used to discredit 
MONUSCO.19 They are a symbol of  social conflict and dissent.
The Government and opposition leaders are not absent in this. As seen 
above, Kabila is accused of  working for Rwanda’s benefit. In Baraka, some Fizi 
deputies are accused of  arming Yakutumba both from an ideological perspective 
and also as a way to access mineral resources.20 It is striking that in a stretch of  
about 800 km between Fizi and Beni and of  over 3,000 km between these loca-
tions and Kinshasa, in a country with hardly any communications and road 
network, and consistently over five years of  field research, the same rumours are 
found word for word: ‘The FDLR is an invention to continue the war’, or ‘UN’s 
soldiers traffic with coltan’.21 Some of  these rumours have become part of  the 
mainstream discourse: ‘the UN is there to serve Rwandan interests’ or ‘UK, US 
and Rwanda want the balkanization of  Congo’ (Monsa Iyaka 2009; Radio Okapi 
2006, 2012b). In Bunyakiri, Fizi and Masisi, for example, a similar rumour 
circulated: MONUSCO provided FDLR elements with uniforms, weapons and 
food to sustain a war in Congo in order to keep Congo weak and easily exploit-
able. It is remarkable that inquiries about these rumours demonstrate that they 
rarely come from first-hand experiences and that acquiring details highlights 
contradictions in the facts. Rumour is used to deny the benign purpose of  peace 
and state-builders, their authority and rhetoric.
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Although rumours are widely known, they remain something to be com-
mented on in the quiet. Denigration through insults also takes place this way. 
The words of  the union representative that open this chapter were followed by 
a more direct statement: ‘yes, you can do the parade and the show and everyone 
might give you a big round of  applause, but it is to mock you, inside they are 
saying “so, yes, you come again to piss us off ”’ (Peasant Union Representative 
(no. 151) 2010). The catalogue of  insults is extensive. It tags politicians and 
international agents as ‘traffickers’, ‘murderers’, ‘thieves’, ‘lazy’ and ‘liars’, 
amongst others.22 As Scott noted, insults should be seen as a more direct act of  
resistance, even if  they do not confront authorities face to face and remain as 
part of  the hidden transcript.
Portraying international and national political actors as incapable, greedy, 
hypocritical and anti-democratic is a form of  discursive resistance that denies 
the claim of  legitimacy and consent. It is a form of  de-legitimation, and hence 
of  more intentional (claim-regarding) resistance, even if  people would not neces-
sarily label these acts as such. What this means is that the intent of  mocking 
and slandering authorities is, precisely, mocking and slandering authorities. The 
intent, in other words, cannot be inferred beyond the act. It is reasonable to 
assume from here that actors are aware of  the fact that they are, at least to a 
certain extent, targeting the deference, credibility, respectability and reputation 
of  authority. These forms of  discursive resistance have embedded a political 
critique of  peacebuilding strategies and agenda advancement. In mocking or 
portraying a negative image of  the state of  current affairs, these forms of  resist-
ance carry out an idea of  how reality should be.
Ideals and the articulation of  social justice as agenda advancing
Going back to how claims of  authority are justified on the basis of  long-term 
idealised promises, this final section analyses how these promises become a 
platform from which to launch a critique of  authority, hold it to account and 
articulate aspirations for social justice. This is done by rearticulating the official 
peacebuilding discourse. Although everyday resistance is not always under-
pinned by these ideas and may be motivated by more banal and immediate goals, 
these redefinitions are an important insight into prevalent political aspirations 
and underpin many other practices that will be explored in the next chapters.
The good state
The state is a primary example of  the dynamics of  denial and subversion. Against 
the critique and discourses seen above, the state becomes rearticulated as some-
thing like a ‘good king’. For a Caritas representative, ‘the state doesn’t exist, it 
doesn’t protect people, its services are taken over by NGOs and its role must be 
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that of  distributing wealth’ (Caritas Representative, Justice and Peace Commis-
sion, Goma 2009).23 A Union Paysanne pour le Developpement Integral (UPDI) 
representative believed that the state should be there to guarantee a good stand-
ard of  living for the peasants and provide the same protection to agriculture as 
in Europe (UPDI Representative 2010). The so-called ‘government of  national 
unity’ brought in by the 2002 Sun City agreements, was renamed ‘1+4=0’. As 
in the most idealised versions of  what the state can and should do, seen in the 
World Bank and OEDC reports in earlier chapters, or what Chandler calls the 
‘silver bullet’, the state is redefined also in non-elite discourses as the engine for 
development, peace, well-being and public service. The creation of  an ideal 
picture of  the state as something like a ‘good king’ or a ‘prophet’ is a form of  
resistance against the lived reality.
In the DRC, idealising the state as a saviour is not new. However, as Englebert 
notes:
Congolese identity, the imagination of  Congo and of  the Congolese nation, serve as 
ideological foundation for the reproduction of  the state, denying legitimacy to alter-
native scenarios and confining political action to factionalism for control of  the state 
itself, or to the non-threatening realm of  ‘civil society’. (2002: 592)
Englebert notes that the co-idealisation of  the Congolese nation both as resist-
ance against domination and as its reproduction is a discursive battleground in 
which elites finally take the upper hand. Yet the significance of  the critique, 
which operates as a way to hold decision-makers to account, and the political 
aspirations it simultaneously projects are not to be disregarded. An image of  a 
good chief  is projected onto the state, resulting in an inversion of  terms, where 
state authority is legitimised in so far as it serves the most vulnerable. Similarly, 
the image constructed of  what the state should be becomes a mirror of  what 
subordinate groups wish the state would provide for them. As such, what Con-
golese subordinate classes seem to be waiting for is an ideal that does not exist 
in any country in the world. They paint a picture of  leaders that are caring and 
honest, delivering the services the population needs, respecting the law and 
protecting citizens.24 The idealised state as a public service and providing social 
well-being is counterposed to an experience of  the state as dominating, coercive 
and extractive. Agendas of  political participation, development and peace are 
inextricably attached to it.
Democracy or ‘démon-cracy’25
Against a practice of  democracy that is almost exclusively premised on the 
organisation of  presidential and national elections, democracy for non-elites is 
premised on direct participation in decision-making processes. In a workshop 
for secondary school students on ‘participatory governance’ organised by the 
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Group Jeremie in Bukavu, it became clear that even if  ‘participatory governance’ 
sounded as if  it had just been taken from any policy report from the UN Depart-
ment of  Political Affairs, it had been appropriated to mean that people should 
participate directly in the decision-making processes of  the country (Participant 
Observation III 2009). This included a vision in which people had a say in the 
management of  the country’s resources and their distribution. An NGO repre-
sentative made this point clearly:
The state lives now on the shoulders of  people, their agents do not get paid … the 
problem here in the DRC is that democracy is also badly distributed. We should have 
started by local elections … but we have started by the presidential elections, legisla-
tives, then provincial, and they have stopped there, and from there they take what 
they need, they share power amongst themselves, they take whatever land they need, 
without taking care of  their real responsibilities (ADDF Representative 2010).26
This representative is arguing that having started with local elections rather 
than national would have provided greater accountability and political control, 
and would have solved the institutional problems linked to problems of  develop-
ment. While there is a critique of  how democracy works at the moment, democ-
racy is being redefined as actual participation by the citizenry.
These criticisms are prevalent and have been present at different landmarks 
in the transition after the wars. At the time of  the Inter-Congolese Dialogue 
(2002) the demand to participate in negotiations for peace meant that peace and 
democracy had to involve all sectors of  society. However, many groups partici-
pating in this event argued that, in the end, the process only facilitated a dialogue 
between the Government and the MLC (Irin News 2002). As such, at the time 
of  the 23 March Agreement in 2009, which put an end to the uprising of  CNDP 
(Nkunda) and other armed groups such as PARECO, people complained that 
what was being created was an incentive to take up arms, raid the population 
and then partake in government (Femmes Père Saint-Simon Representative 
2010; Ngemulo 2010). The negotiations included that these groups would 
become political parties and would have the opportunity to partake in power 
(Programme Amani Leo 2009). Notwithstanding the complexity and challenges 
of  ending armed conflict, these discourses are challenging the legitimacy of  the 
actors who partake in government and redefining this version of  ‘peace’ as a 
truce of  warlords.
Development
Participation is also a prominent theme in the critique of  how development (and 
extraction and exploitation) takes place. As such, alongside the criticism that 
wealth stays ‘in the pockets of  the politicians’ and that the real wealth of  the 
country goes elsewhere, there is the idea that development aid does not arrive 
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and that for development to be properly carried out, and not just from aid agen-
cies, people in the lowest ranks of  society have to be involved. This was articu-
lated most forcefully by a representative of  a peasant cooperative in Bukavu.27 
Since the mid-1990s the co-operative had felt the logic of  development was 
marginalising and disempowering them, something that they continue to see 
presently. The representative stated:
We realised that those organisations hadn’t changed much, they are within a logic 
of  experts, so much a logic of  experts that they have forgotten to engage the benefi-
ciaries of  their projects. So our members did not see themselves in those projects, 
they do them for us, without us? … that’s against us! So we wondered, would it not 
be possible to express and do things by ourselves? (Peasant Union Member (no. 151) 
2010).
The logic behind the creation of  their organisation was a belief  in the need to 
engage more fully in the processes of  development in order for development to 
be effective. This has been a constant in the way development projects are read. 
A women’s NGO representative in Butembo also regretted the approach of  
certain INGOs (that she did not wish to cite), affirming that ‘instead of  support-
ing us, they replaced us … They execute projects, without engaging the popula-
tion or the local NGOs’ (ADDF Representative 2010).28 This participation is a 
way of  expressing that development has to contain a democratic element. 
Democratising resources means that they are equally distributed amongst the 
population and that there is direct control over the distribution and use of  these 
resources (Kajemba 2009).
Peace
Peace, the final element of  the statebuilding discourse is one of  the most ambigu-
ous and multifaceted. Whether it is used to criticise the shortcomings of  peace-
building strategies or to argue that they have succeeded, peace is defined in 
multiple ways – with each meaning signalling a different political agenda. 
Autesserre (2009), for instance, has demonstrated how international actors, 
including international organisations, diplomatic missions and INGOs view 
Congo as innately violent. This assumption has resulted in peace being seen as a 
return to normality, where violence was still present (Autesserre 2009: 251). 
However, this is not only an issue for international elites. For Programme Amani, 
‘peace is a very long process’ (Programme Amani Leo 2009: 2); and they are 
clear that ‘the war is over’ (STAREC – Amani Leo Representative 2009). This 
long process is, however, settled at the top and experienced at the bottom. The 
vision of  non-war/peacebuilding resonates with non-elites’ critique of  the 
peacebuilding strategies, in which peace is about the signature of  a ‘peace agree-
ment’ and ‘power-sharing’. Defining peace therefore sets the priorities and 
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strategies to be undertaken. For those who are still confronting armed groups, 
violence, poverty, repression and absence of  basic services, speaking of  peace is 
simultaneously a critique and the voicing of  what could be seen as an articula-
tion of  social justice. Peace is redefined as being both a process and a product of  
political participation, development and personal and collective well-being. 
What to do about it and how to set priorities is a matter of  putting non-elite 
agendas at the forefront and of  having access to decision-making processes. In 
this spirit, a Group Jeremie representative stated:
We must start from the proposals that are made at the grassroots. What we want 
and what the international community wants is diametrically opposed. I am from 
Kinshasa, here in Kinshasa things don’t go, people suffer. Peace has multiple dimen-
sions: social, environmental, economic … We are oppressed, exterminated, our 
women are raped, the children abducted by the military … The peace in Congo is a 
global thing, we need a global approach and not a sectored approach like the MONUC 
does. It reforms the justice sector here, it does democracy promotion there … Peace 
here is less important than money. The Congolese context is unique … But you, the 
internationals, you come here with laboratory theories, preconceived models and 
try to impose them on the Congo. No, that is not peace. (Group Jeremie Representa-
tive 1 2009)
The ‘diametrical opposition’ that this interviewee is referring to seems to point 
fundamentally to how peacebuilding is undertaken. Most likely the ‘international 
community’, as he states, would agree that peace has all of  those dimensions. 
What he is pointing out is that the strategies enacted are not conducive to 
addressing all of  those dimensions, and that, contrary to the discourses of  peace, 
‘money’ is the underlying real motivation. This is representative of  similar 
responses gathered. As an indication, the representatives of  all 31 non-
internationally funded NGOs who were interviewed denied living in a ‘post-
conflict’ or non-war context, linking ‘real peace’ to well-being and political 
participation. Additionally and simultaneously, an alternative agenda is being 
drafted that redefines peace as social justice with multiple dimensions.
Subverting discourses
Shared vocabulary does not mean shared meanings. The fact that authority 
claims are made as idealised promises offers a fertile ground on which to hold 
authority to account. As Scott notes:
Perhaps the greatest problem with the concept of  hegemony is the implicit assump-
tion that the ideological incorporation of  subordinate groups will necessarily dimin-
ish social conflict. And yet, we know that any ideology which makes a claim to 
hegemony must, in effect, make promises to subordinate groups by way of  explain-
ing why a particular social order is also in their best interests. Once such promises 
are extended, the way is open to conflict. (1990: 77)
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Peacebuilding, and the reconstruction of  state authority at the heart of  it, is 
deployed as a moral necessity to which subordinate classes need to consent, wait 
and suffer the consequences, for this will benefit people in the long run. Yet, the 
same promises are taken literally, holding power to account, confronting the 
ideal that peacebuilding paints against the reality on the ground. This is not a 
new critique. Paul Gilroy, for example, has analysed how black music has pro-
vided a way to confront reality and voice aspirations. He argues that:
The politics of  fulfilment practised by the descendants of  slaves demands that bour-
geois civil society lives up to the promises of  its own rhetoric and offers a means 
whereby demands for justice, rational organization of  the productive processes, etc, 
can be expressed. (Gilroy 1993: 134)
These are not necessarily found overtly but, rather, as a hidden transcript. Or, as 
Gilroy puts it, by ‘opaque means’:
Created under the nose of  the overseer, the utopian desires which fuel the politics of  
transfiguration must be invoked by other deliberately opaque means. This politics 
exists on a lower frequency where it is played, danced and acted, as well as sung 
about. (1993: 134)
The inversion of  peacebuilding’s vocabulary, as discussed above, illustrates 
ways in which it is de-legitimised, critiqued, held to account and counter-
reacted with the articulation of  how things should be. The ‘subtle’ difference in 
meaning, as Toulabor notes, ‘consists, grosso modo, in doubling the usual or 
conventional sense of  the words in giving them second semi-hermetic mean-
ings’ (2008: 99). The state becomes a ‘good king’ with the capacity for salva-
tion that effectively works for the poor; democracy means direct participation 
in the decision-making processes at all levels; development means wealth dis-
tribution and access to its management; and peace encompasses a sense of  
tranquillity, free from threats of  violence and linked to a sense of  justice. They 
are a transformation of  power’s own idealisation of  its capacities, together with 
the political aspirations of  subordinate classes. The creation of  ideals repre-
sents not only the negation of  the present order, but also the formulation of  an 
alternative one.
Conclusion
In the DRC there is no social-political movement that resists peacebuilding. 
Rather, there is a consistent pattern of  acts that challenge the actions and inac-
tions of  national and international elites and that attempt to mitigate the experi-
ence of  a predatory violent order. At the discursive level, this entails contrasting 
lived experience to the promises of  the state as rightful authority and service 
provider. While this image of  the state is not being rejected as an ideal, it is 
rejected in practice. Elite discourses imply a morality that lays a claim to 
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legitimate authority, while exempting elites from responsibility for failure. For 
non-elites, discourses are ways of  voicing discontent while remaining pragmatic 
about both possibilities and repression; they are relevant because they are part 
of  a shared critique. The fact that these discourses are found everywhere and 
resonate across a broad construct of  ‘Congolese identity’ and ‘Congolese nation’ 
indicates how everyday resistance operates as a covert strategy, attempting to 
escape repression while mitigating its effects.
What this chapter has illustrated, beyond how the discursive arena is 
fertile ground for everyday resistance, is the ambivalence of  these discourses as 
platforms on which both domination and resistance operate. In Scottian terms, 
peacebuilding creates public and hidden transcripts where rhetoric, image and 
expected behaviour are enacted for different audiences, following a shared 
vocabulary, including that of  state authority, democracy, development and 
peace. The relationship of  different actors to these ideals is enacted as a ‘pose’; 
that is, there is a level of  ambiguity in how public images of  authority, defer-
ence and obedience are exercised. Discourses are significant because state-
building strategies are established and justified as a form of  inevitable good. 
The moral authority of  the good state and its subsequent delivery of  peace, 
democracy and development facilitate a way to justify a reality of  war, poverty 
and impunity. As such, an obvious starting point from which to look for resist-
ance is the idealism on which promises are made. These powerful promises 
seem to be enough to request the population to keep waiting, obeying, paying 
taxes, providing for themselves and facing repression in return for raising 
concerns.
The implication is that peacebuilding’s discourse rests on people’s aspira-
tions, and not the other way around. To this extent, peacebuilding is hardly 
Western or liberal, but is better seen as an example of  the discursive practice of  
authority, and more as a populist discourse. Demands to participate in the 
decision-making processes, to be protected, to be heard and to enjoy the wealth 
of  their own country are seemingly modest demands. However, these demands 
are idealised in such a way that they pose a fundamental challenge to peace-
building practices. In a context of  limited capacities for political action, the 
discursive is a fruitful site of  resistance, although not the only one. The following 
chapters will complement many of  the discourses surveyed in this one. The 
hidden transcript runs through Mai Mai militias, justifications for tax evasion 
and in the undertaking of  a myriad of  creative survival strategies. Underlying 
these tactics is a process of  de-legitimisation, of  advancing alternative agendas 
and raising political aspirations. These discourses and the political alternatives 
embedded within them are realised not just in mechanisms of  critique and the 
voicing of  aspirations, but in the processes of  denial and mitigation undertaken 
for navigating a context of  violence and poverty.
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NOTES
 1 Applying a similar argument to aid agencies operating in countries in conflict, and the 
DRC in particular, Zoe Marriage (2006) argues that these agencies justify their actions 
under a moral authority, which simultaneously allows them to externalise blame onto 
recipients for the shortcomings of  their own activities. 
 2 The example of  the quietness in the classroom in comparison to the burst of  talking when 
the teacher leaves illustrates the point (Scott 1990: 25). 
 3 This sentiment was recorded amongst all UN officers interviewed. 
 4 This was explicit in 90 per cent of  the interviews with MONUSCO officials between 2009 
and 2014. 
 5 Valeria Izzi (2011) argues that this sort of  slandering illustrates mistrust and the obsta-
cles for the work of  peacebuilders.
 6 MONUC was placed under Chapter VII by Resolution 1291 in 2000, but not in its original 
authorisation in 1999. MONUC/MONUSCO has not tended to use force overall. See 
Chapter 3. 
 7 Although this was raised in many interviews, the sentiment reflected here is something 
observed as prevalent in all fieldwork locations in ordinary interactions outside 
interviews. 
 8 This was corroborated in daily outgoings in Kinshasa, and echoed in several interviews 
and informal conversations elsewhere (Ex-MONUC Officer (no. 2) 2010; Informal Con-
versation International Alert Research Assistant 2010; MONUSCO Officer (no. 190) 
2014).
 9 Those who assert that Kabila is Rwandese say that his real name is Hipolite Kanambe and 
not Joseph Kabila Kabange. 
10 This was observed during fieldwork in Kinshasa, in North and South Kivu and in Equa-
teur as an electoral observer from September to December 2011. 
11 The use of  silence as sabotage is not a new nor an uncommon practice of  resistance in 
Africa (Abbink et al. 2008: 17).
12 In French from the ‘cinq chantiers’ to the ‘cinq chansons’. For the programme visit Presi-
dent Joseph Kabila Office (2009).
13 Direct mockery of  the justice system was recorded in 10 interviews with subor-
dinate groups/civil society representatives. That there is a sentiment of  distrust in 
the justice system in Congolese society was directly raised in all interviews with 
civil society/ordinary people and four Government officials speaking of  a popular 
sentiment. 
14 There are several organisations, now funded by INGOs, that do justice settlements as a 
way to avoid having to go to the courts, e.g. Life and Peace Institute and Alliance pour la 
Paix et la Concorde.
15 This was brought up explicitly in five interviews: Group Jeremie Representative 1 (2009); 
Group Jeremie Representative 2 (2010); UPDI Representative (2010); Nyiragongo SOCICO 
Representative (2014); Youth NGO representative (2014). It also resonated in many of  
the student groups organised to speak of  corruption and justice in College Alfajiri, Bukavu 
(Participant Observation III 2009) and in two focus groups with women in Bunyakiri 
(2010) and Kamituga (2014). References to double standards in applying the law and to 
experiences of  repression also came up in several interviews (COJESKI 2010; CODHOD 
Representative 2009; Observatoire des Droits de l’Homme et Contre la Torture 2009; 
UniKin Student Union Representative, Kinshasa 2009).
16 Rumour in French. 
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17 Brought up in the two focus groups held in Bunyakiri. Interviews with four Bunyakiri-
based NGOs confirmed that these were common rumours: Alliance pour la Paix et la 
Concorde, Association de Dèfense de Droits l’Homme Bunyaki, Voix Sans Voix and 
Femmes Père Saint Simon. It was also raised by Imam of  the Islamic Community in Bun-
yakiri (Kabambi 2010).
18 Half  of  MONUC/MONUSCO officers interviewed directly made reference to this issue. 
19 E.g. Bemba’s 2006 campaign ‘100 per cent Congolais’ reflected the rumour that Kabila 
was Rwandese. Also in the latest reports on the 2011 elections both the Carter Centre 
Electoral observation missions point out that politicians tended to spread hatred dis-
courses and slandering as a political weapon (Carter Center 2012: 71 and 97).
20 The veracity of  the rumour could not be ascertained but several interviewees confirmed 
that this was an extended belief  in Baraka (Fizi SOCICO Representative 2010; Human 
Rights NGO Representative (no. 127) 2010).
21 For example, similar rumours to those in Bunyakiri were expressed by residents of  Masisi 
who specified that ‘In Nyabiondo and Pinga the Indian contingent has profiteered of  
mineral resources’ (Informal Conversation with Masisi Parish Priest 2010).
22 This was gathered most significantly in informal conversations. The words of  an airport 
porter are revealing: ‘Here everyone comes, take what they want, the politicians are liars, 
the state is a thief  and the MONUC does nothing, they are accomplices in all this’ (Infor-
mal Conversation with Airport Worker – Luggage Porter 2009). 
23 Similar statements were repeated in multiple interviews. For example: ‘There is no state 
here, no roads, no water, no free education […] Those are the real problems and in order 
to address them, they need to start identifying the local initiatives that are already in place 
[but] we are replaced by everyone’ (Pole Institute Researcher 2010).
24 All interviews with members of  civil society and non-elite participants made a link 
between the state and its responsibility for security. 
25 A form of  mocking of  democracy around Kinshasa (Yoka 2009: 250).
26 Other similar statements were as follows: ‘the resources, minerals, forestry, water, etc, 
have to be distributed equally amongst the population’ (Kajemba 2009); ‘The population 
must participate in how the public economic resources are distributed’, from the summary 
of  a group of  students in High School Workshop (Participant Observation III 2009); 
‘Resources must be available for the population to live not for the politicians to enrich 
themselves’ (Focus Group Civil Society Mwenga 2014).
27 Other interviewees made the same point (ADDF Representative 2010; Group Jeremie 
Representative 2 2010; Pole Institute Researcher 2010; SPIP Representative 2011).
28 They have accessed International Alert funds.
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5
Everyday violence and Mai Mai militias  
in Eastern DRC
What would you do if  the state was a man? I’ll kill him.1
From words to weapons
Although there were skirmishes, especially throughout the 1990s, Chapter 3 has already exposed how the first phase of  the conflict was the defining moment in which the armed mobilisation of  subordinate 
classes took place. The fact that the AFDL war was conducted under the guise 
of  a national liberation movement and led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila succeeded 
in reviving the Mai Mai historical sentiment of  fighting against oppression and 
colonial conquest (Dunn 2002: 55). As noted in Chapter 3, Kabila had been 
a member of  Lumumba’s cabinet and fought with Pierre Mulele, who led one 
of  the biggest revolts against Mobutu and was a driving force for the creation 
of  the Simba and Mai Mai popular militias in the 1960s.2 During the 1996 
and 1998 wars, Mai Mai militias generally fought on the side of  the Govern-
ment to repel the RCD rebellion and the Rwandan, Ugandan and Burundian 
invasions. However, they remained autonomous from the army, and since the 
transition most groups have developed an anti-government stand. The Mai 
Mai militias consider themselves inheritors of  a tradition of  resistance that 
dates back to the struggle against colonialism and beyond. In a note from a 
Mai Mai Padiri combatant, this historical tradition of  resistance is explained 
as follows:
We cannot stop thinking and we cannot stop sending the calls to the mystery that 
surrounds us everywhere; that is, we cannot stop resisting evil. It is within that 
approach that the Movement of  Mai-Mai resistance was born, which has its distant 
origins in the domination of  man by man […] Already in 1481, the king Nzinga 
Panju was opposed to Portuguese occupation in his kingdom; in 1682, the prophet 
Chimpa Vita resisted against the implantation of  foreign power in the kingdom of  
Kongo, she was burnt alive. In 1942, in the kingdom of  the Bahunde, where the 
Bakumu live, in Masisi, in one of  the hunters’ villages, in Ntoto, Mandayi told 
Sindikiza that his brother Yusufu Kitawala in the cultural struggle against foreign 
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occupation had a formula that protected men against all attacks from bladed or fire 
weapons by the enemy. In 1951, Simon Kimbangu died in exile, Patrice Lumumba 
and Pierre Mulele and recently Desire Kabila, killed 16/01/2001 for having bran-
dished and lifted the spirit of  a profound love for the homeland. (Unknown Author 
2005: 1)
Hence the AFDL rebellion awakened a latent revolt. However, the subsequent 
militarisation has set peasants on the path to a permanent state of  armed con-
flict (Amuri Misako 2008). This permanent conflict is not because rural classes 
have since maintained a popular uprising, but because the war has made them 
primary targets. The RCD rebellion in support of  neighbouring countries’ inva-
sion of  the DRC in 1998–2003, the insecurity provoked by the different CNDP 
uprisings and the ongoing presence of  foreign and national armed groups rep-
resent a continuation of  the self-defence and liberation agenda. The strategies 
undertaken for surviving and confronting war are inseparable from the strategy 
of  joining armed militias as a way of  ‘reacting against their marginalisation and 
exclusion’ (Vlassenroot 2002: 150). The means used are largely conditioned by 
the historical moment in which actors are embedded.
Nevertheless, there is great variety amongst Mai Mai militias. While some 
groups abide by a firm code of  conduct and are attached to an agenda of  libera-
tion and social justice, others have also turned into predators of  the population 
(e.g. Rasta) (UPDI and LPI 2009). The attacks of  the Mai Mai Cheka in July–
August 2010, mentioned in Chapter 3, are a primary example. They included 
systematic rape and other crimes in 15 villages in Walikale in alliance with the 
FDLR. Mai Mai Cheka was born out of  a power-struggle for the control of  the 
largest cassiterite mine in the DRC, which had been given to FARDC/CNDP after 
the 23 March agreements in 2009, to the detriment of  the FARDC/ex-Mai Mai 
brigade of  Colonel Samy that had controlled it previously (UN Group of  Experts 
2010b: para. 34–43). Other militias, as already seen, have been successfully 
co-opted into state/elite networks to be used for proxy wars between the DRC 
(e.g. PARECO) and Rwanda (e.g. Mundundu 40 – now defunct) (Hoebeke et al. 
2009: 132; UN Group of  Experts 2008b: 100–3). The popular character of  some 
militias is therefore challenged by the fact that militias ally with and pursue elite 
agendas. Yet this is not static; there is an important element of  unreliability and 
contingency, meaning that Mai Mai groups are likely to betray these elites and 
form new groups.
Despite these complexities, the history and current dynamics in many Mai 
Mai militias make them representatives of  the ways in which rural classes have 
used or joined these militias as a form of  resistance to the effects of  domination. 
The deepening of  the statebuilding strategies in the last decade has implied the 
militarisation of  the Kivus, of  which Mai Mai militias have been the primary 
targets. The terms set for Mai Mai demobilisation, the ongoing context of  war 
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and poverty, and the FARDC being deployed as a representation of  state author-
ity are all sources of  distrust and rejection of  state authority. The consolidation 
of  administrative and military positions in the hands of  the CNDP, the CNDP and 
M-23 uprisings, the continuous presence of  the FDLR along the Kivus and the 
military operations by FARDC have fuelled Mai Mai nationalist sentiments. The 
role of  the Mai Mai as militias of  self-defence and vehicles of  political participa-
tion has become even more prevalent. They provide a way to defend and advance 
agendas of  security provision, control of  land and local political authority. This 
last element permeates Mai Mai ideology and represents the long-term aspira-
tions of  the Congolese peasantry.
Understanding everyday forms of  resistance in the DRC implies acknowledg-
ing that the fact that they are based on the lack of  direct confrontation and on 
practices undertaken to attract the minimum amount of  repression does not 
necessarily mean they are without violence. Resistance is shaped by the political 
context in which it is embedded and practices do not define resistance per se. 
Three aspects need to be analysed in order to understand the role of  violence as 
a tool of  resistance: the context of  war, the motivations that popular classes have 
to support or create armed groups, and how extensive this popular support is. 
Whereas the context of  war was analysed in previous chapters, this one will 
focus on the other two aspects – motivations and support. These two aspects 
account for the defining elements of  resistance, including the denial/mitigation 
of  claims and the agenda-advancing on the part of  popular classes. They also 
show different gradients in the practices. Attacking the military or other armed 
groups is a denial of  the state’s claim on the monopoly of  violence and a form 
of  mitigating state-making-related violence. This is a claim-regarding overt 
practice of  resistance. Conversely, using Mai Mai militias to provide security is a 
self-regarding practice. The violence generated by the context is used and trans-
formed as a self-serving mechanism to counter precisely the effects of  violence. 
In so far as the state is experienced as a form of  predation and insecurity, sub-
ordinate classes’ motivations have at their core the rejection of  state authority 
and state-making agendas. They strive to provide security and protection, while 
advancing agendas of  political participation, representation and land. However, 
these motivations are not static, nor is the support subordinate classes give to 
these militias; rather, the support is contingent and changing. Mai Mai militias 
tend to be formed from specific ethnic groups, or those who are closely related, 
although not all members of  an ethnic group or of  a particular area would 
support the local militia.
Mai Mai militias pose multiple challenges to an account of  resistance. In 
order to address these challenges and to analyse violence as part of  the everyday 
practices of  resistance, the chapter first discusses the motivations then the 
support for these militias. The focus of  this chapter is on Fizi, where Mai Mai 
Yakotumba operates, and on Bunyakiri, with ex-Simba Mai Mai/MRS and 
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current Raïa Mutomboki. These cases display an anti-government agenda 
(having less government interference as a result), as cases that have confronted 
the effects of  state-making and whose relation to their constituencies illustrates 
the dynamics and motivations for popular support. These militias do not repre-
sent a continuous popular uprising or a model for ethical resistance. They are 
an effect of  war; and they are ultimately representative of  the heterogeneity in 
the practices of  resistance.
Motivations
The mainstream narrative of  Mai Mai militias is that they seek their enrich-
ment or to attack antagonistic ethnic groups, where any discourse of  social 
justice and grievances is just a façade (ADEPAE et al. 2011; Alden et al. 2011).3 
Those who have studied these militias in greater depth observe that their 
motivations are more complex (Acker and Vlassenroot 2001; Amuri Misako 
2007, 2008; Hoffmann 2007; Jourdan 2004; Maindo Monga Ngonga 2007; 
Vlassenroot 2002).4 Researchers have identified four categories of  violence 
as anti-government, income-generating, maintaining social control over the 
group they operate from and symbolic, where targets represent their beliefs 
or identity.5 For Verweijen (2015), it is income generation and (re)production 
and expansion of  control over the ethnic community they represent that are 
most significant. Other studies have identified marginal conditions of  living, 
poverty and general disenfranchisement as the main reasons for combatants 
to join militias (Lubala Mugisho 2000: 209–10; Vlassenroot 2000: 94–6). 
Lubala Mugisho adds historical factors as important for the emergence of  these 
militias. Yet others have seen the militias as a form of  rural political mobili-
sation, motivated by a rejection of  the status quo, and aspirations for social 
justice (Acker and Vlassenroot 2001; Amuri Misako 2008; Hoffmann 2007; 
Vlassenroot 2002).
The formation of  Mai Mai militias cannot be delinked from the history of  
uprisings since colonial times. However, at the present time their presence 
cannot be separated from the context of  war. What Misako calls the ‘militianisa-
tion’ of  life means that self-management and security provision, in the context 
of  relative state absence, as well as the pursuit of  political agendas and aspira-
tions through armed groups is an ‘effect’ of  the context of  violence (Amuri 
Misako 2007: 21). Violence becomes a form of  political participation where 
power is asserted through violence. In the war context of  the DRC, Acker and 
Vlassenroot argue, violence is the language through which many young mar-
ginalised Congolese demonstrate their distrust of  state institutions, resist the 
conditions in which they live and aim at a more egalitarian order (Acker and 
Vlassenroot 2001: 104 and 106). Joining an armed group could be generally 
inscribed in the dynamics of  contestation of  the state since these conditions of  
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living tend to be seen as the consequence of  an unjust social order in which the 
state is directly responsible or complicit.
These dynamics of  war and state contestation, which, as Prunier argues, 
come both ‘from above and from below’, signal that uses of  violence can be read 
as furthering elite or personal agendas (1991: 4). The political meaning granted 
to these motivations is a defining factor in analysing popular classes as politically 
minded or as politically manipulated.6 Following a Scottian framework, self-
centred individual and collective motivations come together in the everyday 
politics of  non-elites. These militias represent an arena where patterns of  resist-
ance to practices of  coercion and extraction unfold. The examples from Fizi and 
Bunyakiri explored in this section illustrate this point by analysing, firstly, the 
rejection and distrust of  the state, and secondly, how these motivations are 
linked to community protection and security as important underlying agendas, 
and to land and political participation as important aspirations.7
Rejection and distrust
Fizi: Yakotumba
Mai Mai Yakotumba was created in 2007 but has a significant rebel history.8 Its 
core members fought in the various brigades that were part of  the second-
biggest Mai Mai structure in South Kivu, led by General Daniel Dunia, during 
the 1998–2003 war. General Dunia’s troops resisted both Kabila’s AFDL and the 
RCD rebellion. Not only were both of  these uprisings seen as an invasion, but 
Dunia’s resistance was the only form of  protection against the brutal violence 
with which these uprisings were undertaken. Yakotumba’s and the previous 
Dunia’s troops were composed mostly of  Babembes, who are the majority ethnic 
group in the area of  Fizi.9 The Babembe take pride in claiming that they resisted 
Mobutu for over 25 years, arguing that they ‘vehemently hate all dictatorial 
political systems that violate fundamental human rights’ (Unknown author 
2010: 16). The same articulation has been seen in the increasing distrust 
towards the Government throughout the transitional period.
When the transition in 2006 brought in the different plans for Mai Mai 
demobilisation and reintegration, not all of  General’s Dunia’s troops were suc-
cessfully disengaged. Refractory elements, especially William Amuri Yakotumba, 
rejected the demand to redeploy his troops out of  Fizi. Several military and politi-
cal factors were in place for this decision.10 Militarily, the Banyamulengue Mai 
Mai group operating in the high plateaus of  South Kivu, the FRF, did not reinte-
grate into the army and pushed for the constitution of  the territory of  Minembwe 
in order to have an independent administration from Fizi.11 The Rwandan-
supported CNDP had already rejected reintegration, continuing its military 
activity. Finally, many Yakotumba members felt disillusioned with the DDR 
process (Demobilised Combatant from Mai Mai General Dunia 2010; Informal 
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Conversation with Yakotumba members 2010). Politically, the Mai Mai move-
ment created out of  the 1998–2003 war was marginalised from the power 
distribution of  the 1+4 formula. It reproached the Government for not acknowl-
edging that successful resistance against the rebellion and foreign occupation 
in the East had been due in large part to its actions. Additionally, the electoral 
results were contested. These military and political concerns went hand in hand 
with the Mai Mai criticism about the lack of  social and economic development. 
As such, according to a Mai Mai Yakotumba member, they understood that ‘the 
DRC kept being open to foreign intervention’ and, although this had turned 
from a military to a political strategy, they had ‘judged it necessary to create the 
maquis and oppose the Government’ (Mai Mai Yakotumba Combatant 1. 2010).
Interpreting the Fizi conflict within patterns of  state-making and resistance 
is not straightforward. The dynamics of  conflict in Fizi have been read as those 
of  ethnic conflict, challenging discourses about social justice as being manipu-
lated by local elites. The so-called autochthonous/allochthonous conflict became 
even more salient in the context of  Mobutu’s Zairianisation and Bisengimana’s 
policies concerning land, political representation and nationality.12 Currently in 
Fizi there is an important ethnic element in the connection between, on the one 
hand, Yakotumba’s perceptions of  Kabila as a Rwandese or as a facilitator of  
Rwandan economic expansionist agendas in Eastern DRC; and, on the other, the 
fact that the Banyamulengue community are largely of  Tutsi origin, having 
offered support or been supported at crucial times by the CNDP, M-23 and 
Rwandan officials (FARDC General (no. 146) 2014; UN Group of  Experts 2008a: 
paras 65–6). This is added to the fact that FARDC deployment in the area was 
ex-CNDP after the 23 March agreement (FARDC Colonel (no. 129) 2010).13 This 
discursive connection illustrates a rejection of  state and foreign agendas and the 
hailing of  traditional modes of  political authority and representation. Even if  we 
were to equate ethnic claims with political ones, or to problematise the bounda-
ries between the categories of  ethnic identity and the political,14 we would still 
see that discourses of  communal identity are simultaneously discourses of  
resistance and liberation (Hoffmann 2007: 24). This does not mean necessarily 
an ethical modus operandi. This is the challenge that violence brings. Mai Mai 
Yakotumba have been accused of  killing, stealing cattle and hassling Banyamu-
lengue herders (ADEPAE et al. 2011: 62; Banyamulengue Sheep Herder 2010). 
Violent actions need to be seen as conditioned (not justified) by a broader context 
of  war, where there is a vicious circle of  armed conflict, arms trafficking, military 
operations and several statebuilding projects that fuel the motivations for further 
violence.
Bunyakiri: Simba-Mai Mai and Raïa Mutomboki
A similar dynamic is found in Bunyakiri. It was the headquarters of  the ‘biggest’ 
Mai Mai group in the two inter-state wars under General Padiri (Vlassenroot 
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2002: 138).15 Although in the first instance his troops fought the AFDL uprising 
because it was largely seen as a foreign invasion, this developed into a fragile 
agreement to later make Padiri Secretary General of  the resistance movement, 
which was attached to the FARDC (Forces Armées Congolaises at the time).16 
Hoffmann points out that Padiri had significant influence, since the Mai Mai had 
become the de facto government in many rural areas that were under its control 
(2007: 78). As such, the exclusion of  Mai Mai representation from the 1+4 
formula had a special impact amongst Padiri’s supporters. Many interpreted this 
as the exclusion of  the rural population and as foreign intervention in Congolese 
affairs. Although Padiri was able to reintegrate, his supporters and those who 
fought with him see current government politics as a continuation of  exploita-
tion with no real development of  the economy or peace, and this has been a 
fundamental factor in the formation of  new militias in Bunyakiri.17 Similarly, 
there are those who have reintegrated into the army but whose sons continue 
as members of  the Mai Mai militias in their villages (e.g. Colonel Samy operating 
in the areas of  Numbi, Nyawarowa, Katasoko, Busurunki) (APC Representative 
(no. 114) 2010).
An ex-Mai Mai Padiri combatant expressed the view that, being disap-
pointed by the Government after the transition, his group saw it necessary to 
renew the group Simba Mai Mai/MRS in 2006 (Simba Mai Mai/MRS Combatant 
2010). Not all members broke with the Government immediately, and indeed 
this officer,served as a STAREC demobilisation officer for 18 months in 2008 and 
2009 (May May Simba/MRS – Axe Bunyakiri [Authors anonymised] 2009: 
4–5). However, he regretted that at, the time of  the interview in August 2010, 
he had been paid for only three months. Likewise, when his demobilisation team 
(formed of  other ex-Mai Mai combatants) had to go on a demobilisation mission, 
STAREC gave them a vehicle without petrol and they received no stipends or food 
for their journey (Simba Mai Mai/MRS Combatant 2010). This combatant has 
since stopped believing in the programme, questioning whether the Government 
was really committed to demobilisation, and has become a spearhead for the 
creation of  Raïa Mutomboki in Bunyakiri.18
Since the mid-2000s, Raïa Mutomboki has operated on and off  in the ter-
ritory of  Shabunda, South Kivu, largely in response to the insecurity created by 
the presence of  the FDLR in the area and the Government’s neglect of  this 
region, which is difficult to reach by road. The FDLR had been operating in the 
area since approximately 1998 and officially deployed under FARDC after it was 
reintegrated as part of  the steps towards the Sun City Agreement in 2002. 
Feeling betrayed by the Government shortly after, it retaliated with violence 
against residents in the area (Stearns et al. 2013: 12–14). Raïa Mutomboki 
raised as a self-defence militia of  (literal translation of  the name) ‘angry citi-
zens’. As a ‘franchise’ – that is, not as a group that moves from one place to 
another, but more as an idea that other groups enacted – this group sprang up 
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in other parts of  South Kivu such as Bunyakiri (Stearns et al. 2013). In Bunya-
kiri, old Mai Mai members helped to organise the movement and taught it tactics 
and how to operate weapons (Raïa Mutomboki combatant (no. 182) 2014; 
Simba Mai Mai/MRS Combatant 2010). For one Raïa Mutomboki combatant 
this was not only a strategy of  self-defence, ‘it was a defence of  our territory and 
our lives, after we have understood that we were being demobilised to allow 
others to occupy our lands’ (Raïa Mutomboki combatant (no. 182) 2014). Raïa 
Mutomboki has been largely successful in clearing the area of  FDLR, represent-
ing a radical rejection and challenge of  the state’s monopoly of  violence and of  
the peacebuilding strategies in place.
These examples from Fizi and Bunyakiri illustrate that a discursive critique 
and a denial of  state legitimacy can take the form of  armed struggle too. These 
groups represent trends across Mai Mai groups in the Kivus (Demobilised Com-
batant from Mai Mai General Dunia 2010; Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combat-
ant 2 2010). Peacebuilding and the reconstruction of  state authority are read 
largely as an elite affair which maintains the exploitation of  rural areas while 
placing them under military rule. As a form of  rejection and mitigation against 
this, militias become a tool of  opposition and a source of  security and provision 
of  protection.
Protection and security
The militarised context pushes the population into a defensive stand. Militias are 
what Scott calls a ‘state effect’ – a ‘symbiosis’ of  state expansion, state violence 
and its rejection (2009: 26). Popular militias are a response to militarised rule, 
land seizures and insecurity. Security is a constant concern not only for Mai Mai 
militias but also for the population where the militias belong.19 Although, as 
explored below, popular support for Mai Mai militias is not generalised across 
time and space, and although many times militias have become a menace to 
residents, whenever this support is granted it responds largely to a concern for 
protection. Seeking protection through Mai Mai militias is a denial of  state 
authority and of  legitimacy to the peacebuilding discourse of  protection. It is 
done as the least-bad option and could be seen as a self-regarding claim (Morvan 
2005: 95–8). The denial/mitigation of  the violence generated by state-making 
is not the intention so much as for individual or collective survival. Yet it is 
undermining of  the authority of  the state and the peacebuilding actors.
A professor from the Catholic University of  Bukavu argued that the war has 
made popular classes use the Mai Mai militias not only to defend themselves 
against foreign armed groups but also against the state (Université Catholique 
de Bukavu Professor 2009). For this professor, this is in the context of  the clash 
between customary and state land policies. The dual customary and administra-
tive land-property system privileges rich owners who can have access to a land 
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title (Vlassenroot 2006). In these cases popular militias confront the state 
because ‘it behaves as a foreign power and not a power that is at the service of  
the population’ (Université Catholique de Bukavu Professor 2009). The implica-
tion is that, in the context of  war, Mai Mai militias are also used to protect the 
population from land expropriation.
Fizi
For Fizi residents, the major threat they face is the FARDC, even if  Mai Mai Yako-
tumba has also committed abuses against them.20 Interviewees in Baraka criti-
cised Yakotumba, but they felt closer to them than to state administrators or the 
FARDC.21 This was exemplified by the way a member from a NGO articulated her 
complaint about the negative effects of  the war on women. She stated:
We continue with all those armed groups … here, there are the regular army, the 
Government and the militias that are in the forest, they continue to make violence. 
The women, they go from Baraka to Kafolo for example to get provisions, and 
they [the mentioned armed groups] continue the violence. They all put a problem 
for us, the FDLR, the FRF, the Mai Mai and the army … The Amani Leo came here 
to get the FDLR that are located 250 km away. But instead of  going there, they have 
stayed here. They have started in Makobola towards Fizi centre, there were no FDLR 
there! Yesterday the FDLR attacked the post of  FARDC in Nyange, in the border 
between Fizi and Kalembe … now, the Amani Leo have come to do what?… They 
should go. (FEDI Representative 2010)
Another NGO worker stated that the solution to the ongoing insecurity in the 
area was for all militias to demobilise or reintegrate into the army. However, he 
recognised that for the ordinary people it was the army and not the militias that 
created the main problem. He stated: ‘if  you ask the population, what do you 
want to be done here? They are going to say: that the Amani Leo go. The milita-
risation of  the area is a problem’ (Human Rights NGO Representative (no. 127) 
2010). He then continued to argue that the reason for the militarisation was the 
resistance found in the area:
There is a lot of  resistance, there are a lot of  weapons that do not come from the 
Government and that do not submit to the orders of  the Government. Yes the pres-
ence of  Amani Leo is a problem for the population, even more than the Mai Mai, but 
I think the problem of  the continuation of  the Mai Mai is an ideological and ethnic 
problem. (Human Rights NGO Representative (no. 127) 2010)
These words summarise many of  the arguments that have so far been put 
forward in this chapter. The reliance on popular militias to provide security, 
added to a sentiment that sees the state either as directly responsible for the situ-
ation or as not doing anything about it, illustrates the patterns in which resist-
ance takes place. Even if  this is seen, as the interviewee sees it, from the perspective 
of  ideology and ethnic confrontation, the reflection illustrates the popular 
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perception that the FARDC is a menace, whereas the Mai Mai militias are the 
least-bad option. Those who are not engaged directly in the militias regret the 
militarisation of  daily life. However, they generally feel more threatened by 
the FARDC and protected by the Mai Mai, with whom they have a more equal 
relationship. After all, Mai Mai combatants could be members of  their families, 
including husbands and sons.
Bunyakiri
In Bunyakiri, residents have been threatened by both the FDLR and the FARDC. 
In August 2010 (during fieldwork) the FARDC brigade stationed there had been 
able to reduce the abuses committed against the population by the previous 
brigade. However, population were still threatened by the special operations at 
the time, the Amani Leo. The cycle of  FDLR activity linked to the Amani Leo 
presence had a direct impact on displacement from areas of  cultivation and 
hence on impoverishment. Bunyakiri had turned into a sort of  ‘island of  refu-
gees’ because the FDLR had the area almost completely surrounded. There were 
often incursions into the town and many residents had been displaced or could 
not access cultivated lands (Action Pour la Paix et la Concorde 2009).
Speaking in Maibano, the Secretary General from the Chefferie of  Buloho 
pointed out several local conflicts related to land and to customary leadership. 
However, for him, the existence of  local armed groups was a direct consequence 
of  the persistence of  the FDLR in the region (Buloho Chiefdom Secretary 
General 2010).22 A local human rights organisation stated that the local Mai 
Mai groups had their own interests, but they were combating the FDLR and 
they were not there to abuse the civilian population (Voix de sans Voix Repre-
sentative 2010). Similarly, a representative from an NGO of  women survivors 
of  rape stated the situation of  threat that women faced, generated by all armed 
groups. However, she regretted that: ‘We have to live with the Amani Leo and 
we never know with which intentions they are coming’ (AFIP Representative 
2010). The sentiment she conveyed was that whereas they had an opportunity 
to react against the Mai Mai and the FDLR, even if  minimal, in front of  the 
army they felt defenceless.23
The solution against the FDLR that was brought by the Government and 
supported by MONUC/MONUSCO was for Bunyakiri residents, as for many in 
other Eastern regions of  the DRC, more of  a curse than a blessing. The Secretary 
General of  the Buloho chiefdom spoke against the FARDC strategies to fight the 
FDLR: ‘Kimya II has been a disaster, they were there to hunt the residents, their 
fields and their crops, they pillage, they destroy everything … Then they brought 
Amani Leo, which has done exactly the same, the population does not have any 
hope anymore’ (Buloho Chiefdom Secretary General 2010). This administrator 
summarised a widespread sentiment amongst residents in Bunyakiri, Bulambika 
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and Maibano.24 Most political representatives, whether administrative or cus-
tomary, expressed their regret regarding an army that was ‘a disorder’, while 
pointing out that ‘we cannot speak about it’ (Notables at Maibano 2010; Voix 
de sans Voix Representative 2010).
The situation had a direct impact on the perception residents had of  MONUC/
MONUSCO. Residents kept wondering what the role of  MONUC/MONUSCO was 
if  the FDLR’s positions were known and yet not targeted. Not surprisingly, 
rumours of  UN collaboration with the FDLR, as seen in the previous chapter, 
spread easily amongst residents. In a focus group with the youth of  Bunyakiri, 
most participants stated that they could not understand why the FDLR was 4 km 
away from the village without the UN doing anything, a situation that had 
already been like that for approximately 15 years. ‘Today’, one of  them said, ‘we 
cannot go to Bukavu as we used to without feeling threatened; our parents long 
ago stopped cultivating their lands because they have been occupied by the 
Interahamwe’ (Focus Group Young People Bunyakiri 2010). As such, they said, 
‘this situation has made people furious and as a result, some have taken up 
machetes, others rifles, in order to constitute themselves as militias of  popular 
defence’ (Focus Group Young People Bunyakiri 2010; JMAC Officer 3 2012; see 
also: Zounmenou and Kok 2012). As a matter of  fact, by March 2012 Raïa 
Mutomboki had expelled the FDLR from Bunyakiri. And although their subse-
quent activity has remained ambiguous, as a source of  self-defence, of  violent 
pursuit of  particular village interests, and as the meddling of  provincial and 
national actors, most residents still see them as a force of  their own, as a source 
of  protection and security. This was captured in several interviews. For instance, 
for a civil society representative ‘all the population has been united around them 
[Raïa Mutomboki]’ (Civil Society Representative 2014). For the Burogoya Civil 
society delegate, ‘Raïa Mutomboki are a force organised by the people and for 
the people’ (Buroyoga civil society delegate 2014). This motivation to protect 
residents from the FDLR goes hand in hand with the need to cultivate the land 
and get on with their life. In this situation, the desire for normality, to put it in 
Hibou’s terms (2011a; 2011b), is not to ‘accommodate’ to the situation of  inse-
curity and army rule, but to act upon it, even if  by violent means.
Overall, the search for protection and security is a pattern in all Mai Mai 
groups. What it shows is that the need for protection is not generated by a lack 
of  state authority, but from the ways in which state authority is asserted. 
Although some Mai Mai groups illustrate the engagement of  the civilian popula-
tion in forms of  state violence, the cases seen above, especially through the provi-
sion of  protection and security to the civilian population, represent patterns of  
resistance in a context where state-making and peacebuilding agendas neglect 
civilian protection. This becomes more clearly visible when explored alongside 
the aspirations embedded in Mai Mai ideology.
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Aspirations and agenda advancing
Rejection of, and protection from, government agendas, war and state-making 
do not stand alone; rather, they are embedded in a broader system of  ideology, 
religious beliefs and political aspirations. These include the reaffirmation of  
forms of  local political authority, political participation and land distribution. 
Although these refer explicitly to the current context, they resonate with broader 
historical, religious and cultural understandings in Congolese rural areas. The 
Mai Mai militias and their leaders, as previously noted, contextualise themselves 
in the specific traditions of  resistance against domination that have taken place 
in the DRC since colonisation. Thus, these agendas are better seen as aspirations, 
which simultaneously overlap with and reinforce elements of  rejection and 
protection.
Mai Mai militias articulate their agendas around a ‘nationalist ideology’, 
aiming for the development of  the DRC. It is based on a common reference across 
the DRC where a ‘patriotic mentality’ means acting for the well-being of  all 
Congolese. Although vague, it reflects the construction of  ideas of  social justice 
that were explored in the last chapter. The articulation of  specific political 
agendas comes with a religious armour that links cultural understandings of  
justice with historical traditions of  oppression and liberation.25 In an analysis of  
the Mai Mai groups of  the Uvira-Fizi region, the underlying prophetic and reli-
gious element of  these groups is noted:
Fizi also has numerous mistico-religious movements, where the leaders present 
themselves as local ‘gods’, porters of  messages about the liberation and emancipa-
tion of  the population. At the heart of  that society, security-wise in crisis, that mes-
sianism of  war and self-liberation is alive within the ‘armed groups’ where the core 
of  their prayers devote themselves to prophecies of  victory. Those links with the 
‘armed groups’ make of  those religious movements spaces of  popular mobilisation. 
(ADEPAE et al. 2011: 85)
This study illustrates that popular aspirations for liberation are expressed 
through religious and mystical discourses, sifting through Mai Mai ideology and 
practice. Important to Mai Mai ideology is the discourse of  ‘hatred’ against the 
‘foreigners’. As noted in previous studies of  Mai Mai militias, this needs to be 
understood not as ethnically based but, rather, as a construction of  the ‘unpat-
riotic element’ as a symbol of  oppression (Lubala Mugisho 2000: 214–16; Vlas-
senroot 2002: 130–3). The resurgence of  militia activity in the Kivus and 
elsewhere maintains these ideas.26 For instance, a representative of  Mai Mai 
Yakotumba notes:
We were convinced by our brothers in the Government that it was a nationalist 
government, but in reality, we have realised after the transition that it is a govern-
ment that just wants to capitulate the Congo, they are the thieves that want to leave 
the country in the mess it is now, only to keep pillaging … it has come in by the 
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window, it is not even a legitimate government. (Mai Mai Yakotumba Combatant 1. 
2010)
Against this, the Mai Mai’s discourse of  emancipation is simultaneously created 
by critiquing the Government for pursuing foreign agendas while locating them-
selves in a historical tradition of  resistance: ‘We want sustainable peace, not a 
peace that goes in three seconds … not a peace in servitude, a peace of  subjection 
… that, we will never allow … our kids here are resisters by birth.’27 The Govern-
ment represents for Yakotumba members this ‘fragile peace’ understood as an 
order of  submission. They are hence convinced that ‘sustainable peace’ is only 
achievable through ‘conquest and not through dialogue’. The exercise of  con-
quest is not only aimed at Baraka or Fizi, but is national in scope. ‘We want a 
responsible government for the Congo that respects human rights, brings a 
prosperous society, where we do not speak of  war any more, where there is no 
discrimination, with the aid of  god.’ As this interviewee continued to elaborate, 
the ‘national’ ideal is formulated not as a project of  expelling the foreigners, 
but as eradicating oppression and implementing development and political 
participation.
In a similar way, the actions of  ex-Mai Mai Simba/MRS and the formation 
of  Raïa Mutomboki were justified as a critique against the Government for being 
‘foreign’ and as a need to realise the population’s aspirations:
Kabila is not Congolese, they say he is from Hewabora, but we know he is not … he 
does everything opposite of  what people want … the teachers are not paid, the army 
is not paid, the public servants are not paid … there is social injustice … our politi-
cians are liars, thieves, corrupt politicians that go against the constitution.28
The constitution encapsulated popular aspirations to a certain extent, which 
explains the popular support it received: ‘People voted “yes” to the constitution, 
their aspirations are seen there, they want justice, schools, good public services …’ 
These aspirations are well captured by what this combatant called ‘the move-
ment’: ‘We aim to establish a government that is based on the ideals of  socialism, 
which promotes civic and moral education and endogenous political and eco-
nomic development for the restoration of  Congolese dignity.’ So, although Mai 
Mai militias have a local attachment and an ethnic component, their ideals go 
beyond these identities. Yet, despite this, the way in which they speak of  libera-
tion and a national agenda has been interpreted as a façade to justify criminal 
activity.
Social justice as a façade?
Some scholars, policy-makers and NGO researchers have argued that these 
motivations are just a façade. For example, Alden, Thakur and Arnold argue that 
the continuation of  militias in the DRC follows an impulse for personal enrich-
ment where Mai Mai’s discourses of  social justice are a masquerade without 
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substance (Alden et al. 2011: 15). Others argue that the real drivers for these 
militias are historical conflicts over land and customary leadership (Autesserre 
2006; 2012a). Some Mai Mai themselves have criticised the mushrooming of  
militias as an opportunistic, self-serving activity devoid of  political significance.29 
They criticise this as ‘hillism’,30 articulated as a mockery of  those who defend 
their own ‘hill’ and do not have a broader political programme for the ‘nation’. 
It is also in this vein that the ‘true’ and ‘false’ Mai Mai, the ‘warrior’ against the 
‘adventurer’31 comes in. The difference is articulated between those who ‘truly’ 
protect the population under a patriotic agenda and those who do not.
These aspirations illuminate the patterns in which resistance unfolds. 
Although existing land and ethnic-based conflicts could have caused tensions 
and even violence at earlier times, this was far from the devastating war that has 
been taking place since 1996. Additionally, as advanced in the first two chapters, 
one of  the distinct characteristics of  the DRC conflict is the challenge to the 
notion of  the local as a distinctive sphere from national and international. Rather, 
it is their co-constitution that unearths how different agendas are intertwined 
in a fluid, changing context. At times they are the most reliable security provider, 
even against the FARDC, yet at other times they are predatory and impose 
authoritarian rule. They also represent the militarised masculine version of  a 
struggle for social justice. Amidst this, it is not possible to ignore that many 
combatants blame state agendas for the militarised context and the subsequent 
political, social and economic underdevelopment. Despite these fluid bounda-
ries, the motivations underpinning Mai Mai militias and their support illustrate 
that resistance is defined by a context of  domination. Even so, examining more 
carefully to what extent popular militias have a popular membership is impera-
tive to analysing them as tools of  everyday resistance in a peacebuilding context.
The popular element in the Mai Mai militias
This book has been arguing that everyday resistance is better conceived as an 
activity of  subordinate groups. Not only is this a closer application of  the every-
day framework, but it also allows for narrowing the scope of  the concept. Addi-
tionally, the practices of  statebuilding generate violence and extraction, 
reproducing conditions of  domination, war and poverty. Nevertheless, if  Mai 
Mai militias have been used as proxies by different governments, elite factions 
and MNCs for their own agendas, it is imperative to elucidate the extent to which 
Mai Mai militias are tools for popular classes’ resistance and the extent to which 
this popular element is represented in their membership.
Additionally, when popular support is granted, it is neither unconditional 
nor generalised in any one village. It is more accurate to speak of  a tendency to 
rely on these militias to confront the army, other armed groups and advance 
security, land and political participation agendas. The fact that some of  these 
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militias represent another source of  violence and domination against the popu-
lation makes this popular support contingent. Violence remains a minority 
response in comparison with discourses and survival. Yet it is another tool in a 
broader catalogue by which subordinate classes confront everyday forms of  
domination. This section gives a brief  account of  popular support through mem-
bership and goods provisioning. It then provides a more extensive discussion 
through the analysis of  government and UN strategies to break the solidarity 
between civilians and militias.
Membership
In 2002 the UN estimated the number of  Mai Mai combatants active in the two 
Kivus to be between 20,000 and 30,000 (UN Secretary General Kofi Annan 
2002: 13). In 2009, a report by Human Rights Watch calculated that there 
remained around 22 Mai Mai groups with up to 12,000 combatants (Human 
Rights Watch 2009: 4). However, as stated in an unpublished report, a UN DDR 
action in 2010 was expecting to demobilise 28,375 Mai Mai troops only from 
South Kivu (MONUC DDR Unpublished Report cited in ADEPAE et al. 2011: 
69).32 Although voluntary membership is contested due to practices of  abduc-
tion, their members are largely young men, coming from the rural, unem-
ployed, and unschooled sectors of  the population, living with few economic 
resources.33
Additionally, although many Mai Mai militias’ leaders and original instiga-
tors are the more educated, military and notables of  particular villages, these 
are hardly representative of  the elite.34 There are exceptions, and there are also 
those groups who, like Mai Mai Yakotumba, have operated for a long time and 
through different dynamics, engaging with state representatives at different 
levels (Stearns 2013b).35 But generally, like Yakotumba himself  or Jean 
Musumbu, a local healer and spiritual leader who led the formation of  the first 
Raïa Mutomboki, these leaders do not represent state-based authority or large 
landowners (Vogel 2014a: 310). Rather, they should be seen as what Scott calls 
‘translators’ or ‘vehicles’, whose more educated position enables them to play as 
representatives (2009: 296 and 309). In a study focused on the militias of  the 
Maniema province, Amuri Misako argues that ‘the resurgence of  Mai Mai 
responds to a reinforcement of  influential ethnic groups and their elites rather 
than their replacement or insertion of  subordinated ones’ (2008: 13). However, 
for Misako this did not affect the fact that Mai Mai militias were a ‘mode of  politi-
cal participation of  rural masses’ (2008: 3). Misako also points out that the 
upsurge of  popular militias corresponds to a reorganisation of  the rural political 
space (2008: 13). As seen in the works of  Wolf  and also of  Scott, peasants’ 
political struggles and political aspirations need to be analysed in light of  their 
reliance on their own authorities and their reticence towards outsiders, whether 
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they are foreigners or nationals (cf. Wolf  1971; Scott 1985). The overwhelming 
perception gathered in interviews from representatives of  subordinate groups, 
civil society, the Government, the army and UN officials is that there is substan-
tial overlap between the civilian population and Mai Mai militias.36 This idea, it 
must be stressed, is expressed throughout the militias’ non-elite membership. 
However, it is also a fact that the non-military active population provide key 
support for the continuation of  these militias.
Provisioning: weapons, food, protection and information
Another area where popular support is visible is in the provision of  different 
goods and services for the militias to operate and survive. Although militias may 
receive incentives from deputies in Kinshasa, the bulk of  their support in terms 
of  weapons, ammunition, protection and information comes from the popular 
classes.37 Many of  these militias have also settled around mining areas and are 
now part of  networks of  resource plundering and parallel exploitation.38 
However, this is further evidence of  the overlap between the civilian population 
and popular militias. At times resources are exchanged or services are paid, 
fostering relations of  mutual support and reciprocity. These networks of  support 
and exchange represent a great challenge not only to the authority of  peace-
building but also to the DDR(RR) programmes that are at the heart of  it (UN 
Security Council 2000 and subsequent mandates).39
Weapons
Significant funding has been put towards a programme of  disarmament by 
which for every weapon the Government pays US$100 in Kinshasa and US$50 
everywhere else.40 However, these incentives have been subverted by the avail-
ability of  weapons. Many interviewees and informal interlocutors declared how 
easy it was to buy a Kalashnikov for US$30.41 The same is true of  the pro-
grammes of  demobilisation, which find it very difficult to persuade combatants 
to leave the armed groups, even with substantial economic benefits (Comité de 
Paix Representative 2010; Demobilised Combatant from Mai Mai General Dunia 
2010; Marriage 2007). The problem that resistance to disarmament poses to 
DDR programmes is that authorities believe their weapons can be handed over 
to Mai Mai combatants (Assistant Administrator to Baraka’s Civil Authority 
Representative 2010; Human Rights NGO Representative (no. 127) 2010; 
DDRRR Officer, Uvira 2010). Mai Mai Yakotumba members narrated how they 
make use of  solidarity kin and religious-based networks to access the weapons 
held by villagers (Informal Conversation with Yakotumba members 2010). 
Other Mai Mai combatants also recognised their use of  family and kin networks 
to take advantage of  trafficking in conventional weapons and to gather bamboo 
and gunpowder to fabricate their own guns (Demobilised Combatant from Mai 
Everyday violence and Mai Mai militias 
143
Mai General Dunia 2010; Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant 2 2010; Mai 
Mai Yakotumba Combatant 1 2010).
The Mai Mai do not only rely on these networks to gain access to weapons. 
They also steal them from the army and even from the UN blue helmets. As a 
Raïa Mutomboki combatant explains:
we have combat them [blue helmets] in Kamananga with machetes and hunting 
weapons calibre 12 and then we have found that in their hideouts they had ammuni-
tions and weapons from FARDC, which we have taken. Then we have carried out 
another attack against the FARDC, we combat with the weapons of  our enemies. 
(Raïa Mutomboki combatant (no. 187) 2014)
They claim to use magic formulas that protect them from dying, which enable 
them to attack the army to collect their arms. A traditional formula, giving the 
Mai Mai their name (Mai or Mayi means water in Swahili and Lingala), is based 
on the combatants bathing in water blessed by prophet Kimbangu. This bathing 
protects them from the bullets, which at the moment of  impact are turned into 
water. Another formula is the fabrication of  a potion called ‘dawa’, ‘Formula 
115’ or ‘grigri’.42 Once this potion is swallowed, it provides protection from 
death. Being under the effects of  these formulas, Mai Mai combatants would 
attack a battalion, killing its members or making them flee, and then collect their 
weapons (Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant 2 2010; Mai Mai Yakotumba 
Combatant 1 2010; Simba Mai Mai/MRS Combatant 2010).
Another source of  weapons and ammunition is illicit trafficking, mainly of  
minerals. Mai Mai Yakotumba is a case in point. Being in control of  part of  the 
coast in Lake Tanganika gives it access to Tanzania and Burundi. It has been 
known to capture boats (CCAP Representative 2010; Mfaume 2010). It also 
controls mines whose profit is used to purchase armaments (JMAC Officer 1 
2010; UN Group of  Experts 2011: 4–5). However, the transport and hiding of  
many of  these arms is carried out through networks amongst the civilian popu-
lation and not necessarily amongst combatants.
Food, protection and information
Although weaponry is fundamental for the continuation of  militias and their 
military successes, they rely on other services such as food, protection and intel-
ligence for survival and strategic planning. Militias tend to be hidden in the 
forest, although some of  their members live in the villages. Most of  the time they 
do not have the resources to set up self-sustaining camps. So, for instance, an 
NGO representative who was active in training women in self-defence in the ter-
ritory of  Kabare (South Kivu) states that ‘their enemy were the FDLR and the 
FRF … the Mai Mai [General Padiri] just came here to eat and get provisions’ 
(Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant 1 2009). Although this would be typical 
of  a family connection, the support network seems to be much greater.
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The Raïa Mutomboki counts on popular support in Bunyakiri, but many 
interviewees reflected that this support is requested when people cannot really 
grant it and ends up being obligatory or exploitative. For example, the spokes-
person for Femmes Unies stated the following:
We don’t have any problems because they don’t rape us, but they make us cook for 
them and ask our husbands to go with them, even sing for them songs of  honour. 
We have now a group organised that keeps food and supplies for them, in case they 
come. We owe them respect, most of  the time they are husbands or fathers of  our 
children, what they demand is what keeps us as a family. (Femmes Unies Representa-
tive 2014)
Buroyoga civil society delegate confirms this:
Our women suffer, especially those who can’t leave the town when the Raïa Mutom-
boki come. They demand them to go with them to help them carry their supplies or 
to cook for them. The women do that quickly because they love them inside and think 
that otherwise no one will liberate them from those who pillage, kill and rape every-
where. (Buroyoga civil society delegate 2014)
Civil Society secretary in Kichanga stated the following:
The Raïa Mutomboki come suddenly without us previously knowing, then they ask 
or oblige people to leave what they are doing to join them. They can ask you to stay 
with them for several hours or even to stay overnight. They often find us tired, after 
having worked in the fields, and then, imagine, they tell you to stay with them and 
they make you transport their supplies, sometimes up to 70 kg for 8 hours. […] we 
do that because we fear of  what can happen if  we don’t. (Civil Society Representative 
2014)
This is added to the displacement and human rights abuses that are committed 
as a result of  attacks against the FDLR or the FARDC. Still, it is not possible 
to make a clear-cut division between these Mai Mai groups and the civilian 
population.
Speaking about Fizi and Yakotumba, an NGO researcher noted that the 
strongest support Mai Mai had were from its own clans and families. ‘It is from 
here that they take what they need: provisions, munitions, information …’ 
(Human Rights NGO Representative (no. 127) 2010). However, support has to 
be bigger than the clan, by necessity. The interviewee noted that ‘they also have 
their networks from which they can send a messenger even to the heart of  the 
army to gather information’. Different services are sought, ranging from the 
closer environment of  the family to the clan, to the ethnic group, to the broader 
political, military and economic networks and other Mai Mai militias. As will be 
noted in the next chapter, these networks and exchanges are also part of  strat-
egies of  everyday survival against poverty.
A FARDC colonel in charge of  Fizi had no doubt about the solidarity and 
overlap between the Mai Mai and the population. He pointed out firstly that 
Everyday violence and Mai Mai militias 
145
Kimya II had failed because of  a lack of  support from the population, and that 
‘in fact they [the population] kept passing information to the armed groups’ 
(FARDC Colonel (no. 129) 2010). For this FARDC colonel, it was clear that ‘what 
makes the whole thing complicated is the population’, and he added ‘what 
enrages me when I see how a soldier is killed is to think, how many houses has 
he passed by to arrive there? Why has he been hidden? Why hasn’t the popula-
tion given any information?’ (FARDC Colonel (no. 129) 2010).
On the whole, Mai Mai’s strongest and most reliable support is the popula-
tion. Gradients of  support are likely to develop from the family to the clan, to the 
ethnic communities and then onto broader networks. This support, even if  it 
cannot be generalised across the whole of  the population, represents a challenge 
to the statebuilding mission. A main obstacle to inter-community dialogue and 
local peacebuilding strategies is Mai Mai’s conviction that the laying down of  
arms means subjection to the rule of  the army. Evariste Mfume from the NGO 
Solidarites de Volontaires pour l’Humanité summarised it succinctly: ‘If  the 
communities were to get together and say no to the armed groups, the problem 
would be finished … but each sees in their armed group their protector’ (2011). 
In Masisi, Bunyakiri, Fizi and Baraka, fieldwork illustrates not hatred against 
other communities but mainly fear of  the army, the FDLR and other armed 
groups (Banyamulengue Sheep Herder 2010; CCAP Representative 2010; FEDI 
Representative 2010; Fizi SOCICO Representative 2010; Gakunzi 2010). Peace 
is highly desired but there is a general distrust that the Government and the 
military can provide it. Significantly, the breaking of  ties between the civilian 
population and their armed groups lies at the heart of  many UN and government 
statebuilding strategies.
Desolidarising popular classes and Mai Mai militias
The popular support given to Mai Mai militias becomes a visible fact when we 
observe the significant resources the Government and the MONUC/MONUSCO 
invest to ‘desolidarise’ the population from the Mai Mai militias and ‘sensitize’ 
‘civil society’ to ‘accept state authority’, ‘lay down the arms’ and ‘live pacifically 
with the army’.43 UN Civil Affairs, for instance, has these ‘sensitization’ exercises 
as part of  its mandate for supporting the restoration of  state authority 
(MONUSCO Civil Affairs 2012b). ‘Since 2011’ MONUSCO Civil Affairs claims to 
have ‘reached about 7000 people in 17 different localities in North Kivu, South 
Kivu, and Ituri District’ in a ‘sensitization campaign on the rights and responsi-
bilities of  the administrative authorities and local population’ (MONUSCO Civil 
Affairs 2012a: 7). STAREC has done its own ‘sensitization forums’ throughout 
those provinces with the support of  civil society organisations (e.g. Ahoussi 
2009). STAREC sessions are done by civil society representatives because ‘people 
do not have any trust in the political class’ (Kikongo Kisimila 2010; President 
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of  Civil Society Masisi Centre 2011; SOCICO – North Kivu Representative 2010). 
Their aim is to convince people to stop supporting the armed groups, to stop 
guarding their weapons and to ‘pacifically co-habit with the army’ (SOCICO – 
North Kivu Representative 2010).
An example from Baraka and Fizi
One such ‘sensitization’ activity is the workshop organised by MONUC Civil 
Affairs in Fizi and Baraka (South Kivu) to ease the sour relationship between 
civil society (population) and the military (Participant Observation XIV 2010). 
The purpose of  this workshop is best described in the words of  the Civil Affairs 
officer in his opening speech: ‘there needs to be collaboration and cohesion 
between society and power in order to render results towards peace and stability’ 
(MONUSCO Civil Affairs Officer (no. 191) 2010). This officer is voicing not only 
the perception that people’s solidarity with the armed groups is a real impedi-
ment for the statebuilding mission, but the extent to which resistance is success-
ful in denying and subverting state agendas.
The significance of  the Fizi territory has already been noted. Aside from the 
tense relations that have developed between the Tutsi-Banyamulengue popula-
tion and the Bembe population, the 23 March agreement, by which CNDP ele-
ments integrated into the army and were spread throughout the Eastern 
provinces were also felt in this region. This military deployment fed the theories 
claiming that Rwanda would be infiltrating the army in its attempt to annex a 
part of  the Kivus. Many of  these reintegrated CNDP elements are of  Tutsi origin 
and include many who speak only Kinyarwanda.44 This situation, in addition 
to the military strategy of  scattering an utterly under-resourced and undisci-
plined army throughout the territory, has created a low-intensity war between 
the population and the military. As previously noted, this strategy entails those 
military elements living with and off  the civilian population. Although many 
brigades engage in multiple commercial activities which complement local com-
mercial networks, residents are forced to provide the military with labour, food, 
housing, sex and information, while the military are a source of  violence and 
predation.45
As such, this so-called ‘sensitization workshop’ illustrated that the military 
is perceived as an enemy by the civilian population, and that the military and 
state authorities needed ‘civil society’ in order to establish state order. The mili-
tary complained that people would side more with the Mai Mai militias than with 
them, that people would not give them information, that the population was 
hostile to them and that they did not respect authority (Participant Observation 
XIV 2010). NGOs present at the workshop complained about the military’s 
human rights abuses, including rape, arbitrary arrests, extortions, theft and 
abuse of  authority. They also complained about the fact that the military did not 
speak their language and that the population were treated like criminals, because 
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of  the perceived support for the local militias. One of  the UN officers moderating 
the sessions at one point explained what role each was supposed to play: ‘the 
army, the police and civil society all have a role to play in society under legality’; 
for example, he said, ‘the teachers must teach and not take up arms’; ‘the soldiers 
must protect the population and not steal from them’ (Participant Observation 
XIV 2010).
This workshop demonstrated two interesting factors. One was that the civil 
society/population component, represented by local NGOs and religious organi-
sations, had links to the Mai Mai militias. Two days after the workshop, members 
of  this ‘civil society’, in an attempt to show good will, passed information to the 
commander of  the area to notify him of  an incoming attack on one of  his bat-
talions. Similarly, despite the imbalance of  power, it was demonstrated that 
people retained a substantial amount of  control over what takes place on the 
ground. Army and state administrators had much to gain from the withdrawal 
of  civilian support to militias and they could obtain concrete commitments from 
the population: pass information, stop making donations, stop giving food and 
shelter to the militias. However, there were no similar commitments on the part 
of  the military and the state administrators: stop abuses, rape, robbery, abuse of  
authority and illegal tax collection. Still, the frustration of  the military and 
administrators was that without the help of  the population they could not get 
rid of  the armed groups (FARDC Colonel (no. 129) 2010; FARDC Officer (no. 
162), Baraka 2011).
The experience of  the workshop also revealed ‘civil society’ as an ambiguous 
partner for statebuilding strategies. This ambiguity has been established by 
research conducted within both policy and academic circles (DFID 2010: 56–7; 
Mac Ginty 2011: 15–17 and Ch. 8). Mac Ginty, for instance, has shown the thin 
line in Northern Ireland between ‘civil society’ and ‘armed groups’ (2011: 194). 
This is important because, whereas civil society is seen as a pillar for liberal peace 
in order to legitimise a project of  statebuilding based on good governance, civil 
society’s role in this situation is not straightforward. It can act as an antagonist 
rather than a partner.
‘People are intoxicated’
An examination of  the efforts to ‘desolidarise’ the civilian population from the 
Mai Mai militias illustrates the non-elite support for these militias and the moti-
vations behind this support. Firstly, it is possible to establish a significant overlap 
at the non-elite level of  the population, even if  the boundaries of  class, resistance 
and domination are blurred and complicated in the DRC context. Secondly, these 
efforts highlight underlying elite assumptions. Precisely because these militias 
represent the subordinate groups in society it is not uncommon to observe how 
DRC Government representatives, UN officials and NGO members, far from 
making an analysis of  people’s political agendas, think of  the Mai Mai as ‘the 
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poor’ or ‘marijuana smokers’ or just remnant ‘embers’ (Amani Leo Operations 
Officer 2010; Catholic University of  Bukavu Seminarist 2009; Heal Africa Rep-
resentative 2009; MONUSCO Political Affairs Officer (no. 63) 2010; Stearns 
2012b: para. 1). From these analyses the reasons explaining popular support 
for Mai Mai militias can be summarised in the statement of  an NGO officer: 
‘people are intoxicated’ (Human Rights NGO Representative (no. 127) 2010). 
People’s support of  the militias is seen as the action of  helpless, ignorant, 
‘lumpenproletariat’-type of  people, manipulated by politicians to fulfil their own 
interests. These assumptions illustrate elites’ hidden transcripts. Delegitimising 
and mocking the militias by denying them any political significance and linking 
them to drug use and human rights abuses is a discursive attack of  the form 
seen in the previous chapter.
Conversely, that state authority is not straightforwardly accepted resonates 
strongly with what Certeau would see as a popular mechanism that subverts 
discipline (1984: xiv). The denial of  state authority, whether symbolised in the 
rejection of  the army in Fizi, of  the MONUC/MONUSCO-backed military opera-
tions in Bunyakiri, in the self-defence mechanisms against the FDLR in Bunya-
kiri, added to the continuous provisioning for the militias, illustrates political 
choices with collective dimensions that cannot be seen as anything but forms of  
resistance.
Militarised peace, militarised authority and violent resistance
The militarisation of  peace and the dynamics of  violence in the DRC are carried 
out through both official and unofficial channels in relation to how ideals and 
practices stick, or deviate from the kind of  ideal state. Although at an official 
level strategies may attempt to concentrate the use of  legitimate violence on the 
hands of  the state, the practice of  statebuilding has achieved what Mbembe calls 
the ‘socialisation’ of  violence. For Mbembe, this means that community groups 
form their own armed groups and remain armed or ally themselves with armed 
groups as an effect of  domination and not as an action of  resistance (2001: 45 
and Ch. 2). Although Mai Mai militias represent this form of  socialisation and 
many times have become a source of  domination and violence to their own con-
stituencies, they represent a challenge to statebuilding and the broader order it is 
part of. Mai Mai militias signal self-reliance for community protection and hence 
a challenge to the discourse of  protection on which peacebuilding is premised. 
They are a vehicle towards political aspirations. These are articulated through a 
discourse of  survival, security, political participation and land distribution, 
which are equated to emancipation. Although their ongoing military activity 
reifies a militarised context that provokes further domination, Mai Mai militias 
represent an everyday form of  resistance. Not only do they generally operate in 
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typical self-defence and non-confrontational ways, but there is also significant 
overlap between the militias and the non-elite sectors of  the population. Either 
directly or in representation of  a larger constituency the Mai Mai deny or miti-
gate the actions and effects of  those that cause insecurity, which is experienced 
as a form of  domination. The cases of  Bunyakiri with the presence of  the FDLR 
and the Amani Leo troops, and Fizi with the FARDC are exemplars.
Both MONUC/MONUSCO and the Government defeat their idealised vision 
of  the state in the very praxis of  peacebuilding and state-making. The idealised 
vision of  the state, deployed in the sensitisation workshops to desolidarise the 
population from the militias, involves a civil society that demands services, an 
army that secures people and a government that provides services to the popula-
tion. That the Government and the army act as predatory armed groups and the 
fact that MONUC/MONUSCO, knowing this, still supports a strategy of  disarm-
ing the population while supporting the military strategies of  the Government 
and the army challenges the approaches by which they want to restore public 
service, order, development and peace. A significant response from the popula-
tion when flight is not possible or is unwanted is to join or support the Mai Mai 
militias.
The fact that these ‘poor marijuana smokers’ present a challenge to the 
Government lies not just in their capacity to mobilise illegal resources from 
mines or weapons. Rather, the main challenge is that they convey the sentiments 
of  a significant sector of  the population against domination and are a tool to 
protect people’s agendas of  security, political authority and land. These broader 
political agendas and not just the difficult economic circumstances they endure 
should be seen at the root of  the challenges many demobilisation programmes 
face. In conversation with a demobilisation officer, it was stated that without 
programmes providing reinsertion in to a life with enough means of  living and 
a motivating job, it was difficult to persuade combatants to return to civilian life 
(UPN-DDR Officer 2010). However, as Marriage and Hoffmann show, it is not 
just the lack of  motivating elements to return to civilian life, but the ideological 
commitments to the armed groups that demobilising strategies do not take into 
account (Hoffmann 2007; Marriage 2007).
Mai Mai militias represent a violent way of  claiming popular aspirations. 
Yet these weapons of  the weak need not to be seen as the summation of  other 
strategies, or as a step forward from the others. Rather, they need to be seen 
alongside others. Armed resistance, whether it is by supporting the Mai Mai or 
becoming a combatant should also be seen as an effect of  war and statebuilding. 
Denying and mitigating their effects while advancing alternative agendas is an 
example of  everyday resistance. The next chapter will illustrate in a similar 
manner how the context of  poverty pushes people to organise their own forms 
of  survival as well as challenging authority’s claim on the distribution of  wealth.
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NOTES
 1 Majority response in 2005 World Bank survey in ‘DRC, economic sector, Governance and 
Service Delivery’ (cited in Trefon 2007: 27).
 2 Young notes that Mulele’s rebels ‘eliminated a central government presence for some 
months in the northeast quadrant of  the country and some parts of  the Kwilu district in 
the southwest’ (Young 2002: 20; see also Ndaywel è Nziem 2009: 496–9).
 3 ADEPAE’s monograph also accounts for socio-political factors.
 4 A series of  NGO reports and monographs also illustrate this (ADEPAE et al. 2011; Morvan 
2005).
 5 Wood, Erikssen Baaz and Verweijen, Kalyvas and Bravant and Nzweve cited in Verweijen 
(2015: 173).
 6 This includes academic and policy literature, both international as well as Congolese. See 
section ‘Social justice as a façade?’ below. The Commité de Coordination des Activités pour 
la Paix (CCAP) representative coordinating the first dialogue between Banyamulengue 
and Babembe stated: ‘the problem was not the capacity of  the communities to live 
together, but the influence of  the war, the flow of  weapons into the area as well as the 
political discourses that some governments and politicians started to play with’ (CCAP 
Representative 2010).
 7 For an earlier analysis of  these two areas see Vlassenroot (2002).
 8 This is the area from where Che Guevara attempted to organise a revolutionary move-
ment with Laurent Kabila. By 2012, as Judith Verweijen points out, ‘some of  the “bri-
gades” forming part of  the larger Mai Mai movement built by Yakutumba in 2007/2008, 
operated de facto as entirely autonomous groups, and later left the movement. It concerns 
the 5th brigade under Assani Ngungu Ntamushobora, the 6th under Aoci Behekelwa and 
the 7th under Mulumba’ (Verweijen 2012).
 9 Babembe literally means Bembe people.
10 Especially the period immediately preceding the Goma Accords, as described in Chapter 
3.
11 Banyamulengue literally means people from Mulengue, in Swahili. Traditionally, this 
term has been given in South Kivu to people associated with the wave of  migrations from 
Rwanda and Burundi in the early twentieth century, who settled in the high plateaux of  
the Minembwe massif  in between the territories of  Kalehe, Mwenga and Fizi, and who 
tend to be of  a Tutsi background.
12 As seen in Chapter 3 this included the transferring of  Belgian and white-owned land to 
selected Rwandan/Tutsi who were made Congolese nationals after the changes in the 
nationality law.
13 See below the discussion on civil–military relations in Baraka.
14 Thanks to Judith Verweijen for pointing this out.
15 His real name is Joseph David Karendo Bulenda.
16 According to Kasper Hoffmann: ‘In 1999 the Mai-Mai were officially recognised as a part 
of  the Congolese army by decree of  the then president Laurent-Désiré Kabila, but their 
operations on the ground were not coordinated by Kinshasa’ (2007: 77).
17 This feeling was transmitted by all Mai Mai combatants interviewed in formal and infor-
mal conversations. According to APC representative and ex-Mai Mai Padiri combatant, 
in the case of  Bunyakiri this has been felt particularly amongst Mai Mai leaders like 
General Ziralo, General Kirikicho, Major Janvier and Colonel Sadam (APC Representative 
(no. 114) 2010; Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant 1 2009).
18 The issues raised by this combatant were shared by the 11 other Mai Mai combatants 
interviewed formally and in informal conversations. In conversation with a DDR and 
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STAREC officer, although they did not directly acknowledge lack of  payment, challenges 
for funding were raised as a challenge for demobilisation (STAREC Representative 2 2014; 
STAREC – Amani Leo Representative 2010; UPN-DDR Officer 2010).
19 Scott too notes that rural rebellions have many times been underpinned by a concern for 
security (1998: 37).
20 Illegal taxation, cattle theft, especially from Banyamulengue farmers, and recruitment of  
children, although denied by Mai Mai Yakotumba members (UN Group of  Experts 2011: 
184–7; 657 and 663).
21 During fieldwork in 2010, 12 NGO representatives were interviewed in Baraka. This 
interpretation was reflected in four interviews with MONUSCO staff  and one with UNHRC 
staff  working in Baraka, as well as by two officers working from Uvira and Bukavu, but 
with direct responsibility of  the Baraka-Fizi region. Multiple informal conversations with 
residents, local NGOs, INGOs and MONUSCO operating in Baraka also supported this 
view. See also: Alden, Thakur, and Arnold (2011: 116–17).
22 This has been shared by most interviewees in the area (APC Representative 
(no. 184) 2014; Primary School Teacher 2014; Raïa Mutomboki Combatant (no. 183) 
2014).
23 A local human rights NGO representative said that normally complaints about the army 
could go to the customary security council. However, as the military could participate, 
the extent to which residents could voice their concerns about the army were limited 
(APDHUD Representative 2010).
24 The interview took place in the form of  a public audience attended by 15 people. These 
words resonated amongst the group. This was the general sentiment gathered across the 
fieldwork in the area of  Bunyakiri, including Maibano and Bulambika. At the time, it 
included 14 interviews with residents, 5 of  which had a similar public setting. This was 
also reflected in two focus groups (Focus Group Bunyakiri Women 2010; Focus Group 
Young People Bunyakiri 2010).
25 Amuri Misako 2008 points out how prophetic religion, the syncretism of  Mai Mai mili-
tias, is part of  its radicalisation (2008: 127).
26 Militia activity is also seen in other provinces like in Ituri, Maniema, Equateur and Bas 
Congo. Mbembe argues this is across Africa (2010: 196–221).
27 Information in this paragraph comes from Mai Mai Yakotumba Combatant 1 (2010). It 
was reflected in the rest of  interviews with other Yakotumba members (Mai Mai Yako-
tumba Combatants 2–5 2010).
28 This and the following quotes come from Simba Mai Mai/MRS Combatant (2010).
29 Especially Simba Mai Mai/MRS and ex-Mai Mai Padiri. Others thought these were false 
accusations coming from the Government, MONUC/ MONUSCO and the INGOs.
30 From the French colline (small hill), they speak of  ‘collinisme’ (Simba Mai Mai/MRS 
Combatant 2010).
31 Opportunistic, motivated for self-gain or self-aggrandisement.
32 Only 1,749 attended, according to the same report.
33 Abduction and forced recruitment have been reported in Human Rights Watch 
(2008: 18); UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon (2009: 39). For an overview of  
membership see Lubala Mugisho (2000); Maindo Monga Ngonga (2007); Vlassenroot 
(2002).
34 An exception is the FRF in Minembwe, which was formed through a split in the military 
leadership. Still, many disillusioned unemployed youth in the area may have joined since 
(FARDC General (no. 146) 2010; ADEPAE et al. 2011: 47–8).
35 PARECO’s creation was helped by MP Bakungu Mithondeke; as discussed in Chapter 3, 
PARECO was co-opted by the Government to fight the CNDP (Stearns 2013c: 34).
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36 This was the view gathered from 15 government and local administration officials, 10 
military officers, 17 UN officials and two UNHCR representatives. The desolidarisation 
strategies discussed below also support this view.
37 Several MPs spoke of  these dynamics as an obstacle to ending the conflict (Goma MP 
2011; Masisi MP 1 2010; Masisi MP 2 2014).
38 E.g. Yakotumba in the Mukera, Ngandja and Milimba mines in Fizi (ADEPAE et al. 2011: 
119; see also: UN Group of  Experts 2015b).
39 From the DRC Government, there are three presidential decrees (DRC Government 2004a, 
2004b, 2004c).
40 The World Bank created a multi-million-dollar donor trust for Disarmament and Reinte-
gration that in 2009 had invested US$275 million (World Bank 2009: 1).
41 This was available information in all fieldwork locations. It was confirmed by the two 
demobilisation officers interviewed, all Mai Mai and ex-Mai Mai combatants and was 
raised in several interviews with MONUSCO and local authorities (JMAC Officer 2 2011; 
Masisi Territory Administrator 2011).
42 Dawa (medicine in Swahili) is a generic name across territories but the others are also 
used in Bunyakiri and Uvira, respectively.
43 These words are part of  the technical vocabulary of  used by MONUC/MONUSCO and 
STAREC (Ahoussi 2009; MONUSCO Civil Affairs 2012c. esp. Q.1 and 3). ‘Sensitization’ 
activities were already attempted by L. Kabila after the 1996 war and at beginning of  
1998 war (ADEPAE et al. 2011: 39–40).
44 Kinyarwanda is a Rwandese language. Some of  the elements reintegrated in the army do 
not speak the official languages of  the provinces (Swahili and French), let alone the local 
languages. I was able to observe this during my field trips in Baraka, Fizi and Masisi.
45 Some of  these issues were raised in the workshop. They came in several interviews and 
have been reported extensively as dynamics in civil/military relations (e.g. FEDI Repre-
sentative 2010; Femmes Père Saint-Simon Representative 2010; Free the Slaves 2011: 
13; Human Rights Watch 2009: 3).
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Creative survival as subversion
Solidarities and creative tactics against ‘conditions of  death’1
In the DRC, the exercise and consolidation of  state authority does not neces-sarily imply social transformation or a real commitment of  the state to impose itself  but, rather, the management of  state absences and state pres-
ences through a plurality of  authorities. Still, the patterns of  coercion and 
extraction that have followed from the 20 years of  conflict, with the different 
state-making and peacebuilding processes, determine the conditions for the con-
tinuation of  poverty on the ground. Poverty has a long and complex historical 
legacy. Nonetheless, the process of  producing state authority is part and parcel 
of  processes of  production, distribution and institutionalisation of  social hierar-
chy.2 Kankwenda notes that predation in the DRC, or, as he calls it, ‘predatoc-
racy’ is ‘as old as the country’ (2005: 10 and 17). As such, the strategies of  
resistance against the impact of  war and peacebuilding on livelihoods are 
inscribed in a long historical trajectory. Some would argue that these strategies 
are characteristic of  the material relationship between states and societies, or 
even of  the natural struggle against poverty (Ouendji 2009; Latouche 2007; 
Ward 1973).3 Although a similar argument should be made of  discursive and 
violent practices so far observed, creative survival figures prominently as an 
example of  how patterns of  resistance are recontextualised alongside changes 
in political and economic circumstances.
Peacebuilding in this sense represents a contemporary snapshot of  a histori-
cal process in which political, economic and cultural relations connect the local 
to the global. Whether resistance is exercised discursively, violently or, as will be 
explored in this chapter, as a form of  survival, it is conditioned by the way 
authority is asserted along the axis of  state absence and presence. Nonetheless, 
in this interstice, solidarity, and not just coercion and extraction, is an important 
element of  the everyday political landscape.
Creativity, as the art of  la débrouille,4 is defined here as the use of  imagina-
tion, solidarity and reciprocity to produce anything that allows or improves 
survival. Although a rumba song may have captured the concept better, 
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Figure 6.1 is also illustrative of  the ways in which creativity provides everyday 
needs.5 It is a broom made from needle-like palm leaves held together by a 
tomato can. The making of  this broom is the fruit of  a myriad of  monetary, 
symbolic and reciprocal exchanges. The final product is testimony to how Con-
golese creativity facilitates survival and that this is a collective project.6 This 
creativity is applied to the delivery of  all sorts of  services (food security, health, 
education, conflict resolution, and even national army and police provisioning). 
By taking control of  these services, subordinate classes are simultaneously 
articulating modes of  political authority and social organisation in a way that 
denies, mitigates, ‘de-totalises’ and provides alternatives to state authority 
(Bayart 1983: 119).7
This is not necessarily an attack, or a direct denial. Rather, it is a self-
regarding activity, a form of  aikido, that subverts forms of  extraction by enacting 
Figure 6.1 Home-made broom, photo taken June 2010, private dwelling, Yolo Nord, 
Kinshasa
Creative survival as subversion
155
channels of  re-appropriation. This re-appropriation provokes denial of  extrac-
tive claims and facilitates the mitigation of  the effects of  domination. Within 
these practices of  survival there are different practices and grades in the vis-
ibility of  intent. For instance, while tax evasion or defending landownership 
through armed groups could be seen as a more direct claim-regarding form of  
resistance, non-violent self-help tactics of  land seizure, negotiating the terms of  
military rule and social service and infrastructure provision could all be seen 
as self-regarding activities that subvert the effects of  poverty, appropriation and 
authoritarianism.8 Revisiting Certeau’s language, they are tactics that follow 
self-logics, they redirect wealth, re-appropriate it and defend it, subverting the 
logic of  power. This interpretation is nonetheless contested. Everyday survival 
is also the site of  structural violence, racketeering and mutual manipulations. 
The analysis of  survival as resistance does not tell a romantic story but only 
explores the dynamics of  resistance that rely on survival strategies as they 
attempt to appease or evade extraction.
This chapter is structured in four sections around the topics just mentioned. 
It first addresses these critiques as a way of  analysing how the framework applies 
to survival. The following three sections then offer examples that illustrate dif-
ferent aspects of  peacebuilding and resistance practices, starting with tax 
evasion and practices against elite land appropriation.9 Then follows a section 
illustrating the mitigation of  the authoritarian nature of  military rule through 
negotiation. This has to do with the military approach against armed groups as 
part of  the political compromises with the FDLR, CNDP and Rwanda, and as a 
palliative to state absence. The chapter finishes with a section examining various 
examples of  social service provision.
All these examples illustrate that surviving and mitigating the effects of  
dispossession are simultaneously a way to provide self-management and to 
rearticulate the social and political space. They reaffirm mechanisms of  self-
reliance and assert alternative political agendas. In all these areas, although it 
might not be explicitly stated, women take a central role, being the main service 
providers (Demobilised Mai Mai Padiri Combatant 1 2009; Peasant Union 
Member (no. 151) 2010; Yoka 2009: 11). The note on gender division should 
not be seen, especially after the preceding chapter, as a portrayal of  war-
mongering men and caring women (Elshtain 1998). Far from establishing an 
image of  women as ‘peace-makers’ and men as ‘war-mongers’, these divisions 
need to be seen as part of  the imperative of  a broader war context, determining 
labour roles through gender roles. It should also be noted that the examples 
discussed here of  taxation, land distribution, negotiating military rule and social 
service provision, are all complex areas from which one could generate volumes 
of  analysis. They have been chosen as illustrations of  the dynamics between 
peacebuilding, state-making and resistance as they pertain to the sphere of  
livelihoods and material extraction.
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Appropriation and extraction in the interstice of  state presences and absences
The reliance for survival on the débrouille has been a feature of  Congolese history. 
The response to the ‘delinquency’ of  this relatively absent state, as Kankwenda 
puts it, has been ‘the emergence of  an active and dynamic civil society, organised 
to take control of  everyday survival, education, health, neighbourhood security, 
etc’ (2005: 176). ‘People being in charge’ has a dual political value as social 
services and as political organisation (Barrios 2010: 6–9). For Mac Gaffey, for 
example, ‘through the second economy, the citizenry may not only evade civil 
obligations but also express resistance to the state and to the class which controls 
it’ (1991: 10). It follows that with the humanitarian crisis of  the different wars 
in the DRC, the economy has once again relied on people’s capacity for survival, 
reflecting the tension between necessity and resistance.
Survival has been seen as an effect of  governmentality, signalling accom-
modation, not resistance, to a successfully imposed neoliberal agenda (Chabal 
2009).10 Some have also argued that the relative absence of  the state facilitates 
the creation of  mechanisms of  domination where the state and the effects of  a 
particular political economy transcend private life (Chabal 2009; Hibou 2011b; 
see also: Meddeb 2011). Subjection, or at least, negotiation, is henceforth the 
key for surviving domination, but may not be seen as a form of  resistance.
The work of  Chabal exemplifies this view. He argues, firstly, that ‘the state 
may not be able to do what it is mandated to do but it is still vigorous enough to 
keep a check on what is being done informally’ (2009: 132). As a result, the 
state keeps a degree of  control on the ground and maintains informal networks 
of  power linked to state agents and bureaucrats. Secondly, Chabal argues that 
subordinate classes, by providing all sorts of  social services, from security to 
electricity, and hospitals to rubbish management, are actually involved in a form 
of  state extortion. ‘Civil servants’, he argues, ‘prey on those who cannot afford 
to resist them: police harass ordinary people; nurses demand bribes; teachers 
require payment; the providers of  official paperwork (ID cards, passports, market 
licences, etc.) sell their “good offices”’ (Chabal 2009: 151).
Chabal identifies what has been noted in previous chapters, that the capac-
ity of  peace strategies to claim success is the capacity of  subordinate classes 
to absorb their negative consequences. Leaving people to ‘fend for themselves’, 
whether it is rubbish collection, dealing with armed groups or sustaining the 
national army, can be viewed, within the context of  the DRC, as a mode of  
extortion only benefiting those who would otherwise be responsible for dealing 
with these things. However, the problem with Chabal’s arguments is that he 
does not afford agency to the political choices that subordinate classes make. 
This is not to say that people opt to be exploited, but to observe just this factor 
is to ignore the daily strategies of  resistance to exploitation and the capacity 
of  subordinate classes to exercise control over their circumstances.11 Whereas 
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predatory strategies are seen in many state-residual services, self-provision helps 
to placate poverty, violence and war, and to mitigate the extraction of  labour, 
land and taxes.
These strategies also create mutual obligations where ideals concerning 
what authorities should be doing provide a measure of  legitimacy. Chabal 
himself  states that:
[a]t the heart of  the politics of  belonging and partaking[,] relations of  proximity and 
reciprocity provide the foundations upon which rulers and ruled, elite and populace, 
relate to each other within and across communities [and] notions of  ethics and moral-
ity are based on the honouring of  relations of  social exchange and on how these 
relations influence the nature and conduct of  politics on the continent. (2009: 136)
Therefore ‘bartering’ puts authorities and subordinate classes on a more equal 
footing. It grants non-elites a space for subverting the relationship by imposing 
on elites the requirement to negotiate. In all of  this, as mentioned before, there 
is an element of  exploitation and abandonment. As a resident of  a Butembo 
neighbourhood put it: ‘if  we have to wait for the state, nothing gets done’ (Neigh-
bourhood Representative of  10 houses 2010). This self-management and self-
provision palliates the effects of  domination, identifying alternative political 
agendas of  food security, land and political participation. The examples provided 
in this chapter are not exhaustive; they illustrate instances of  everyday survival 
where the elements of  denial, mitigation and the advancing of  subordinates’ 
own agendas are present.
Confronting extraction, subverting distribution
State authority assertion and consolidation is done through the levying of  taxes 
and the transfer and allocation of  property rights. Despite its claim to bring order 
and stability, statebuilding brings with it a predatory effect, which is seen in the 
areas of  land property management. In the DRC, since land belongs to the state 
by law, its allocation can be arbitrary, yet remaining within the law; land links 
state administrators to multiple state institutions and private elites. Similarly, 
taxes are not only a tool for state financing but also a survival strategy for public 
servants.12 Contradictorily, the resilience of  customary and collective land 
administration, in addition to the fact that the state cannot efficiently raise taxes, 
offers an insight into how everyday creative survival denies and mitigates the 
impact that taxation and elite land distribution has on peasants’ livelihoods 
(African Development Bank 2012: 4).
Tax
Popular classes see tax collection as illegitimate. Whether in a formalised or 
informalised way, there is widespread concern that taxes are paid to enrich the 
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pockets of  the politicians.13 There is nothing unusual about this; the same patterns 
of  discourses and tax evasion could be found worldwide. However, in the DRC, 
taxes not reaching the state take on an important dimension. Those that are 
collected on the ground generate revenues, and this is illustrated by the dynam-
ics in which tax collection and tax evasion take place. The tax revenue in the 
DRC was 13.5 per cent of  total GDP in 2010 (as opposed to for instance the 25.1 
per cent of  the UK) (World Bank 2012b, 2015). According to the World Bank, 
in all countries, generally, 1 per cent of  registered tax-payers provide 70 per cent 
of  the tax revenue (International Finance Corporation 2009: 17). Thus, while 
non-elite tax contributions to the state treasury are marginal or non-existent, 
they make up the salary of  state-representatives on the ground.
Still, the way taxation works also means that there is widespread tax avoid-
ance.14 In a focus group in Butembo (North Kivu), five out of  six participants 
confirmed that they did not pay their taxes, firstly because the tax officer rarely 
came to their houses, and secondly because they felt that they did not owe any-
thing to the state (Focus Group Butembo Residents 2010). The chief  of  this 
neighbourhood stated that before they paid their taxes, the state had to fix the 
streets (only three major roads were asphalted) (Walikomba 2010). In informal 
conversations, many residents stated their refusal to pay their taxes if  they were 
not going to get anything back from them. Interestingly, the idealised version of  
the state works as a tax avoidance strategy: if  the state does not work for them, 
people will not pay the state its dues.
This was a constant in all places where fieldwork was undertaken. Conflict 
around tax seemed to be especially prevalent around small commerce, where tax 
officers are more present. In Goma, in a small survey carried out with street 
sellers, all participants confirmed that they had found ways to avoid taxation.15 
This included hiding merchandise, packing and leaving, and alternating selling 
days. In the central market at Baraka (South Kivu), sellers complained about the 
variety and cost of  the taxes. They said that the benefit they receive is too low 
and the taxes are too high. As a result, they have invented mechanisms for tax 
evasion (Baraka Market Sellers 2010). For instance, people selling the same 
products tend to gather together in the same place. They keep checking whether 
a tax officer might be coming. If  an officer arrives, several sellers of  the same 
product will go away, while one remains. This individual tells the officer that all 
the products are hers so that the tax paid is substantially lower than if  each 
person had to pay for their products separately. The result is a mutual reticence. 
Neither the tax officers nor the taxpayers are happy with the tax system, but 
they cohabit as a kind of  a stalemate. This does not mean a lack of  conflict. On 
the contrary, there is a constant ‘toing and froing’, which, in the context of  war, 
entails negotiation, but also armed confrontation.
As with the workshops organised to desolidarise the population from armed 
groups, tax payment has its own ‘sensitisation’ workshops. For example, a Civil 
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Society (SOCICO) representative in Masisi was asked by the Government to carry 
out seminars to ‘demand people to pay their taxes’; but, as he said, ‘that didn’t 
pass well through their ears’ (President of  Civil Society Masisi Centre 2011). A 
representative of  the Itinerant Traders Association in Bunyakiri spoke about the 
arbitrariness with which taxes were charged. In an exemplary instance of  nego-
tiation, he indicated that often ‘when there is a tax that traders see as unfair or 
that they cannot pay, the association speaks to the inspector or the authorities 
so that traders are relieved of  the payment’ (Bikanaba 2010). This cautious 
negotiation style was reflected in the taxation campaign started by the provincial 
government of  South Kivu. The message on a poster, displayed in one of  the 
poorest neighbourhoods in Bukavu, gently asked: ‘Dear tax-payer, pay your 
taxes and duties in order to aid your provincial Government to finance the 5 
pledges and other projects of  development.’16 As Mkandawire has shown, unpaid 
taxes are a sign of  the weakness of  the state and the success of  resistance in 
many African countries (2008: 119–20). The result is a mutual ‘arm’s length’ 
distance. The Government makes the people responsible for the lack of  develop-
ment, while people are not willing to pay taxes until they see the Government 
working for development.
However, negotiation and coercion go hand in hand. The state seeks alterna-
tive ways to finance its own presence and support elite networks, including both 
threats and the imposition of  penalties, including prison (Mukendi 2010). The 
state shares the power to levy taxation with armed groups, the army and the 
police. This kind of  taxation is often negotiated but, if  it is not accepted, it is done 
at gunpoint. The use or the threat of  violence makes this taxation difficult to 
evade and further spurs armed contestation. As an example, Table 6.1 shows 
the taxes extracted by the FARDC and Amani Leo forces.
Table 6.1 only shows estimates, from multiplying the extraction observed in 
one day by the 30 days in a month. Although these are not exact figures, extor-
tion by FARDC and Amani Leo troops has been widely reported (Global Witness 
2009: 27–30, 2010b: 8; UN Group of  Experts 2010b: p. 3 and para. 177; 2011: 
paras 301–2). However, it would be limited to conclude that the above supports 
Chabal’s arguments about successful domination. These activities should not be 
looked at from the perspective of  whether the state has been ‘successful’ in 
extracting taxes and whether resistance has been ‘successful’ in avoiding them. 
Rather, both of  these practices should be seen as ongoing dynamics. For state-
making, these dynamics entail negotiation and sharing fiscal authority; for 
resistance they mean a denial of  taxes and legitimacy to the state.
Land
To a large extent, all of  the above regarding taxation applies also to land. However, 
land has a special symbolic and historical meaning. Changes in its use and 
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Table 6.1 FARDC extortion at checkpoints in Kabare and Kasha






1 Cibingu Axe 
Kabare-Nindja
Amani Leo 13.4.10 69 2,055
2 Citende Ludaha Amani Leo 14.4.10 102 3,069
3 Kamukenge Amani Leo: 31st 8-10 
&12-14.4.10
101 3,036
4 Mulembo Amani Leo: 31st
5 Lushandja Amani Leo: 31st
6 Chez Nshembe Amani Leo: 31st
7 Biranga 10th Military Region
8 Mbalaza Kasha 10th MR: Bagira camp 23-26.4.10 24 719
9 Rugondo I Kasha 10th MR: artillery 23-26.4.10 48 1,427
10 Rugondo II Kasha 10th MR: artillery 23-26.4.10 53 1,600
11 Mogo Cirunga 10th MR: Bagira camp 15-17.4.10 55 1,637
12 Cidaho Cirunga 10th MR: Bagira camp 12-14.4.10 36 1,094
13 Kaiwaira Bugobe-Ludaha 10th MR: Bagira camp 12-15.4.10 22 660
14 Chez Chiyumpa 10th MR: Bagira camp 12-15.4.10 28 839
15 Buhanga 10th MR: Bagira camp 12-15.4.10 69 2,068
Total 18,203
Source: Oxfam International (2009: 5)
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also on the social order and identity attached to it. As such, the conflict over land 
is one not only of  livelihoods but also of  political projects. One project is based 
on community control, participation in political representation and dignified 
living; another concerns increasing land privatisation and concentration; yet 
other concerns state security and managing military and elite conflicts. These 
have been underlined by a process of  militarisation, as war has acted as a con-
veyor belt between statebuilding and changes in land tenure. Land seizure and 
allocation in the DRC have become militarised both through direct occupation 
by armed groups and by the military response these seizures have prompted. As 
with the operations of  armed groups, wars over land, and subsequent lack of  
access to land, have caused massive flight.17 Even if  the land becomes empty, it 
still fulfils a series of  statebuilding purposes: production of  revenue through its 
sale, allocation or transfer to politicians, entrepreneurs or MNCs and the produc-
tion of  shared authority. Similarly, even if  armed groups occupy land, if  they are 
sufficiently powerful, they are likely to join elite and statebuilding networks.18
Creativity has subverted elite-land distribution in three ways: as survival 
against deteriorating livelihoods, as cooperation for production and distribution 
and as a form of  negotiation with elites.19 These practices do not necessarily 
demonstrate a victory against elite-land redistribution, but they subvert the logic 
of  appropriation, mitigating its effects and serving non-elite agendas. The effect 
is also a denial of  legitimacy to elite claims, the detotalisation of  coercion, the 
imposition of  negotiation and the projection of  political alternatives. Networks 
of  proximity and kin, cooperative schemes, relying on solidarity and reciprocity, 
are often used as the ‘workers’ wig’, in Certeau’s terms. They are the foundation 
for maintaining and recreating forms of  political authority and self-organisation. 
There is a caveat to this affirmation: as the conflict over land has followed ethnic 
lines, one may argue that the elite/non-elite distinction is inadequate. This is 
partly true. However, the elite/non-elite division identifies the political and eco-
nomic status linked to land tenure, even if  social mobility makes these identities 
fluid.20 As such, without making permanent statements about who belongs 
where on the basis of  class or ethnic identity, this division gains currency because 
it illustrates the patterns in which those who hold the power to grant land access 
are resisted by those who do not.
In a study on land tenure, conflict and household land-use strategies in the 
territories of  Masisi, Lubero (North Kivu) and Walungu (South Kivu), Vlassen-
root (2006) identifies several mechanisms of  survival within a context of  
increasing dispossession and food insecurity. They go from collective responses 
such as shared production and cooperative membership to individual methods 
such as crop theft and militia membership. Table 6.2 summarises the research 
and findings.
Many of  these strategies are present in the activities of  the League of  
Women Peasants Cooperative (LOFEPACO).21 This is a federation of  peasant 
162
Everyday resistance, peacebuilding and state-making
Table 6.2 ‘Food constraints and household strategies’
Constraints to food production Constraints to food 
access
Household strategies
- Shifts in land tenure systems:
• from a system of  relative 
equality, proximity and 
mutual dependency based 
on customary chiefs to a 
system of  alliances based 
on proximity to 
Kinshasa’s authorities
• collective tenure 
increasingly privatised 
and expropriated to large 
ranches
- Limited access to land
- Crop restrictions on rental 
land
- Reduction of  plot sizes
- Conflicts over land 
ownership
- Loss of  livestock
- Other conditions:
• Decrease of  land fertility 
due to over-exploitation
• Demographic pressure
• Presence of  armed 
elements
• Pillaging of  harvests
- Reduction of  
purchasing power
- Limited availability 
of  food
- Increase in the 
amount and 
number of  taxes
- Limited access to 
markets due to 
insecurity
- Absence of  
cooperatives that 
protect merchants
- Lack of  organisation
- Pillaging of  stocks
- Degradation of  road 
network
- Destruction of  
market 
infrastructures
- Disappearance of  
microcredit systems
- Cultivation of  small 
plots in wetlands
- Shift from monoculture 
to polyculture
- Adaptation of  crop 
diversification to (lack 
of) tenure security
- Shift from agriculture to 
petty trade
- Shifts in food 
consumption patterns
- Harvest and 
consumption of  
immature crops
- Cash for work
- Joining of  farmers’ 
associations
- Cultivation on shared 
plots
- Migration to urban 
centres or mining sites
- Joining of  local militias
- Theft of  crops
Source: Adapted and edited from Vlassenroot (2006: 3. Clarifications on land tenure 
changes from pp. 6–7)
organisations for the protection of  peasant interests, but with a special regard 
for women’s issues (most organisations integrated in LOFEPACO are women 
only). According to Clarisse Ngemulo, LOFEPACO’s activity animator, the crea-
tion of  these organisations and the federation responded to a need to provide 
women with a space to deal with their specific problems. These problems 
include a sense of  disempowerment, inequality and marginalisation. In the 
Hira culture in particular, women have inferior cultural status,22 and around 
the year 2000 they decided to create a federation to reinforce the strength 
and effectiveness of  other organisations in the empowering of  women and 
peasants.23 The league facilitates exchanges and training in different domains, 
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including government lobbying. What is striking is that in the middle of  one 
of  the worst periods of  armed conflict they felt that the struggle they had 
started and the campaigning tools the cooperative was granting them became 
even more meaningful. Not only did women feel like the main targets of  war, 
but they also considered that part of  the solution to war relied on solving the 
problems of  poverty, inequality, corruption and certain customary traditions 
that kept women disadvantaged.
As such, the federation constituted an economic solution, a funding mecha-
nism against the effects of  war, a campaigning tool and a vehicle for political 
and social change.24 Its activities included the creation of  a credit cooperative, 
assuring food security, creating a seed bank and exchanging products and skills 
training. The women-only spaces promoted discussion on empowerment, self-
esteem, leadership, awareness of  land-tenure rights, customary rules and 
sexism, and what they called ‘listening spaces’. These were spaces where women 
who had been raped could be heard by other women; this has been reinforced 
by INGO funding and training and has now developed into a psychological and 
economic support for survivors of  sexual violence.25 They have organised sit-ins 
to demand the de-militarisation of  certain areas like Mangango and Beni. They 
have also been successful in allowing many widows to access land titles. This 
has been achieved through campaigning and accompanying claimants to the 
territorial administrator office.
These activities demonstrate an associative tendency when addressing 
needs and engaging in political claims. Most importantly, they demonstrate that 
the constraints imposed by the political context do not make peasants lower their 
political aspirations; instead these become imperative. Of  the six peasant coop-
eratives interviewed for this research, all emphasised that the end of  war should 
bring well-being, development, education, equality and political participation.26 
For instance, a representative of  the Union of  Peasant Cooperatives of  North 
Kivu (UCOOPANOKI), a cooperative of  farms and cultivators, said that the main 
problems they faced were the appropriation of  land by politicians, big landown-
ers and MNCs, as well as the incursions by armed groups stealing their crops.27 
Their aspirations were stated in terms of  land access, security and fair prices to 
assure life in dignity (Batenda 2010).28
Likewise, in Bukavu, the UPDI (Union Paysanne pour le Developpement 
Integral) was born in 1994 out of  peasant members feeling disempowered and 
marginalised from INGO development projects (UPDI Representative 2010). 
Although land seizures and changes in land tenure had been in place already 
under Mobutu, the war has accentuated this. Peasants feel that they are victims 
of  all parties, including politicians, armed groups and MNCs, and marginalised 
in decision-making. They see themselves as an essential part of  development, 
being at the heart of  agricultural production. Significantly, the activities of  the 
cooperatives mentioned above included a project of  food security and a project 
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of  social change. The peasants all claimed a need for empowerment and resolu-
tion of  land conflict.
Subverting logics
Extraction through taxation and elite-land distribution illustrates the mecha-
nisms whereby statebuilding and resistance could be seen simultaneously in 
direct conflict, as in conditions of  mutual reticence. The models of  private own-
ership pursued by the DRC Government and international agencies, added to the 
favoured model of  extraction whereby precarious artisanal and militarised 
mining serves large corporations but not necessarily local communities, poses a 
threat to some of  the core subsistence mechanisms that the peasantry has tra-
ditionally relied on (Global Witness 2009: 59–69). Tax levy, although not a 
source of  state income, serves other political and military purposes that foster 
the presence of  state authority. In this context, resistance delegitimises author-
ity, reduces its extractive impact and imposes negotiation. More so, resistance 
produces self-organising mechanisms that resonate with non-elite aspirations 
for social justice and alternative forms of  political authority. It is argued that 
these subversive practices follow self-regarding logics and operate as self-help 
mechanisms for re-appropriation and well-being; they are a form of  resistance 
to the modes of  accumulation. This raises the question of  the relationship 
between these forms of  resistance and peacebuilding. Peacebuilding produces 
externalities that are felt by the civilian population on the ground. An additional 
use of  survival strategies and cooperative schemes is to tame the effects of  the 
authoritarian nature of  the army. This is a direct implication of  having a strategy 
that privileges the needs of  armed groups, security and economic interests over 
the needs of  the civilian population.
Taming the military
The strategy of  scattering the army throughout the North and South Kivu 
territory serves the political compromises acquired by the military operations 
arising different negotiations such as the Goma Accords or the 23 March agree-
ment, and also the purpose of  having some form of  state authority presence. 
Despite much criticism of  the poor discipline, lack of  control and disorganisation 
of  the FARDC, the actions of  MONUC/MONUSCO have supported the Govern-
ment in what seems to be a ‘better than nothing’ approach. MONUC/MONUSCO, 
the EU and a plethora of  foreign government aid agencies have provided opera-
tional support, training and funding (MONUSCO – ISSSS/STAREC liaison Officer 
2010; STAREC – Amani Leo Representative 2010). But, aside from militarising 
the environment, which in practice is a tool for hierarchisation and the reaf-
firmation of  positions of  domination, army deployment is also an extractive 
tool. On a daily basis, the political, social and economic cost of  this military 
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deployment is assumed by local residents, particularly in rural areas. As seen 
in previous chapters, this deployment has generated resistance and met with 
discourses of  delegitimisation and armed attacks. The military’s dependence 
on the population has created an ambiguous ground on which survival tactics 
have been a way both to meet the military’s needs and to mitigate its effects. 
Notwithstanding the abuses of  the military, these tactics have subverted the 
effects of  the military presence, such that they serve the self-help logics of  the 
civilian population. Although Chabal, Hibou and Mbembe, for instance, argue 
that there is not resistance but accommodation, and even a logic of  subjection, 
the dynamics of  negotiation highlight that arrangements are contingent, thus 
allowing for redefining the limits of  domination.
In this case, the process of  negotiation taps into the logics of  reciprocity and 
creativity that sustain daily life. Militarisation and authoritarianism, imposed by 
the conditions on which the army is deployed, is ‘detotalised’ through expecta-
tions of  mutual obligation and the creation of  mutual dependency. On the one 
hand, FARDC expects the population to respect its authority, provide security 
intelligence, assume its families’ livelihood needs, supply labour and grant it 
privileges in certain economic exchanges.29 On the other hand, residents expect 
FARDC to provide them with security, policing, labour, a greater guarantee or 
even ‘official’ stamp on conflict resolution processes and reciprocity in economic 
and service exchanges. Judith Verweijen (2013), who has extensively studied 
civil–military relations, notes that exchanges and civilian expectations of  FARDC 
provision include conflict resolution, arbitration, policing, economic regulation 
and other governance practices. In terms of  conflict resolution, arbitration and 
policing, these can range from settling chief  succession or dowry disputes to 
being present at football matches and markets and prosecuting crimes such as 
cattle theft and poisoning (Verweijen 2013). FARDC’s authority becomes miti-
gated and detotalised by the process in which survival, including that of  the 
FARDC troops themselves, is better assured by reciprocity and negotiation than 
by force. In conditions of  arbitrariness and inequality, the sphere of  negotiation 
allows space for equalisation and brings a public eye to precisely the arbitrary 
and violent use of  authority.
This dual effect of  creative survival applied to civil–military relations can be 
seen in the response that the newly deployed battalion of  Amani Leo in April 
2010 had in Baraka. Arche d’Alliance Refugee Protection Supervisor, Ildefonse 
Masumbo Zongolo, relates what has been noted by many Baraka and Fizi resi-
dents: these troops were forcing the displacement of  people just in order to steal 
their goats to eat, and beating residents sometimes just to steal their mobile 
phones or money (Masumbo Zongolo 2010);30 some of  their members were even 
accused of  rape (Masumbo Zongolo 2010). The worst period, according to 
Zongolo, was between April and May 2010, which included the attack by Mai 
Mai Yakotumba in April 2010. Arche d’Alliance organised a series of  encounters 
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with these troops and with the Amani Leo commandant deployed at Baraka. 
According to Mr Zongolo, from then on the residents would be able to go to the 
commandant, tell him who had done what and the commandant would apply 
the penalty accordingly. In a primary example of  how DIY and personal recipro-
cal ties produce direct control, the victims and their representatives would come 
to verify whether those who had finally been sentenced were serving their sen-
tence. According to Mr Zongolo (2010):
Now when someone is the victim of  misbehaviour by these troops, we visit the Com-
mander and we say: ‘call in such and such because he has done so and so’ – the 
Commander applies to him maybe fifteen days of  imprisonment … then we verify 
whether he is really in the cell … we go there and may say: ‘Commander, we have 
come to give him something to eat’ – each day, because it is necessary that he gets 
his punishment.
In many ways the hierarchy here has been subverted. This does not change what 
the military still means for many residents: disorder, violence and abuses, but 
engaging with it through collaboration, networking, solidarity, exchanges and 
mutual dependency is a way of  equalising the relationship and taming the arbi-
trariness and authoritarianism of  its presence. Jane Jacobs, in her study of  public 
order, argues that order is not kept by the presence of  the police, but by the 
presence of  a multitude of  bystanders, watchers, wanderers, shoppers, sellers 
and commuters going ahead with their myriad activities (cited in Scott 1998: 
132–46). A similar argument could be made regarding the role of  creative sur-
vival strategies put in place to host and feed the troops. Their menace, disorder, 
disruption and distrust are mitigated by the same activities that are used to 
sustain family, neighbours and community. The hierarchically commanded mili-
tarising presence is subverted by making the military dependent, with a duty of  
reciprocity, on the landscape of  ‘uninstitutionalized, uncodified habits of  street-
level trust in the production of  civic order’ (Scott 1999: 280). Forms of  mitiga-
tion allow for a possible equalising of  civil/military relations. Rather than 
compliance, they signal social conflict and a rejection of  militarisation and pre-
dation by state authorities.
DIY everything
As Tollens argues, it is due to the Congolese art of  survival and their creative 
strategies that, in the midst of  one of  the worst humanitarian catastrophes since 
the Second World War, there has not been a declared famine (2004: 47). The 
home-made broom illustrated in Figure 6.1 represents that when something is 
needed, it is created. This does not apply just to everyday needs but goes as far 
as peace and reconciliation, mitigation of  armed groups’ operations and the 
army presence, and, as this section will illustrate, a variety of  social services and 
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basic infrastructure. Reciprocity, solidarity and mutual dependencies established 
through community networks, ethnic, clan or family links, cooperatives and 
other groups are channels used for survival strategies. Self-reliance takes priority 
over reliance on the Government or state authorities. Its effect, however, is the 
subversion of  extractive practices and the conditions of  poverty and violence 
inherent in the political order.
As Vlassenroot and Romkena argue:
People tried to rely on the trust of  personal relationships to compensate for the 
absence of  a functioning legal and judicial apparatus. They also tried to evade a venal 
bureaucracy and an oppressive state by operating in the second economy to find 
opportunities to better lives. This popular economy of  survival, in the end, became 
an alternative system of  economic development that completely escaped state 
control. (2007: 9)
They also note that ‘these informal structures can pose a serious constraint to 
state building as part of  reconstruction efforts’, and identify three important 
reasons (Vlassenroot and Romkena 2007: 8). Firstly, this provision undermines 
legitimacy in the eyes both of  the population and of  donors. This has a domino 
effect regarding the alternative channels sought by the population for provision, 
which include the reliance on armed groups for security provision. Secondly, it 
places both the population and the state in competition for external funding. 
Thirdly, as a consequence, donors have felt more legitimate and secure in provid-
ing funds to NGOs rather than to the state, which has contributed to an even 
weaker state presence (Vlassenroot and Romkena 2007: 8–9).
More importantly, these mechanisms of  survival entail a deeper political 
statement that resonates with a logic of  re-appropriation over political affairs. 
They signal a ‘reinvention of  order’, as Trefon (2004a) puts it, where there is a 
process of  negation of  the imposed order, a subversion of  it and a projection of  
alternative forms of  social organisation and political authority. These points are 
illustrated with the example of  electricity and the case of  Mabuku (North Kivu), 
where there is no permanent presence of  state authority.
Household and commercial electricity
Only 6 per cent of  the population in the DRC have access to electricity, although 
the DRC is an electricity exporter (EU Energy Initiative (EUEI) 2008: 1; Manson 
2010). However, Congolese residents access electricity not by demanding it from 
the Government or the Société Nationale d’Electricité (SNEL), but through self-
organising mechanisms. There are three main ways of  accessing electricity 
outside the official provision: by stealing it, by collectively sharing a generator 
or by paying a fee to a neighbour who has bought a generator. In Kinshasa, 
people in poor neighbourhoods steal electricity from the official SNEL network. 
The problem is that this source does not always work. Hence the mockery and 
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the renaming of  the state electricity provider as the ‘National Society of  Dark-
ness’.31 All of  the above strategies function to avoid government-provided ser-
vices and their consequences, including taxes. As an electrician hosting one 
generator in a neighbourhood in Goma states: ‘we don’t pay the tax for the 
electricity anymore because it is not provided, we do it ourselves’ (Cooperative 
Generator Electrician 2010). The fact that for access to electricity it is less trouble 
and more straightforward to rely on proximity channels and one’s own creativ-
ity than to engage with the government demonstrates that self-provision is 
simultaneously a political disengagement from the government.
Strategies to produce household electricity started in the North Kivu terri-
tory of  Butembo. There, residents started to create a system by which approxi-
mately every 60 houses would buy a generator together and set up their own 
electricity system. The system is basic but orderly, set up with trunks and pieces 
of  wood. One house hosts the generator and everyone contributes to the petrol, 
and electricity is generated from 6 pm to 10 pm. In Figures 6.2 and 6.3 one can 
observe how a whole electricity system has been created in which lines of  cable 
and wooden posts supply entire neighbourhoods. From Butembo this mean of  
electricity production has now expanded to other provinces.
Figure 6.2 Street view with community-built electricity lines, Butembo, photographed 
30 July 2010
Creative survival as subversion
169
Commercial electricity is done generally through an entrepreneur or a col-
lective undertaking within a household to supply the neighbourhood. Those 
who rent electricity from such an individual or household are generally small 
businesses such as hairdressers, bars and restaurants or internet cafes. Four 
households were visited that host a generator in the popular neighbourhood of  
Keshero, Goma (Figure 6.4). They reported that the cost of  the generator – 
around US$ 3,000 – is never recovered; what users pay for is the cost of  running 
it and the maintenance, although for much of  the time this is not enough. 
Entrepreneurs decide to make the investment because they require electricity for 
their own business; the fact that they can facilitate the existence of  more 
Figure 6.3 Street in Goma, self-made electrical line, photographed 27 July 2010
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businesses offers the neighbourhood more possibilities for development and 
security (Figure 6.5). The business owners interviewed reported that they paid 
a fee of  between 1,000 and 2,000 Congolese francs per day (US$1–$2), which 
is what they could afford to pay. Other forms of  energy production, such as solar 
panels, are not seen as powerful or easily available. Hence the reliance on these 
generators.
Commercial electricity provision rests on the same logic of  reciprocity and 
creativity as the household approach. Although it starts from an individual 
initiative it responds to collective needs and is not for profit. In both examples, 
the imposed conditions of  lack of  electricity and lack of  interest by the state in 
providing it are transformed into a logic of  provision, collective undertaking and 
mutual support. Both of  these forms of  delivering electricity either to the private 
households or to small businesses generate spaces for dialogue about the produc-
tion of  a public good. This opens collective spaces of  mutual support and reci-
procity that are simultaneously a space for public organising about an important 
aspect of  the neighbourhood; it avoids state taxes and state enterprises and is 
able to mitigate the lack of  electricity. In these collective spaces, people establish 
means for distribution and payment. In the case of  households, families establish 
Figure 6.4 Commercial generator, photographed 2 August 2014, Keshero, Goma
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how much they are going to spend on the generator, how much electricity they 
are going to use and how the maintenance will be done. In the case of  commer-
cial electricity, there is negotiation between the business owners and the genera-
tor owner. Although the outcome is the privatisation of  electricity, the fact that 
these mechanisms are very extended has, as a more visible effect, the multiple 
reproduction of  collective spaces of  dialogue and decision-making, redefining 
the terms of  the distribution of  a public good.
Mabuku32
Much of  this self-provision is illustrated by the town of  Mabuku, a small town 
in the territory of  Beni, North Kivu, where no official authority has a consistent 
presence. Police, intelligence officers (Agence Nationale de Renseignement) and 
administrators do not have a permanent post. The Catholic Church, the hospital 
and a school are the closest forms of  institutional authority present, in which 
the population has a direct input, even in decision-making processes. There is 
an established payment scheme for teachers, nurses and doctors, who also 
provide a loose form of  authority. For instance, the women of  the village built 
Figure 6.5 Businesses supplied by the generator, photographed 2 August 2014, Keshero, 
Goma
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the maternity wing of  the small hospital/health centre by collecting materials 
around the area and making their own bricks and renamed it ‘Maternite Yetu’ 
(Our Maternity; Figure 6.6). They also established a cooperative so that they can 
have a partnership with international organisations and thus distribute the 
money through different activities.33 Members of  the cooperative receive train-
ing, a shovel, a hoe and a machete to work on their fields, and bring their prod-
ucts to the cooperative from different villages nearby in order to trade them. They 
also contributed money to have a mill for flour.
The cases of  Mabuku and of  electricity are not isolated: this is the normal 
way that everyday life is approached across the DRC. Regarding services, others 
could be added, such as health. Health provision is a paradox because, as Zoë 
Marriage (2010) has observed, while a substantial amount of  aid goes towards 
health services in DRC, it does not address the causes of  the lack of  a health 
service in the first place. Aside from the doctors per population ratio being 0.6 
doctors per 1,000 inhabitants, infrastructures are either lacking or in very poor 
condition (Ngoma and Luzolo 2010; Participant Observation XII 2010; UN 
Population Fund 2011: 68). Funding comes from a combination of  remnants 
of  government health service, INGOs and foreign government aid funding. 
Figure 6.6 Maternity hospital, Mabuku, photographed 1 August 2010
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Patients are asked to pay for the services and ‘if  someone does not have money, 
they can bring a goat so that it can be eaten by those working on the construc-
tion site’ (Ngoma and Luzolo 2010). The same applies to staff  salaries and the 
provision of  medicines. The South Kivu provincial hospital in Bukavu works this 
way.34 State funds are unreliable and insufficient, and its management is done 
through a Catholic Church scheme, each department being managed on a daily 
basis by the doctors and nurses working at the hospital, and their ongoing 
payment relying on the contributions made by the patients (Informal Conversa-
tion with Emergency Unit Nurse, South Kivu General Hospital 2010). Similar 
schemes are found in schools, other social services and in public infrastructure, 
including road maintenance and house construction.
Infrastructural work is often done through what is called ‘Salongo’. Salongo 
has had several adaptations. It was first a ‘perversion of  a traditional custom of  
communal labor in service […] by colonial administrators to justify forced labor’ 
(Free the Slaves 2011: 13). It was then made ‘obligatory civic work’ by Mobutu 
as one-day-a-week work towards community service (Free the Slaves 2011: 13). 
Under Salongo, FARDC, armed group leaders and government authorities have 
justified forced labour, including mining, porter services, cooking and house-
work (Free the Slaves 2011: 13–14). In Butembo, it has been re-appropriated as 
a way to provide community service and improve living conditions (ADDF 2010; 
Focus Group Butembo Residents; Neighbourhood Representative of  10 houses 
2010; Walikomba 2010). In this case, the beneficiaries of  a subverted Salongo 
are those who initiate these works, and they are also those who need them or 
otherwise they would not have these services. Other times, people collectively 
decide not to do Salongo, as is the case in Mwenga, where, despite the call to all 
residents to do Salongo from 7 am to 10 am on Saturdays, they decided to con-
tinue with their own activities. In 2014 the provincial government representa-
tive visited Mwenga. People had to clear the roadsides of  vegetation but, despite 
the call by the territorial authorities to do so, people did not attend. Residents 
argued that it was the work of  the roads office to do it and that they already paid 
the tolls for it to be done (Participant Observation XXVI 2014).
Not only is the extent to which all these important services are provided and 
to which many more could be added remarkable, but so too is the extent to which 
this provision creates significant control over important social and political pro-
cesses.35 This does not mean successful evasion of  domination, but it does entail 
resistance to it. As such, these services could be seen, as Mac Gaffey noted of  
similar dynamics under Mobutu, as a ‘political option’ against ‘the interests of  
the state-based class’ (1987: 157). For Mac Gaffey, this ‘political option’ was seen 
as one where ‘people confront a predatory state which fails to provide them with 
the opportunity to earn a living wage, with a functioning economic infrastruc-
ture or with basic social services’ (1987: 157). These non-confrontational forms 
of  resistance mitigate the effects of  domination in which the production of  social 
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order and decision-making processes are re-appropriated. To retake the lan-
guage of  the MONUSCO officer cited in Chapter 2, taking over these services 
provides the ‘software’ that operationalises the ‘state’. In this case, such opera-
tionalisation is being redirected to serve people’s needs, provoking, as Vlassen-
root and Romkena argued, the undermining of  statebuilding in the process.
Conclusion: reinventing authority
The illustration at the start of  this chapter represents those survival mechanisms 
that are not only a form of  navigating a hostile environment but an activation 
of  multiple channels of  exchange and production. These create mutual depend-
encies resting on solidarity and reciprocity, and have the capacity to subvert the 
effects of  domination. As Aili Mari Tripp states, the provision of  and control over 
these services speak to a broader issue of  self-reliance and self-organisation of  
the social and political arena:
By pursuing their various survival strategies, people were not just responding to 
necessity, they were actively remoulding their own destinies. They were not only 
seeking new and innovative ways of  obtaining an income, they were consciously 
and vigorously resisting the state. In the course of  defying various anachronistic 
state policies, they were reshaping the political and economic structures that sur-
rounded them. (2003: 161)
Resistance, then, should be seen in these survival strategies as a mitigation of  
predation. And this predation is, in the eyes of  many people, mainly the respon-
sibility of  state action. In the process, as Tripp reminds us, alternative forms of  
political organisation are being created. In this sense a further argument could 
be advanced: if, as Mbembe states, Africa has been portrayed as the ‘embodiment 
of  nothingness’, we might have to rethink Africa as the embodiment of  creativ-
ity. Survival/DIY activities ‘signal renewal and creativity’ in ways that show 
‘Africa […] immeasurably more alive’ (Davidson 1992: 293).
Survival is not just a form of  accommodation or domination, but also a 
form of  subversion. Although some survival strategies are a direct denial of  a 
claim, such as evasion of  tax levies, they should be seen, following Michel de 
Certeau, as tactics that, without being intended strategies of  attack, and follow-
ing self-logics and one’s own needs, generate the possibility to subvert order. The 
intent to impose taxes and elite-land distribution is directly rejected through tax 
evasion, disobedience and multiple strategies to retain landownership and food 
security, especially through peasant cooperatives. Army deployment provokes a 
direct impact on the economic and political order. Its maintenance is externalised 
politically and economically onto the population, making the army dependent 
on the population. This dependency, alongside subtle negotiating mechanisms, 
is used by subordinate classes to tame the authoritarian rule of  the military and 
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its extractive effects. Finally, taking over all sorts of  social services and public 
infrastructure simultaneously provides opportunities for avoiding state control 
and for establishing forms of  social organisation where people participate more 
directly in decision-making processes. This may not be a ‘political threat’ as 
Maliyamkono and Bagachwa point out, ‘but they certainly pose an economic 
challenge to the official establishment’ (cited in Mac Gaffey 1991: 157). This 
challenge has a significant political dimension, since the ways in which state 
authority is resisted have embedded forms of  reinventing social organisation 
and modes of  political authority.
The chapter has addressed one of  the pillars of  statebuilding: extraction and 
wealth distribution. Although extraction in the DRC has been seen as state-
destructive rather than state-constructive, there is a certain logic to the way in 
which it is carried out (Johnson and Kayser 2005; Kankwenda 2005). It pro-
duces authority: it is not necessarily invested, nor is there a project of  turning 
popular classes into working and consuming taxpayers, but it allows for sectors 
of  the elite to retain channels of  appropriation and distribution. It is self-serving: 
these forms of  authority assertion have been examined from the point of  view 
of  the effects they have on the civilian population’s living conditions. The chapter 
has indicated three areas of  resistance through the dynamics of  state presence, 
the layer of  peacebuilding strategies and the dynamics of  state absence. These 
three areas have illustrated patterns of  responses and different characteristics 
of  how resistance unfolds.
This challenge is both theoretical and practical. On the one hand, peacebuild-
ing shows itself  to be a less peaceful and committed method to building a devel-
oped, peaceful, democratic Congo than it claims. On the other hand, it shows that 
as far as its practice on the ground contradicts subordinate classes’ aspirations, 
it is stripped of  legitimacy, attacked and subverted. Mac Ginty’s ‘tale of  two econo-
mies’ in Iraq, one official and one of  survival, reflects how, in the absence of  an 
economy that is able to serve the needs of  the population, the people go outside 
of  the official channels, subverting one of  the most important foundations of  the 
liberal peace project (2011: 15; ch. 5). In other words, creative survival mecha-
nisms prepare a fertile ground not to accept the state but to reject it.
However, the balance between reciprocities and solidarities, on the one hand, 
and violence, inequalities and hardships, on the other, demonstrates the ambigu-
ous character of  survival. Trefon points out that the reinvention of  order in Congo 
‘has been characterized by tension, conflict, violence and betrayal, as much as by 
innovative forms of  solidarity, networks, commercial accommodation and inter-
dependencies’ (2004a: 2). Daily exchanges are the target of  scams, deceits and 
chicanery. But from here important features of  resistance can be extracted that 
relate back to the themes that have been explored in the course of  this book.
The analysis of  resistance should not project onto the practices used or 
onto actors the vision of  an ethical world that characterises the actors’ own 
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aspirations. Resistance is contradictory because it is not a permanent state of  
being of  the actors concerned. Nor is it a neat succession of  events that connect 
actors’ ideas with their everyday actions and outcomes. On the contrary, seen 
from the point of  view of  the actors, resistance is a conditioned response to a 
particular context and various changing relationships. More so, the ambiguity 
of  survival as a site both of  domination and of  subversion makes resistance 
something that cannot be analysed by its strategies, nor by its outcomes. From 
the point of  view of  the everyday micro level, resistance rests more on intent, 
as Scott argued. However, this intent is gradated along a political spectrum that 
ranges from individual protection against a particular claim, to the collective 
refusal of  it, to the attack against it and the disengagement from it. More impor-
tant are the patterns created at the macro level by this variety of  actions, making 
resistance a permanent feature of  the process of  state-making.
NOTES
 1 The conditions that represent the particular relationship between sovereignty, life and 
death in Africa (cf. Mbembe 2003).
 2 See Chomsky for an interesting reflection on the role of  the state in post-war reconstruc-
tion as a vehicle for a capitalist economy (1996: Ch. 2).
 3 To say that there is a natural way of  surviving poverty resonates with Manfred Max-Neef ’s 
observation (1992) that universal strategies against poverty include being alert, creative, 
imaginative and make use of  networks of  solidarity and mutual aid. Others have reflected 
on survival strategies and state–society relations in the DRC (Lemarchand 1989; Mac 
Gaffey 1991; Roitman 1990).
 4 French for ‘survival’ or ‘to get by’. The term makes reference to Mobutu’s command in 
1973 ‘débrouillez vous’ (fend for yourself), literally meaning that the state was withdraw-
ing many social services. Other terms are also used: ‘article 15’, ‘opération qui cherche’, 
‘6e chantier’, ‘horoscope’ and ‘libanga’ (Yoka 2009: 246).
 5 Music is most representative of  creativity in the DRC. Not only is it part of  Congolese 
historical heritage in a special manner, but also it is ever present in daily life as an essential 
part of  its recreation. Music has thus particular significance in la débrouille. Arguably, 
music, even mainstream, is a tool of  political engagement rather than simple entertain-
ment (Zeleza and Eyoh 2003: 71 and 130). Note the lyrics of  a rumba song by Koffi 
Olomide: ‘Toza na systeme ya lifelo moto ekopela kasi tozo zika te (‘We are in hell. The 
fire is burning, but we don’t burn’) (cited and translated in Zeleza and Eyoh 2003: 307; 
see also: Mangwanda 2009).
 6 Note here the notion of  Jean Marc Ela (1994; 1998) whereby the ‘Africa at the bottom’ 
has a common project of  survival where solidarity is an imperative, an expression of  a 
common cause and an acknowledgement of  a common destiny. This is a different notion 
to that of  Göran Hyden’s economy of  affection (1980), where the peasantry is ‘uncap-
tured’ outside the sphere of  action of  the state by its own survival activities. On the 
contrary, it is argued, survival is an effect of  domination and resistance reflects a social 
conflict, not non-dominated spheres of  action.
 7 An exercise against the totalitarian effects of  certain forms of  authority.
 8 ‘Self ’ as both individual and collective.
Creative survival as subversion
177
 9 In order to simplify the analysis, the term elite-land appropriation will be used to refer to 
those strategies that are in the orbit of  statebuilding, including as a consequence of  the 
policy to grant ownership to land holders in detriment of  collective holdings via custom-
ary law, or as the result of  new wealth allocations and development policies. The term 
non-elite land distribution refers to peasants’ agendas, which imply collective or custom-
ary landownership, land rights and food security.
10 Chabal follows Foucault here. For Foucault, government practice had a certain rationale 
not only about what government means but about the best way to achieve it. ‘Govern-
mental ratio is what will enable a given state to arrive at its maximum being in a consid-
ered, reasoned, and calculated way. [To govern is] to arrange things so that the state 
becomes sturdy and permanent […] wealthy [and] strong in the face of  everything that 
may destroy it’ (Foucault 2008: 4).
11 As Scott argues in relation to inhabitants in the high plateaus of  ‘Zomia’, people do not 
reject ‘development’ but domination (2009: 113–15).
12 Callaghy notes that at the time of  the copper crisis in 1978, the state had already stopped 
collecting much of  its taxes in a formalised form (Callaghy 2001).
13 Cf. discourses explored in Chapter 5.
14 This interpretation resonates with other studies (Adam and Vlassenroot 2010; earlier 
studies include: Roitman 1990; Mac Gaffey 1991).
15 Small survey sampling 10 street sellers in the Boulevard Kanyamuhanga in Goma, 
including: three phone credit sellers, two tomatoes, chillies and peanut sellers, one music 
seller, three bread sellers and one photocopy maker.
16 Provincial Government of  South Kivu, Bukavu’s Kadutu neighbourhood. Poster seen on 
8 August 2010.
17 This was the tactic used, for instance, by the APR against the Interahamwe, but it has 
also been used by CNDP and the FDLR (Pillay 2010: para. 150; Andreu Merelles 2008: 
Facts 18 and 27).
18 This has been the case of  the CNDP entering the orbit of  Rwanda’s state project, and 
PARECO for the DRC Government to counter it.
19 Other responses include flight and the use of  militias. This section explores practices of  
resistance directly linked to creative survival strategies.
20 For instance, while Banyarwanda Hutu peasants had felt discriminated against by Hunde 
chiefs in Masisi through at least the beginnings of  its largest migration movement from 
Rwanda in the 1950s, they gained political and military leadership in Masisi by joining 
the CNDP under Banyarwanda elite and Rwanda’s Government (Banyarwanda meaning 
literally people of  Rwanda, which is a term traditionally used in North Kivu to denomi-
nate Kinyarwanda speakers, people of  Rwandan origin or with Rwandan ancestors). 
JMAC reports that CNDP was majority Hutu but with minority Tutsi leadership (NRC 
Representative, 2010; JMAC Officer 3 2012; Vlassenroot 2006).
21 Unless otherwise noted, the information in the following two paragraphs relies on 
Ngemulo (2010).
22 This is the ethnic community that many members of  LOFEPACO belong to. Women are 
not allowed to own land; when their husband dies, the land is redistributed by the custom-
ary chief  or through the male members of  the family (Ngemulo 2010; Walikomba 2010).
23 Their activities were focused in North Kivu and their name was in fact LOFEPANOKI. 
After 2005 they acquired a national focus, changing their name to LOFEPACO, although 
at the time of  the interview their radius of  action was still North Kivu and more so the 
Beni-Butembo axis. Maintaining a national coverage, even if  nominally, can be a way to 
have access to certain national and international funding.
24 Information in this paragraph comes from Ngemulo (2010).
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25 In particular the INGO Vredesilanden.
26 UCOONAKOPI, LOFEPACO, Association of  Manioc producers (Bunyakiri), Syndicat de 
Protection des Intêrets Paysans (Beni), UPDI and Association Nutrition Assisse Commu-
nautaire (ANAC). The first three are federations of  cooperatives operating across different 
territories within the province. UPDI and ANAC also operate as broader platforms for 
peasants to exchange products and cultivation techniques, provide community service, 
conduct lobbying activities and attract international funding. UPDI has eight coopera-
tives associated with five territories in South Kivu (Kabare, Kalehe, Walungu, Mwenga 
and Uvira), and ANAC works in Mabuku and Beni (North Kivu). This was also the senti-
ment transmitted in other interviews with peasant unions and producer associations 
(Market Sellers and Buyers of  South Kivu Representative 2010; SPIP Representative 
2011).
27 As an example, they stated that 725 hectares of  land in Kabiso (North Kivu) that belonged 
to the cooperative were threatened to be expropriated by the provincial Government. 
According to a UCOOPANOKI representative, the issue had been taken to court, but ‘the 
approximate 1000 residents were threatened to have to leave in favour of  3 or 4 new 
proprietors’. Flight normally occurs to another area where other family members can 
host them, help them to migrate to the city or attempt to work in the mines. Most farms 
belonging to the cooperative had suffered attacks from all armed groups, in particular, 
Mweso and Nyanzale (Batenda 2010).
28 Access to just prices was also raised in Bunyakiri by the Manioc Producers Association 
(Manioc Producers Association Representatives 2010).
29 Respect and intelligence became one of  the most important demands of  the FARDC to 
civil society in the MONUSCO Sensitization workshop in Fizi and Baraka to ease civil–
military relations (Participant Observation XIV 2010). How the civilian population pro-
vides for the everyday living needs of  the military was directly raised in several interviews. 
This includes cooking, helping with childcare, aid with housework to military wives or 
directly hosting them at home (ADDF Representative 2010; FARDC Colonel (no. 129) 
2010; FEDI Representative 2010; Femmes Père Saint-Simon Representative 2010; 
Manioc Producers Association Representatives 2010).
30 The interviewee did not mention that in fact the crimes committed by some FARDC 
members have amounted to crimes against humanity, condemned in 2011 by a military 
tribunal in Baraka (UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon 2010: para 13, 2011: para. 42).
31 From Société Nationale d’Electricité is called Société Nationale de l’Obscurité.
32 Unless otherwise noted the information relies on Participant Observation I (2010).
33 This included Veterinarios Sin Fronteras (VSF) and Doctors Without Borders.
34 The same staff–patient management either directly or through the mediation of  Catholic 
or Protestant Church schemes was present in Bunyakiri (South Kivu), Butembo and 
Walikale (North Kivu) and Mbandaka and Gemena (Equateur).
35 Other prominent services include rubbish collection, road repairs and house building 
(Goma’s Town Hall Representative 2010; Participant Observations IV–VII, IX and XXVI).
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Everyday resistance and everyday order in 
world politics
Despite the increasing involvement of  peacebuilding strategies in spheres of  sovereign authority after the Cold War, and despite the fact that these strategies aim to reconstitute state authority, peacebuilding continues to 
be thought of  as external to the conflicts and violent dynamics it addresses. The 
critical peace and conflict studies literature has challenged this vision, but in 
trying to understand the power dynamics in peacebuilding processes it has 
reified a binary vision by analysing these dynamics along an international–local 
axis. This vision has also reinforced the view that conflicts and their aftermaths 
relate to a different kind of  politics and history to that of  peacebuilders and 
peacebuilding. Resistance in this context is the ad hoc strategies of  multiple local 
actors towards the international peacebuilders.
Throughout this book I have argued that resistance in a peacebuilding 
context recontextualises historical practices of  mitigation and denial of  domina-
tion. This domination comes not only from the international imposition of  par-
ticular policies, but primarily from the reproduction of  coercive and extractive 
practices embedded in state-making. Peacebuilding is premised on building state 
authority as a necessary means to achieve and consolidate peace, democracy 
and development. However, practice makes these aims more of  a claim to legiti-
mate authority than a manifestation of  what is actually done. Peacebuilding’s 
everyday demonstrates that the reconstitution of  political authority after con-
flict is plural, contradictory and improvised. Everyday forms of  resistance there-
fore provide insight into the everyday practices of  institutions, norms and 
processes that operate transversally at local, national and international levels. 
This is demonstrated by how the everyday resistance strategies seen in the last 
three chapters target national and international actors as symbols of  authority. 
This is also why peacebuilding cannot be seen as an external process or actor. 
The study of  everyday resistance reveals important elements of  everyday order 
in world politics.
Lack of  attention to resistance has long provided a view of  peacebuilding as 
overpowering and monolithic in peace and conflict studies. The turn to hybridity 
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has included a focus on resistance and provided a more grounded critique of  
peacebuilding. But resistance remains under-theorised, given how subjects and 
their aims are left undefined. The everyday framework of  James Scott and Michel 
de Certeau that this book has drawn on places the agency of  resistance on sub-
ordinated subjects, on patterns in power relations and on different types of  acts 
that are context specific. In the militarised and complex context of  the DRC, 
practices that overtly challenge authority, whether discursively or physically, go 
hand in hand with practices that are covert and self-regarding, but still subver-
sive of  domination.
Theorising resistance in peacebuilding contexts is not only an important 
part of  a critical project that seeks to provide a more nuanced and realistic 
account of  peacebuilding: it is also a step forward in theorising resistance, which 
is crucial for a critical IR as a whole. This is a necessary contribution for a subject 
whose focus is primarily the study of  power. This last chapter offers a path to 
that research agenda and summarises how the book as a whole has provided a 
step in that direction.
Resistance, a relational heterogeneous practice
Xavier Guillaume notes that ‘[t]he tryptic [sic] constituted by resistance, the 
everyday and the international does not readily fit the idealized images of  the 
international: the realm of  exceptional events conducted by states and states-
men, or their proxies’ (2011: 459). As discussed in previous chapters, everyday 
forms of  resistance are the insults, mockeries and jokes; the ways in which 
violence from popular militias is used as well as how popular classes find chan-
nels of  re-appropriation and confront extraction. These are not just activities 
that take place on an everyday basis, they are a pattern. It is the realm of  
normality, against the realm of  the exceptional, as Guillaume notes, that sets 
the ground of  resistance. This does not mean that all of  what happens in these 
relations can be reduced to dynamics of  power and resistance, but that resist-
ance is found in this context. Both Scott and Certeau base their account on 
this patterned element. Even as they place other elements at the forefront of  
their analyses, such as acts and intent in the case of  Scott, and tactics in the 
case of  Certeau, they both see these as recovering meaning when they become 
a pattern and are not just random. These patterns and the power relations in 
which they are embedded give heterogeneous individual and collective acts 
political significance.
Their heterogeneity comes from the fact that they are practised according 
to opportunity and context. Resistance is context dependent, and in the coercive 
and extractive context of  the DRC it is visible in a discursive, violent and sub-
versive form. On the whole, the framework allows us to see some overarching 
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elements about subjects, objects and practices of  resistance in a way that a 
general theoretical framework can be derived, but is not fixed.
Subjecthood and agency
Regarding the subjects, the way the everyday framework is interpreted through-
out this book challenges the notion of  subjects of  resistance in the liberal peace 
debates as ‘locals’. This conceptualisation of  subjecthood and agency clashes 
with the fact that another important element in understanding what resistance 
is, at least from an everyday framework, is the material and symbolic inequalities 
that constitute relations of  domination. The resistance that both Certeau and 
Scott describe and the subjects they focus on in their works are not members of  
a privileged class, they are peasants and working classes – in general, individuals 
and collectives in a subordinated position, both materially and symbolically.
Identifying this subordinated element in resistance has several implications. 
Firstly, it narrows down the account and acknowledges that it may not be pos-
sible to account for all forms of  resistance from all actors under all circum-
stances. One of  these limitations is applying the framework to governments, 
international organisations and members of  privileged classes. This does not 
mean that elite resistance does not exist, nor does it mean that it would be impos-
sible to adapt forms of  elite resistance to this framework, although it would 
require explanation and reconfiguration of  the framework. This is because 
resistance is not simply the act of  objecting, challenging or transforming, but 
has to do with the aims and positionality of  the subjects that carry out these 
actions. Scott foresaw that relations of  resistance are simultaneously power rela-
tions (Scott 1985: 22–3, 1990: 45). In the same way that peasants, market 
sellers and cooperative members tilt at UN members and the Government for not 
doing anything about the conflict or for fuelling it, UN officers and Government 
officials launch attacks against Congolese or the ‘marijuana smokers’ for being 
lazy, uncommitted to solving their own problems and violently pursuing narrow-
minded village-related interests. The problem is that the power of  governments, 
international organisations and members of  privileged classes is not comparable 
to that of  peasants, street sellers and members of  popular classes. It is this 
element that has to be embedded into accounts of  resistance and analysed.
A second implication is that placing subjecthood and agency on subordi-
nated individuals and collectives historicises relations of  domination. Though 
the different wars have had a great impact, subordination has a longer history. 
This history reflects the social and political configuration of  a particular place 
and the dynamics that reproduce it. The everyday order in world politics, which 
impinges on this configuration, is at play here. In the DRC, inequality and vio-
lence have a history that goes from colonisation to the different regimes 
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governing the country, most prominently, Mobutu’s regime. This history has 
turned the DRC into an economy of  extraction for the world economy whereby 
the DRC produces raw materials for export, and imports manufactured con-
sumer goods. It is also a recipient of  aid and a producer of  debt repayments. The 
economic and political conditions necessary for the transformation into a service 
state and a social economy have not taken place. This is due as much to the 
Mobutu and the two Kabilas’ regimes, and the way politics function in the DRC, 
as to the everyday international order under which these regimes have operated. 
The living conditions affected by war that peacebuilding strategies have not 
improved also have to do with this longer history. These conditions are at the 
root of  resistance.
A final implication is that resistance becomes something embodied rather 
than abstract. Whether resistance requires a theory of  embodiment is another 
matter. At a minimum it requires an account of  subjecthood and agency. In the 
everyday framework, subjects of  resistance are ‘fleshed’ people with a particu-
lar experience of  subordination, with difficult or no access to decision-making 
power at the institutional level and with difficult or no access to sufficient 
means of  living. Although the hybridity literature in liberal peace debates has 
explored the impact on livelihoods, material and symbolic privileges, and inter-
secting forms of  power on individuals and groups, the tendency has been to 
theorise resistance in abstract macro-terms. This adds to a division in IR more 
generally between resistance as something public and organised, where resist-
ance is reflected in the aims of  social movements and collective transforma-
tions, as opposed to being embodied in the individuals who resist oppression on 
their own terms. Very few scholars have been able to link these two as sides of  
the same coin (Bleiker 2000; Marchand 2000; Mittelman and Chin 2000).
Object, motivations and intentions
The same way that the concept of  the local hides a great variety of  subjects and 
agencies, placing the object of  resistance on the liberal peace conceals the wider 
spectrum of  aspirations and experiences that trigger resistance. The agency of  
resistance comes out of  an alternative agenda that motivates actors to under-
take resistance acts. These may not have to do with grand ideologies, and can 
instead be as mundane as demanding greater protection or maintaining rent 
prices. On the whole, what the above reveals is that the object of  resistance has 
to do with improved conditions of  living, social justice, political and economic 
participatory democracy and access to land. It therefore has to do with long-
term political aspirations by subordinate classes though it now uses peacebuild-
ing discourse as a platform. This agenda permeates whatever practices of  
resistance are used and as such is not, as Scott argues, simply another act of  
resistance. What this means is that these practices always have an embedded 
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idea of  how things should be, and this serves both as justification and as motiva-
tion behind resistance acts.
In the DRC this ideal ‘should be’ works both as a claim to authority from 
international peacebuilders and Government and as a form of  resistance. Using 
an ideal image of  how things should be aims to hold peacebuilders to account 
against a picture of  how things are. This allows resisters to point out what 
authorities should be doing, and how conditions of  living are far from the prom-
ises of  peacebuilders and Government. The object of  resistance is visible in dis-
cursive form, but it also underpins forms of  resistance such as survival and 
re-appropriation strategies, as well as the activities of  armed groups. Motivations 
become a moral justification for disobedience and attacks.
In this sense, aims become the immediate rationale for a particular act. As 
was illustrated in previous chapters, this can be seen in not paying taxes, not 
having to give all the food to the military, or hiding the armed groups’ weapons. 
The result of  these aims is to deny and disobey authority, which are clear forms 
of  resistance. This is different to, though intertwined with, the motivation for 
these acts in the sense that they represent an ideological vision that taxes are 
unjust, or that military authority is exercised in an unjust and extractive form. 
Denying these claims, or deploying strategies to mitigate them, are also forms of  
resistance. The aims and motivations go hand in hand, and they become repre-
sentations of  the aspirations and politics of  subordinate classes.
Means, acts, practices
The means used for these objectives are infinite. That is why to simply refuse does 
not say much about resistance. When the use of  these means or the undertaking 
of  these acts becomes a practice, that is, a pattern in relations of  domination by 
members of  a subordinate class, it becomes resistance. Much emphasis has been 
placed on acts and not on the other elements of  the account. Additionally, dif-
ferent types of  acts, whether violent, overt or covert, have been seen as signs of  
different forms of  resistance. This is added to old debates about whether resist-
ance has to be intentional or can be unintentional, whether it has to be selfless 
or can be self-centred.
I have argued that means or acts can have different gradients in terms of  
intensity, visibility of  intentionality and engagement with claims. Having dif-
ferent gradients provides a solution to the problem of  gathering intent, its vis-
ibility and the diverse range of  acts. Using the differences in Certeau and Scott, 
this book established two categories of  acts: one inspired by Scott of  claim-
regarding acts; and another inspired by Certeau of  self-regarding acts. Thus, 
everyday resistance can manifest itself  as an attack or direct denial against 
authority claims in the form of  insults, mockery, armed violence or tax evasion. 
But it can also take the form of  subversion, including redefining the ideals 
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embedded in the peacebuilding discourse, using armed groups to protect oneself  
or mitigating the dominating effects of  military rule through negotiation and 
creative survival. The Scottian claim-regarding practices address elite claims 
directly. The Certeaunian ‘self-regarding’ practices identify acts that deny or 
mitigate elite claims indirectly. These acts have the self  (individual or collective) 
at the centre of  the action. By using or ignoring the claims, subjects have the 
capacity to subvert these claims. Actions like entering into negotiations with 
the military or enacting forms of  survival not only facilitate the mitigation of  
authoritarian forms of  rule and the effects of  poverty but also facilitate alterna-
tive forms of  social organisation and political authority.
Africanist scholars have objected to what they see as unambiguous inter-
pretation of  certain acts as resistance embedded in the everyday framework, and 
in particular that of  Scott. While they have provided nuanced understandings 
and critiques of  how structures of  power operate in daily life, they have also 
portrayed an image of  subjection and an imbalanced account of  power. These 
competing interpretations are not surprising, since power and resistance cannot 
be theorised with regard to independently existing facts. What has been surpris-
ing is to find a convergence of  literatures seeing ‘agency’, ‘process’, ‘complexity’ 
and ‘hybridisation’ as limiting, with a scepticism around the possibility to 
account for resistance in its own right. These divergences need to be explained.
For example, in regard to discourses and mockery in particular, Achille 
Mbembe criticises Scott, Toulabor and, more extensively, Bakhtin. In Mbembe’s 
articulation of  post-colonial political authority, mockery, derision and popular 
discourses should not be seen as tools of  the governed but as the banal dramatisa-
tion of  political power (2001: 104). For Mbembe, the way authorities become 
symbolised in jokes and derision with reference to the anus, genitals, sexual inter-
course, defecation or belching is evidence of  power’s descent to the banal, its 
usurpation of  popular discourses and its own dramatisation (2001: 108–13). 
Henceforth, derision is the domain not of  resistance against power but of  power’s 
own reproduction. Mbembe and Scott are not far from agreement. Mbembe’s point 
is that post-colonial relations are too complex and muddled to be seen through a 
prism of  categories that are based on structures that are not necessarily opposed 
but negotiated (1991b: 106). But Mbembe agrees that, despite these sophisticated 
tools of  intimate and entangled power relations, oppressive structures and their 
subversion play a constant game of  readjustment where none of  them is com-
pletely able to subject or subvert the other (1988: 217). This is not dissimilar to 
Scott’s conceptualisation of  the pose, nor to Certeau’s notion of  trickery.
Mbembe also reminds us that ‘the ways in which societies compose and 
invent themselves in the present – what we could call the creativity of  practice – is 
always ahead of  the knowledge we can ever produce about them’ (Weaver 
Shipley 2010: 654, emphasis in the original). Any practice of  resistance has to 
be understood as embedded in the practice of  everyday life, without reducing 
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daily life to a binary relation of  domination and resistance. Survival strategies 
and non-elite re-appropriation escape rigid categorisation, but they also display 
elements of  claims, denial/mitigation and agenda advancing present in relations 
of  domination. These strategies facilitate non-elite denial of  the state’s extractive 
and wealth-distributive mechanisms; they mitigate multiple daily sources of  
oppression, including the externalities of  peace strategies; and they represent 
self-organisational arrangements closer to alternative political agendas of  par-
ticipation, distribution and social service. The same way that militias are an 
effect of  state-making, understood as the continuation of  war and the militarisa-
tion of  peace, survival strategies are also an effect of  state-making. They have 
to be understood within the context of  presence and absence of  multiple author-
ities, and of  their distributive and extractive capacity.
Regarding the use of  violence, the book pointed out that Scott’s framework 
is not one of  peaceful resistance per se, but a framework to analyse the political 
significance of  these quotidian practices. Because Scott’s studies are not settled 
in a context of  war, they concentrate on relatively peaceful practices. However, 
Scott acknowledges that even within these contexts, boycotts, hit-and-run and 
guerrilla tactics are habitual (1985: 241). ‘Such low profile techniques’, Scott 
argues, ‘are admirably suited to the social structure of  the peasantry – a class 
scattered across the countryside, lacking formal organization and best equipped 
for extended, guerrilla-style, defensive campaigns of  attrition’ (1985: xvi–xvii). 
That is, despite the use of  violence, guerrilla-style tactics are not rare and 
they follow the patterns of  other practices regarding loose organisation and 
avoidance of  direct confrontation. Following Thandika Mkandawire, this book 
embraces the challenge that ‘fatally flawed and morally reprehensible though 
these movements may be, one needs to take their political roots and ideological 
cognitive components seriously, even as their banditry confounds their politi-
cal agenda’ (2008: 107). This ambiguous ground problematises the account 
of  resistance but unearths important nuances without imposing a Manichean 
vision.
The militarised context and historical dynamics of  self-reliance generate 
interesting insights into different practices, showing that not just opposition and 
attack, but also reciprocity and solidarity, are important mechanisms against 
domination. Different practices run alongside each other, affording the possibil-
ity to observe the interplay between violence, self-defence and political aspira-
tions for social justice. Even if  the same practices may give rise to different 
conclusions, this analysis establishes one way to challenge uni-vocal readings 
of  discourse, violence and survival as agencies of  subjection or evidence of  
domination.
In Certeau, violence is hardly visible, although uses of  Certeau have pro-
voked different readings of  the relationship between the framework, resistance 
and violence (Mitchell 2011a; Richmond 2011a). Everyday forms of  resistance 
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establish a framework to understand that the tendency to enact non-
confrontational and unorganised self-help practices against everyday forms of  
domination is connected to the ability these methods have to avoid repression. 
Different practices need to be seen alongside and in relation to the political 
context in which they are embedded.
None of  these elements, regarding the subjects, object and means, nor the 
intensity and visibility with which they operate, is free of  ambiguity. One of  the 
advantages of  the everyday framework is its capacity to visualise its own limita-
tions and the complex relation between reality and interpretation. The fact that 
resistance and domination do not speak of  permanent states of  being but of  an 
ongoing, changing relation requires theorising relations of  domination in refer-
ence to their fluid boundaries. Daily life and its political context cannot be 
accounted for only by reference to a relation of  domination and resistance. 
However, taking resistance out for being too ambiguous is to take out an essen-
tial part of  power relations and everyday life. This book is evidence that resist-
ance is not only relevant, it is a necessary category in our understanding of  
reality. Resistance, as Scott argues, is a prosaic presence. This is visible in the 
DRC, as in other peacebuilding contexts. Yet it is precisely this prosaicness that 
requires from us an examination of  the practices of  peacebuilding through 
practices of  state-making to understand the longer history from which resist-
ance comes.
War and peace between coercion and extraction
Since the end of  the Second World War, collective security has been articulated 
to prevent conflicts and threats from degenerating into the two world wars expe-
rienced in the first half  of  the twentieth century. Nevertheless, its practice has 
never been without challenges and contradictions. If  interventions during the 
second half  of  the twentieth century were almost paralysed due to the Cold War, 
interventions at the turn of  the twenty-first century have also suffered from 
aiming at transforming state authority while lacking sufficient means and clash-
ing with other agendas. In the DRC, the granting of  the monopoly of  legitimate 
violence to the state, so central to peacebuilding, has been a constant source of  
the reproduction of  violence. However, due to peacebuilding’s capacity to exter-
nalise blame and claim the authority to continue operating, the strategy has not 
changed.
Bourdieu observes that history forecloses the multiple possibilities it brings. 
He notes that, at one particular time, it would have been possible not to develop 
nuclear energy, or to enact a fairer system of  property law. Once these policies 
are established, however, they are seen as irreversible and unthinkable otherwise 
(Bourdieu 2014: 164–5). The consequence of  an international system that rests 
on state authority means that any threats to states are a threat to the entire 
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system. State-making becomes the only alternative to war and insecurity, even 
if  core aspects of  it are a cause of  instability.
Defining the problem and its solution is thus evidence of  the authority 
peacebuilders exercise. Yet, in the context of  an African country, it also proves 
Africa’s paradigmatic status as ‘an object of  experimentation’ (Mbembe 2001: 
2). In so far as ‘Africa stands out as the supreme receptacle of  the West’s obses-
sion with, and circular discourse about, the facts of  “absence,” “lack,” and 
“non-being,”’ it is also a paradigmatic target of  interventions and policies that 
‘through a process of  domestication and training, bring the African to where he 
or she can enjoy a fully human life’ (Mbembe 2001: 1–2). The DRC was in fact 
one of  the first cases in which statebuilding was attempted, and scholars have 
seen in new policy more of  a discourse than a real undertaking (Chandler 
2010a). They have linked the goals of  these strategies to the broader global 
governance agenda, whose aims, as Duffield (2007) points out, are not the 
improvement of  institutions and conditions of  living for Global South residents, 
but the protection of  Global Northerners from the perceived problems of  the 
so-called South.
The outcome of  over 15 years of  peacebuilding in the DRC has not been the 
reconstruction of  a democratic state but the continuation of  patronage and 
violence (ISSSS 2013). In this sense, peacebuilding becomes a claim to legiti-
mate authority to deploy a series of  policies that reflect more on discourse than 
on their real outcomes. Yet its everyday practices are important to analyse, as 
they provide us with an understanding about how these policies have in fact 
reproduced issues they wanted to solve. In addition, and more importantly in 
our case, they help us to better understand resistance.
Drawing on a critical reading of  Weberian historical sociology and through 
the analysis of  critical Africanist scholars on the nature of  political authority in 
Africa, the book presents state-making as defined by the practices of  coercion, 
accumulation and legitimacy claiming. This does not fit a narrative of  centrali-
sation and institutionalisation, but it reflects patterns of  violence and wealth 
management as sources of  state authority. Following contemporary Weberian 
scholars, it is evident that states are far from the ideal image of  organised coher-
ent institutions depicted in peacebuilding policies (Mann 1993; Tilly 1990). 
Authority is drawn from the combination of  the use of  force and the negotiation 
of  multiple public and private interests coming from inside and outside the state. 
Violence and extraction play a fundamental role in the distribution of  power, 
privilege and wealth.
As discussed, the African state maintains an extractive and violent structure 
but this is not because African states have not made it yet, or because African 
leaders are particularly corrupt individuals. It is the combination of  a series of  
historical events that go hand in hand with, or even ahead of, world history 
(Comaroff  and Comaroff  2012). Although the book did not have the chance to 
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deeply analyse the history of  the DRC and common features of  the African con-
tinent, it has pointed out that there are historical factors which need to be taken 
into account to understand the nature of  contemporary states and wars in the 
continent. These include how independence largely enforced a colonial state, 
albeit with native leaders (Davidson 1992). They also include how the Cold War 
hijacked the processes of  socialisation and democratisation of  African states: 
either as violent confrontations like those in Angola and Mozambique, or as the 
quashing of  transition processes such as those in the DRC and Burkina Faso. 
Added to the authoritarian regimes and economic crises of  the Cold War, devel-
opment strategies, and in particular the SAPs, made states go through a process 
of  adjustment, privatisation and the dismantling of  public institutions, with 
little left over for social services and infrastructure. The democratic aspirations 
that came with the end of  the Cold War were shattered by wars and crises. The 
wars of  the post-Cold War period in Africa should be seen in the longer patterns 
of  Africa’s relations with the world as well as with its own history.
The problem is that the view of  peacebuilding and its actors as external to 
this history maintains a vision of  issues in a country like the DRC as endogenous. 
This partial view ends up primarily focusing on the format rather than on the 
content. It targets so-called neopatrimonialism and personalised forms of  gov-
ernance, leaving untouched the terms of  trade, of  debt, of  investments and 
distribution which contribute to the violent and extractive nature of  the Congo-
lese state. In fact, peacebuilding/statebuilding strategies have themselves entered 
logics of  informal shared governance arrangements. Even though the peace-
building discourse generates important dynamics regarding the ‘pose’ state-
builders need to legitimise their actions, assertion of  state authority is linked to 
power-sharing agreements between warring parties, military strategies and 
political compromises. These include shared coercive and extractive capacity 
with foreign countries, state and non-state actors. The DRC case illustrates that 
state authority is seen as paramount to other post-conflict strategies like democ-
ratisation, economic reconstruction and even peace. However, it also illustrates 
that state authority may be represented, mediated, shared or compromised by 
other institutions, actors and even other competing state authorities.
This sociological understanding of  peacebuilding goes beyond the hybridity 
accounts. It analyses how macro, micro, present and historical dynamics inter-
relate with patterns of  continuity and change. In this book, it has offered the 
possibility to identify resistance practices, not only as part of  the complex pro-
cesses and agencies that mould and hybridise peacebuilding, but as part of  a 
distinct relationship emerging from practices of  appropriation and violence in 
state-making. This is not a single homogeneous process, but should be seen as a 
series of  intersecting, improvised and second agendas that come into place from 
myriad of  actors, whether local, national, regional or international. There are 
therefore many and not one state-making processes. The commonplace nature 
Resistance and everyday order in world politics
189
of  resistance in state–society relations has also shown the need to ‘pay attention 
to micro-developments that are often governed by contingency but taking care 
to place these within broader patterns of  historical development’ (Hobson, 
Lawson, and Rosenberg 2010: 3360). The value of  studying practices is to 
facilitate a study at the intersection of  these divides across time and space.
Statebuilding has come as a priority and will succeed,whatever other liberal 
goals came in the liberal peace package. For Hameiri (2014), for instance, this 
is because forms of  regulatory statehood have emerged in which states need to 
fulfil a series of  international goals relating to risk management. This does not 
make statebuilding any more real in the form of  actually building state institu-
tions, but in the form of  assuring the fulfilment of  certain functions in regard to 
global security policies. However, as he also argues, this will create the contradic-
tions that we have already seen with the Arab Spring and other uprisings. State-
building interventions create a tension between the way they diffuse state power 
while strengthening the executive branch of  the state, and the popular demands 
for participation and equality (Hameiri 2014: 328–9). We may find here again 
the contradiction that Aimé Césaire has already seen. He accused colonial 
powers of  ‘holding things back’ while ‘the colonized want[ed] to move forward’ 
(2000: 46). He pointed out at the time that ‘it is the indigenous peoples of  Africa 
and Asia who are demanding schools, and colonialist Europe which refuses 
them; that it is the African who is asking for ports and roads, and colonialist 
Europe which is niggardly on this score’ (Césaire 2000: 46). The point is, as Scott 
and others have noticed, that once the promises are laid out, the ground is open 
for confrontation (Gilroy 1993: 134; Scott 1985).
Notwithstanding that, as Hameiri rightly points out, statebuilding is not 
likely to dissipate but, rather, will continue to play a global regulating role; it is 
also likely to continue losing legitimacy as the cornerstone for democracy, peace 
and development. The way popular classes interpret their rights is sharply at 
odds with the rhetoric and the practice of  interventions and the broader function 
that states serve in the global political economy. What a sociological approach 
to peacebuilding and statebuilding explains is precisely why statebuilding will 
continue its course, despite suffering a crisis of  legitimacy. Although legitimacy 
has been seen as indispensable for statebuilding, this is only limited, and instead 
must be seen in relation to the practices of  coercion and extraction that maintain 
everyday order.
War and political transformations in central Africa and the Great Lakes region
Fanon’s view of  the Congo as Africa’s revolver’s trigger still holds. However, as 
put by Kankwenda, it is not because Congo bears Africa’s military’s weight, but 
because it has the capacity to mobilise it (2005: 362). The 1996–97 war is a 
perfect example. The ousting of  Mobutu triggered an even larger and longer war 
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of  continental proportions. In the same way that Europe and the world changed 
with the Second World War, Africa’s World War signalled significant transfor-
mations for the central and Great Lakes regions and the African continent at 
large. Firstly, Africa’s World War consolidated a series of  hegemonic centres in 
Angola, South Africa and what Mbembe calls the new military principalities of  
Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi (2000a: 277). While there is a certain balance 
of  power between them, the different conflicts of  the DRC since the mid-1990s 
have proved that these regimes are willing to use violence in order to secure their 
interests in the region. Secondly, the policies that were tested as a result of  the 
1996 war and the ones that followed, based on the neoliberal reconstruction of  
the state, have not returned to the 1960s development policies where investment 
was channelled largely through the state (Moyo 2009: 14–5). They have fur-
thered a policy of  private investment, which has deepened forms of  private 
governance and shared sovereignty, weakening rather than strengthening the 
state (Abrahamsen and Williams 2009; Hönke 2010). The coming of  new 
players like China and India has also meant that regimes such as the DRC have 
been able to bypass much of  the terms embedded in the conditionality of  good 
governance policy. Still, that has not changed the fact that wealth has continued 
to funnel upwards and outwards. As Prunier notes (2009), these new commer-
cial trading actors are added to the dynamics of  the US war on terror and the 
interest in new discoveries of  oil in the Great Lakes and in the Guinea gulf. 
Thirdly, the war signalled African societies’ long-standing struggle for democra-
tisation and freedom, renewed at the end of  the Cold War. As Prunier also notes, 
no one thought that the 1989 revolutions in Europe would end up affecting 
Africa, but they did (2009: xxxii). The end of  the Cold War was not only a change 
in the geopolitics of  aid and political alliances, it was also an opportunity for 
many in Africa to demand from their own elites and the external powers that 
sustained them the democratic changes that the end of  the Cold War promised. 
In the words of  Christopher Clapham:
Even though the spectacular collapse of  the Soviet bloc and the end of  the Cold War 
created powerful international pressures for democratisation, these have had so 
much apparent influence because they have been able to interact with a favourable 
internal climate. In many ways, indeed, a process analogous to that which led to the 
collapse of  communism has been taking place inside many African states. This has 
notably involved the failure of  state-centred ‘development’. It was always, no doubt, 
optimistic to suppose that the relatively feeble structures and ideologies of  post-
independence statehood would be able to mould the societies which they governed 
in the ways that their leaders hoped … From the later 1970s, however, they started 
to be challenged in earnest, a challenge which has aptly been described by Jean- 
François Bayart as ‘the revenge of  African societies’. In all manner of  ways, the 
suppressed and apparently docile institutions of  the governed started to subvert and 
in some cases to demolish the states that had been imposed on them. (1993: 430)
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All of  these factors make Prunier (2009) connect the conflict not just with 
its past, but with the process of  transformation that Africa as a whole is under-
going in the form of  a second modernity. Yet the tendency to study Africa as a 
case of  neglect, war and desperation has been prominent in articulating the 
causes of  conflict and in neglecting an account of  politics and resistance. This 
has been largely due to the paradigm of  the failed state. The conflicts in the DRC 
have been seen as taking place under the guise of  ethnicity, greed and misman-
agement. The three major explanatory approaches to the conflict explored in 
this book (the resource wars, the localist and the regionalist approaches) are 
underpinned by the vision of  the state as failed or embroidered in neopatrimo-
nial dynamics that prevent it from turning into an accountable legitimate 
institution. Each of  these explanations highlights important dynamics of  the 
conflict, whether the impact of  the exploitation of  natural resources, the rele-
vance of  land and identity at the level of  village politics or the impact 
of  the politics of  the region. However, none of  these dynamics is autonomous 
from the others. Nor can they be seen as delinked from the longer history of  the 
DRC and Africa, or in a way that portrays land and identity as historically 
unchanged and fixed.
In focusing on different forms of  resistance, this book has attempted 
to highlight an important dynamic of  the conflict that has been largely under-
mined. As argued, the war awakened a latent desire for change. This did not 
trigger the formation of  large social movements, although it did trigger the 
self-management of  many villages under self-defence militias. The problem 
is that these militias have not been an example of  ethical struggle or man-
agement. Scholars and policy-makers alike have denied a political element to 
many of  these forms of  resistance. And yet, as conflict in the DRC continues, 
a political response to the different actors, including popular classes, is an 
imperative.
Interestingly, the challenge posed by the context of  peacebuilding and the 
DRC highlighted a convergence of  several literatures with implications for the 
study of  resistance. To liberal peace debates and the political sociology literature 
on statebuilding, it has highlighted the importance of  accounting for the prac-
tices of  accumulation and coercion embedded in state-making. Resistance in 
these literatures needs to find a place in its own right, rather than being an 
instrument for hybridising or moulding liberal interventions. Regarding peace-
building, the DRC illustrates the reconstruction of  state authority as mediated 
by different national, international, state and non-state actors. This mediation 
has fostered the pursuit of  state security agendas through formulas of  shared 
sovereignty, proxy wars through militias and a militarisation of  extractive capac-
ity. These formulas have created a contradiction between the aim of  reconstitut-
ing state authority and the aim of  furthering peace. This contradiction responds 
partly to accommodate the interests of  Rwanda and allies in the region, as well 
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as to the perception that the instability of  the region is primarily due to the DRC 
as a failed state.
It is difficult to ascertain what the future of  the DRC will look, but it is pos-
sible to see several transformations and continuities in the short term. Firstly, 
this context will be marked by a broader transformation that the entire region 
is undergoing, as Prunier has identified. However, the new modernising process 
has not only governments, investors and power dynamics as main actors, but 
also newly created social movements representing a trend in Africa and the 
world at large. Although we know more about Tunisia, Tahir Square or 
the Occupy movement, similar social movements across Africa have been at the 
forefront of  a series of  uprisings since the mid-2000s (Branch and Mampilly 
2015). One of  the characteristics of  these movements is that they aim at deep 
social transformations rather than being focused on single-issue campaigns. The 
DRC has been part of  this wave, with organisations like the Lutte pour le Change-
ment (LUCHA), created in Goma in 2012, or the movement Filimbi, created in 
2015 (Iñiguez de Heredia 2014; Telema 2015). They are largely urban youth 
movements demanding political reform, democracy, development and social 
justice. These and other traditional civil society organisations have been at the 
forefront of  a campaign demanding President Kabila to step down at the end of  
his mandate in November 2016.
The DRC constitution allows for the renewal of  the president’s mandate only 
once, therefore Kabila cannot run for a third term. Rather than clearly stating 
that he will abide by the constitution and that he will organise presidential elec-
tions by the date they are due, Kabila has been creating a chaotic situation in 
what looks like a bid to stay in power, with massive protests in January 2015 
after his decision to redo the census (Guardian 2015). Although these protests 
managed to stop what would have meant the delay of  elections for over three 
years, repression against dissidents and critics has continued. Members of  the 
opposition, youth groups, civil society and journalists have been arrested without 
judicial process, placed in isolation regimes, are currently disappeared or have 
had to seek exile (Amnesty International 2015; Boisselet 2015). Kabila’s call for 
a dialogue with the opposition has been rejected as a manoeuvre to delay elec-
tions. The issue is that unless Kabila states openly his commitment to step down, 
a crisis is likely to ensue. Whether this will end up in a Burkina-Faso-type of  
scenario, where the government will be ousted after a short popular uprising, or 
there will be a Burundi-type scenario, where the country will experience another 
period of  conflict and repression, is yet to be seen.
What we do know is that there are still parts of  the DRC suffering from 
armed conflict, and a crisis like this will only fuel it. In any case, none of  these 
transformations is likely to change the patterns in conflict, failed negotiations 
and military strategies that we have seen in the last 10 years and that have been 
unable to put a stop to the conflict. Neither are we likely to see a change in those 
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longer patterns of  extraction and coercion that prevent social justice in the DRC. 
After over 15 years of  peacebuilding strategies and two decades of  conflict, the 
DRC, its neighbours and popular militias are yet to establish real political nego-
tiations. These have also been undermined by international donors’ disregard 
for regional politics and by an increasingly authoritarian Congolese state. In the 
short term, meaningful political negotiations could address immediate demands 
regarding the proxy wars taking place, the policy towards refugees and the 
opening of  a dialogue around land and representation. In the long term, these 
will be far from addressing the demands for participation and dignity of  the 
popular classes in the DRC. The context is thus a continued trigger factor for 
everyday forms of  resistance, whether violent or non-violent, and eventually, as 
we are starting to see, a pathway to greater social movements.
Reflections and openings
The focus on resistance is a way of  opening a debate. Embracing its ambiguities 
and complexities entails entering a multidisciplinary and long-standing intel-
lectual discussion. The study of  resistance is just beginning to be established as 
an integral part of  debates in post-conflict statebuilding and peacebuilding. A 
first step has been to establish that exploring resistance is an important part of  
providing a more nuanced, realistic and critical account of  peacebuilding. The 
next step therefore is to have a more nuanced and critical account of  resistance. 
This book has provided the ground for such an account and argued which core 
elements it should be concerned with. Different avenues may come to light with 
the comparison of  more case studies, or with a comparison with other frame-
works. There is ample scope to compare how more overt and organised practices 
of  resistance relate to the more covert and uncoordinated ones under different 
frameworks. This has to do not just with the particular conceptual standpoint 
used to account for resistance, but also, with the need to gradate and categorise 
its practices.
The focus on resistance in the liberal peace debates has implications for how 
resistance is theorised in IR. As in the liberal peace debates, in IR, despite signifi-
cant attention to resistance, there have been few attempts to systematically 
theorise it (Bleiker 2000; Marchand 2000; Mittelman and Chin 2000). Rich-
mond has attempted to make this connection by adapting his work on resistance 
in peacebuilding to theorising resistance in IR. However, the theory of  resistance 
that Richmond proposes fails again to historicise the everyday and to materialise 
the subjects of  resistance. His Foucauldian-postcolonial everyday approach sees 
resistance as critical agency that does not just hold power to account, but that 
also offers a real transformative agency as a hidden everyday force (Richmond 
2011b: 422). This transformation is neither ‘governmentalism’ nor ‘revolution’ 
but one that ‘produces a state that is representative and accountable’ (Richmond 
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2011b: 431). Here again, the ‘hybrid’ outcome of  a ‘representative and account-
able state’ is above an account of  resistance. The dynamism of  power relations 
is made static by the possibility of  achieving a common good between resisters 
and their targets.
The everyday framework offers the possibility to observe the commonplace 
presence of  resistance, even when forms of  conscious and organised activism 
are absent. Its study of  practices makes the everyday framework well attuned to 
capture the ambiguities of  power and resistance relations. One of  the most 
important insights from examining resistance in the liberal peace debates is that 
resistance, whether in peacebuilding, globalisation or other processes, is not a 
special kind, rooted in an international/local contention. Rather, resistance 
should be seen as stemming from historical relations of  domination that are 
experienced in everyday life, and that are co-created nationally and internation-
ally. This is not a reification of  unhelpful divides. It is precisely the nuanced ways 
in which the study of  everyday practices captures the interconnections and co-
constitution of  structure and agency, discourse and practice, material and sym-
bolic elements, and micro and macro dynamics that allow us to break with these 
divides.
The everyday framework has much to contribute to help IR to go beyond 
these limitations. Aggie Hirst argues that ‘the emergent scholarship [on resist-
ance] suffer[s] from a common problem in that the forms of  resistance they 
conceptualise are highly susceptible to appropriation by, or reinscription within, 
prevailing forms of  global ordering’ (2015: 7). The resistant subject Hirst calls 
for is ‘an auto-deconstructionist actor committed to viewing her own subject-
hood, as well as her concrete interventions, as a site of  political struggle’ (2015: 
7). Moving from the analytical to the normative account of  resistance is a neces-
sary exercise, but one that does not automatically happen. Hirst does not go into 
the debates around intent, her account points to a conscious resistance against 
the violence, hierarchies and exclusions embedded in global politics. This may 
indeed be the way resistance is more effective, but it does not constitute the only 
form of  resistance there is.
The book has not accounted for forms of  resistance as a route towards politi-
cal change in the form that Richmond or Hirst have proposed. The implication, 
however, is not that the study of  resistance is empty of  ethical forms of  activism 
or revolutionary capacity. Indeed, an important insight from this research has 
been that, despite the war environment and the dominating effects of  state-
making, popular aspirations for justice and well-being not only do not go away, 
they become even more relevant. The argument advanced is that resistance 
cannot be accounted for in Manichean ways. After all, ‘there are not good sub-
jects of  resistance’ (Colin Gordon cited in Scott 1985: vii). Staying away from 
analyses along the ‘unmanly’ divides of  ‘good’ and ‘evil’ is to recognise the 
contradictions embedded in social and political action (Nietzsche 1997: 100). 
Resistance and everyday order in world politics
195
Manichean analyses, as Mbembe argues, have a particular legacy in Africa, as 
part of  ‘a moral economy – whose power of  falsification derives from its opaque 
ties with the cult of  suffering and victimization’ (2002: 630). The implication 
is, Mbembe continues, that the ‘African subject cannot express him- or herself  
in the world other than as a wounded and traumatized subject’ (2002: 630). 
The intention of  the book is to contribute to a breaking up of  these divides. This 
does not mean a rejection of  an ethical commitment to research, but it does seek 
to ‘avoid the philosophical pathology of  demanding that the world reflect our 
conception of  it’ (Hoover and Iñiguez de Heredia 2011: 191).
What these millenarian anthozoans of  resistance mean for the realisation of  
the agendas of  social justice embedded in its practice is another matter (cf. Scott 
1985: xvii). In wondering whether the DRC might have a ‘Tahir Square moment’, 
Stearns argues that the main obstacle to such a moment taking place is lack of  
leadership, whether on the part of  the political opposition or on the part of  social 
movements to channel support around them and build ‘social capital’ (2012d). 
Everyday forms of  resistance are the ‘social capital’ of  revolution, but they 
cannot be theorised as if  they mattered only if  they work towards it. Nonetheless, 
it would be a disservice to the analysis to end with the idea that everyday forms 
of  resistance do not change anything. They do. They are the microscopic rework-
ing of  political and social order. As Certeau states ‘The actual order of  things is 
precisely what “popular” tactics turn to their own ends, without any illusion 
that it will change any time soon’ (1984: 26). Everyday forms of  resistance 
rework meanings, advance agendas, place limitations on how domination is 
imposed and create alternative forms of  social organisation and political author-
ity. These may not be enough to stop war, change the government and the rules 
of  international political economy, but they are an essential basis for more 
meaningful social and political order.
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